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Abstract 
 
The continual expansion in requirements for vehicle features results in a rapidly 
increasing complexity of automotive electronic systems. Automotive electronics exhibit 
properties of systems of systems including that of emergent behaviour and validation 
complexity. This brings with it major financial risks for automotive manufacturers due to 
field failures, launch delays, recalls and loss of customers. The contention of this thesis is 
that robustness, i.e. the ability of a system to avoid service failures resulting from external 
faults, is a key design criterion for automotive electronics as a mass-market system of 
systems. Hence effective tools and techniques for the robust design of complex automotive 
electronic systems are required, but initial research suggests that limited published work on 
robustness, as opposed to safety, has been done in this field. This thesis addresses the 
research question of whether a viable framework of methods to substantially improve 
robustness in the design of complex automotive electronics systems can be developed.  
A literature review is conducted of potential methods for robust design from 
automotive and other domains, which identifies opportunities for contributions to knowledge 
in the following areas. The development of domain knowledge of the prevalence and causes 
of robustness related failures in the area of automotive electronics. The development of a 
“design for robustness” framework for complex automotive electronic systems, which should 
leverage best practices identified during the literature review. Particular items identified to be 
addressed are the adaptation of safety cases to robustness cases and the development of an 
approach to robustness modelling based on understanding of what are important factors to 
model pertaining to robustness of automotive electronics. 
xiv 
A review is conducted of 43 well-documented field issues in the area of automotive 
electronic systems. It is found that these were predominantly (60%) robustness related issues, 
supporting the need for improved techniques. The results confirm robustness issues as 
complex, interactive and emergent in nature which are generally not present during normal 
operation but under transient conditions, in particular during initialisation and shut-down, 
during failures in other systems, as a result of tolerance spread and of unforeseen (ab)use 
cases. 
A design for robustness framework approach is developed incorporating the two 
proposed new methods of “robustness cases” and “robustness modelling”. A “robustness 
case” is a structured argument for the robustness of a system analogous to a safety case. A 
“robustness model” is a model based approach to early robustness verification of complex 
systems. These new methods are developed through their application to case study of 
infotainment and evaluated through subsequent application to a hybrid propulsion system. 
The design methods and artefacts are described in detail, including as generic approaches, 
and the test results from their use are shown and discussed.    
Finally the viability of the methods developed and their contribution to knowledge is 
discussed. The knowledge gained through the study of field issues of root causes of 
robustness issues in automotive electronics ensured the methods were well targeted. From the 
application of the methods to infotainment and hybrid propulsion systems a number of 
positive indicators of the effectiveness of the technique are observed. An analysis is 
conducted of whether the likely benefits would justify the incremental costs of implementing 
the methods. This shows that the methods became viable at the point where they can detect a 
single issue which would otherwise have been undetected until final testing. Deployment 
approaches, known limitations and areas for further work are also described. 
xv 
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1 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
The complexity of electronic systems on premium vehicles continues to increase with 
over 50 Electronic Control units on a premium vehicle and typically 100M lines of code and 
is projected further increase to support the features required for the next generation of 
vehicles (Charette, 2009, Mössinger, 2010). This is creating major financial costs due to field 
failures and even larger risks for automotive companies through launch delay, product 
recalls, warranty costs and loss of customers. The scale of the risk is huge running into tens 
and hundreds of millions of pounds. While safety-related recalls, such as Toyota’s 2010 
recall of 430,000 vehicles related to the software that controls hybrid braking systems 
(Toyota, 2011 p58), receive high levels of publicity, the robustness of electrical and 
electronic systems is concern for all systems. J.D. Power in their 2013 Vehicle Dependability 
Survey (J.D.Power, 2013) found that brand loyalty among owners of premium models 
declines from 55% to 39% if they have experienced three or more problems with their 
vehicle. Such a loss of repeat customers has serious financial implications for vehicle 
manufacturers.  
The availability of tools and techniques for the design of robust complex automotive 
electronic systems will significantly allay the financial risk to automotive companies, whilst 
giving them a major competitive advantage through increasing their capacity to deliver 
sophisticated and innovative products.  
In recent years the phenomenon of Systems of Systems has become recognised as a 
specific type of Complex System affecting many fields including biology, sociology, 
engineering and military where new systems are composed of a number of individual systems 
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with their own levels of autonomy (Bar-Yam et al 2004). There are a number definitions of 
system of systems (Maier 1998), (Boardman and Sauser 1996), (Bar-Yam et al 2004) but 
significant properties are autonomy of elements, evolutionary development, heterogeneous 
elements, sharing of resources, geographic distribution and emergent behaviour.   
Emergent behaviour is an unanticipated interaction between systems which can be 
either positive or negative. The potential for positive behaviour has been utilised in software 
systems based on collaborating agents to outperform conventional distributed control systems 
(Li, Sim & Low 2006). Negative behaviour can result in partial or full loss of service by one 
or more systems within the System or Systems.  
Automotive electrical and electronics systems can also be described in terms of a 
System of Systems (McMurran 2006) which exhibits these properties but also has the 
resultant issues of emergent behaviour and validation complexity as the state space of the 
overall system increases exponentially. The contention of this thesis is that robustness, i.e. 
the ability of a system to avoid service failures resulting from external faults, is a key design 
criteria for automotive electronics as amass-market system of systems. 
Techniques for achieving robust electrical and software based systems within 
automotive are a major issue for the industry as the traditional techniques, based around 
component or individual systems, are proving increasingly limited as system complexity 
increases 
Initial review of published work suggests that little work has been done within the 
automotive electronics field on designing for robustness at a Systems of Systems level. There 
are some approaches being taken within other fields and there are some existing practices 
which may be extensible but no clear framework has been established for this. The 
contribution of this work is the establishment and proving of such a framework and the 
development of new techniques supporting this approach. 
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1.2 Objectives 
The high level research question this thesis addresses is whether a framework of 
methods to substantially improve robustness in the design of complex automotive electronics 
systems can be developed which is viable, in terms of cost and time versus expected benefits. 
This should result in both fewer failure modes in new designs and products which are 
resilient to external faults. This framework will integrate state of the art methods in 
automotive development and develop and adapt methods from other domains. 
To achieve this aim of developing a framework for robust design of complex 
automotive electronics a number of objectives must be achieved. Firstly the actual root 
causes of issues due to lack of robustness in design must be understood to ensure the focus of 
the work is correct. This will establish a context to understand the strengths and weaknesses 
of current techniques and tools used in automotive development and to review the 
applicability of tools and techniques from other domains. This then should enable the 
research and proposal of a framework for design for robustness and the identification of 
requirements for the development of new methods to support this framework. A major part of 
this work is to develop new approaches for the automotive domain which have the most 
potential to enhance capability for robust design. Two specific new methods are developed 
within this thesis. Firstly “robustness cases” which are structured arguments for the 
robustness of a system or system of systems analogous to a safety case. Secondly a method of 
“robustness modelling” to allow analysis of properties relevant to robustness of a system or 
system of systems is developed. Finally the added value and viability of the new methods and 
framework should be assessed and quantified.  
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1.3 Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews and appraises background literature on automotive electronics, complex 
systems, techniques used in their design, including modelling and safety cases, and 
validation methods covering the state of the art approaches within automotive but also 
in other relevant fields particularly aerospace and defense. 
Chapter 3 gives the results of a review of 43 case studies undertaken to understand the 
nature of issues in automotive electronic systems which have not been detected by 
normal design and development methods to confirm if robustness is indeed a 
significant factor and issues with current approaches.  
Chapter 4 utilises understanding of the actual causes of robustness issues in complex 
automotive electronics and the knowledge of applicable techniques derived from the 
literature review to propose a Design for Robustness Framework for automotive 
electronics.    
Chapter 5 develops the two new methods proposed in the Design for Robustness Framework 
of “robustness modelling” and “robustness cases” through their application to the 
design of the control channel of an infotainment system networked by a MOST high 
speed optical-fiber ring. 
Chapter 6 evaluates and demonstrates the wider applicability of the two methods developed 
in Chapter 5 through their application in combination to the initialisation of a hybrid 
electric vehicle control system.  
Chapter 7 discusses the findings from the work, specifically whether it answers the research 
question of a viable framework of methods to substantially improve robustness in the 
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design of complex automotive electronics systems can be developed and considers 
where specifically contributions to knowledge have been achieved. 
Chapter 8 summarises key conclusions from the thesis and highlights areas of future work to 
improve the robustness of complex systems. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a literature review is conducted to: define terminology, understand the 
nature of complex systems and review potential methods which could be employed to 
improve their robustness. Initially the review seeks to clarify concepts of robustness and 
complex systems of systems. Subsequently there is a review and appraisal of background 
literature on automotive electronics to confirm the level of complexity, associated issues and 
existing approaches to managing complexity. Next the state of the art approaches for the 
design and validation of complex systems are reviewed, including modelling and safety 
cases, not only from automotive but also in other relevant fields particularly aerospace and 
defense. Finally conclusions are drawn regarding where the most significant opportunities are 
for new research within the context of this thesis. 
 
2.2 Robustness 
As this thesis is fundamentally about robustness it is important to understand what is 
meant by the concept of robustness in this context and in particular what distinguishes this 
from similar concepts such as reliability and dependability. 
Avižienis, Laprie, Randell and Landwehr (2004) propose definitions of dependability 
and related concepts as well as a taxonomy showing how they are related.  Their stated intent 
in doing this was to give a set of definitions that would enable communications across 
scientific and technical communities in the field of dependable and secure computing and 
these definitions are now widely cited. They class robustness as a specialized secondary 
attribute of dependability “dependability with respect to external faults, which characterizes 
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a system reaction to a specific class of faults”, although they do not elaborate further on the 
specific class of faults. From a software perspective McConnell (2004) defines the concepts 
of correctness, robustness and reliability as follows. 
“Correctness: The degree to which a system is free from [defects] in its specification, 
design, and implementation. Robustness: The degree to which a system continues to function 
in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions. Reliability: The 
ability of a system to perform its requested functions under stated conditions whenever 
required - having a long mean time between failures.” 
Similar definitions are also given by Meyer (1997) for correctness relating to meeting 
specifications and robustness being the ability to react appropriately to abnormal conditions, 
but he defines reliability as being a concern encompassing correctness and robustness”..   
The standard for automotive functional safety ISO26262 (ISO, 2011) defines a robust 
design as “a design that has the ability to function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs 
or stressful environmental conditions”. 
Coming from a mechanical perspective Wang, Wu, and Lust (1997) state “robustness 
can be defined in terms of reliability being least sensitive to variations in the statistics (such 
as means and standard deviations) of the random variables while still meeting design cost 
and performance targets”.   
Common to both mechanical and software definitions is that robustness is more 
concerned with ensuring specified functionality is maintained over the widest possible input 
conditions, including variation in mechanical parts and fault conditions, as opposed to 
reliability which is concerned with reducing the occurrence of faults in the first case. 
However it is also clear that robustness must be defined relative to other concepts such as 
dependability, reliability, faults and failures to be able to use an unambiguous fashion. 
Avižienis et al (2004) in defining an overall taxonomy of terms related to dependability and 
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security provides a good basis for doing this. This taxonomy splits into three key areas of: the 
attributes of dependability and security, the threats to dependability and security and the 
means of achieving dependability and security. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and will be 
subsequently explained adopting the same approach as the authors in highlighting key terms 
in bold. 
 
Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of dependability and security related terms from Avižienis et al (2004) 
 
Avižienis et al (2004) give two definitions of dependability. They give the original 
definition of dependability as “the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted”. 
However they then go on to give an alternate definition as “the dependability of a system is 
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the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is 
acceptable”. These definitions are compatible but with differing emphasis. The first 
definition focusses on justification of trust, while the second on the criterion for what is 
acceptable, clearly both of these aspects need to be considered. 
They then list what they consider to be the primary attributes related to dependability 
and security which they define as: 
• “availability: readiness for correct service;” 
• “reliability: continuity of correct service;” 
• “safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment;” 
• “integrity: absence of improper system alterations;” 
• “maintainability: ability to undergo modifications, and repairs.” 
They then examine the threats to dependability and security in the relationships 
between them. A service failure, often abbreviated to failure, is defined as ‘an event that 
occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service”. They note that this 
deviation can be due to a system not complying with its functional specification or because 
the functional specification did not specify required system functions adequately to 
implement the desired service. They also note that service failures can vary in time (service 
outage), may assume different forms (service failure modes) and have varying levels of 
consequence (failure severities). They also highlight partial failures whereby the system 
may react to faults by adopting a degraded mode implementing a specified subset of services 
to the user. Their classification scheme does not restrict failures to service failures but also 
includes development failures whereby a system does not reach operation as the 
development is never completed and dependability failures whereby service failures occur 
at an unacceptable level. 
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They define an error as “the part of the total state of the system that may lead to its 
subsequent service failure”. The cause of an error is a fault, which can be internal or external 
to the system. They classify faults under 3 overlapping groups of development faults which 
occur during the development of a system, physical faults that affect hardware and 
interaction faults that include all external faults. They introduce a more detailed 
classification of faults which will be used in Chapter 3 to classify faults seen on real systems. 
They also note that internal faults can be dormant until an external fault occurs makes it 
active which they term a vulnerability.  
This then creates a relationship (or “pathology of failure”) between faults, errors and 
failures, illustrated in Figure 2.2, whereby an internal or external fault can lead to an error 
which can lead to service failure either directly or indirectly through causing other errors. 
This service failure can itself propagate to other system components which are dependent on 
the service causing input errors that can lead to service failures. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Error propagation from Avižienis et al (2004) 
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Avižienis et al then introduce the concept of reproducibility as “the ability to identify 
the activation pattern of a fault that had caused one or more errors”, then differentiate 
between faults which are easily reproduced as solid or hard faults and those which are 
difficult to reproduce as elusive or soft faults. They go on to note that “most residual 
development faults in large and complex software are elusive faults: they are intricate 
enough that their activation conditions depend on complex combinations of internal state 
and external requests, that occur rarely and can be very difficult to reproduce”. 
Last area of the taxonomy deals with the means to achieve dependability and security 
which are split into 4 categories: 
• “fault prevention: means to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults;” 
• “fault tolerance: means to avoid service failures in the presence of faults;” 
• “fault removal: means to reduce the number and severity of faults;” 
• “fault forecasting: means to estimate the present number, the future incidence, and 
the likely consequences of faults.” 
Fault tolerance requires error detection to detect a deviation from the correct system 
state which can be done during normal service delivery (concurrent detection) checking or 
errors caused by active faults or while normal service delivery suspended (pre-emptive 
detection) checking for errors caused by transient errors or dormant faults. Having detected 
an error then a recovery mechanism is required to return the system to a correct state. This 
can be achieved by error handling to move the system to a correct state and fault handling 
to prevent faults re-occurring. 
Terms are identified for four activities relating to fault removal. Verification is defined 
as “the process of checking whether the system adheres to given properties” and has sub-
classes of static verification and dynamic verification depending on whether the actual 
system is exercised. Under this definition model based testing is a type of static verification. 
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If required properties are not adhered to then diagnosis and correction has to occur to 
identify and remove the underlying fault or mechanism that allows fault to lead to an error. 
Having corrected a fault it is necessary to perform non-regression verification to ensure 
there are no side-effects of the change. Fault forecasting is defined as “performing an 
evaluation of the system behavior with respect to fault”. This can be done using an ordinal 
or qualitative evaluation that aims to identify, classify and rank mechanisms that would 
lead to failures or through probabilistic evaluation which evaluates the probability of 
attributes being satisfied through either modelling or operational testing. 
ISO26262 (ISO 2011) a significant standard in the automotive domain is aligned with 
the definitions given by Avižienis et al. It also follows a fault, error, failure causality 
paradigm. A fault is defined as an “abnormal condition that can cause an element or an item 
to fail” and it is noted that faults can be permanent, intermittent or transient in nature. It 
defines an error as a “discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or 
condition, and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition”. Hence an error 
is defined as a state of the system not necessarily as a cause of failure or as a consequence to 
the user and it is noted that an error can be due to a fault or unforeseen operating condition, 
i.e. incomplete specification. A failure is defined as the “termination of the ability of an 
element to perform a function as required” and again notes that incorrect specification is a 
source of failure. An incorrect specification would be one which fails to request the desired 
behaviour of a system through misinterpretation or omission of stakeholder requirements. 
Given this correlation of definitions it is reasonable to use the definitions given by Avižienis 
et al in the domain context of this thesis. 
Hence for this thesis the definition of robustness used will be that given by Avižienis et 
al of robustness being “the dependability of a system with respect to external faults”. Under 
this definition it is still equivalent to McConnell’s (2004) definition of robustness as “the 
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degree to which a system continues to function in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful 
environmental conditions”, stressful environmental conditions being a mechanism for a 
physical faults or interaction faults in the taxonomy given by Avižienis et al. Hence it can be 
inferred that a robust system is one that is resilient to external faults. Based on error 
propagation models in Avižienis et al (2004), Figure 2.3 illustrates this definition of a 
robustness failure being the result of an external fault to the system delivering the service. 
The thick black box represents the boundary of the system controlling the service delivery, 
the solid arrows show the error and fault propagation and the dashed arrows show  activation 
patterns. It is important to note the distinction between a robustness failure which must have 
an error propagated by an external fault and a failure due to an elusive internal fault in which 
the fault may be difficult to reproduce, due to a complex activation pattern or a low failure 
rate, but does not contain an input error with respect to the specified interface.   
 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of robustness & conventional failures. 
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From the definitions given by Avižienis et al (2004) further definitions can be derived 
to be used in this thesis. A robustness fault is an internal fault within a system that is 
instigated by an external fault or activation conditions. This is noting that the failure 
mechanism may be through triggering a dormant internal fault. An acceptably robust system 
is one whose behaviour in the presence of external faults correctly implements specified 
services to the user which may be a limited subset defined in a degraded mode. A 
robustness-related failure is a service failure as a result of a fault external to the service 
delivery system. 
 
2.3 Complex Systems of Systems 
Most sources agree that what distinguishes the complex from the complicated is the 
property of interconnectedness i.e. having many connections between the parts or elements. 
This is most well defined by Lissack and Roos (2000) who cite the origin of the syllable 
“plex” in the word “complex” as deriving from the Latin to weave. This interconnectedness 
creates difficulty in modelling and predicting behaviours of such systems which has created a 
whole new discipline of Complexity Science concerned with the concept of emergence. 
The origins of Complexity Science can be traced back to the 1940s notably a landmark 
paper “Science and Complexity” by Warren Weaver (1948). In this paper Weaver shows the 
difference between complicated problems, which he refers to as “disorganised complexity” 
which are amenable to statistical analysis, and complex problems, which he refers to as 
“organised complexity” which are not. Weaver goes on to state, with considerable foresight, 
that two key wartime advances of computing and multidisciplinary approaches may hold the 
key to tackling such problems. 
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Since Weaver’s paper there has been a massive amount of, mainly theoretical, work in 
the field of Complexity Science. A good overview of Complexity Theory is given by Lucas 
(2000) in which he states that “Complexity Theory states that critically interacting 
components self-organise to form potentially evolving structures exhibiting a hierarchy of 
emergent system properties”. He goes on to state that “this theory takes the view that systems 
are best regarded as wholes, and studied at such, rejecting that additional emphasis on 
simplification and reduction as inadequate techniques” due to the inherent nonlinearity of 
strongly interconnected systems.  
Lucas goes on to describe four different types of complexity. Type 1 is “Static 
Complexity” which is concerned with invariant structures such as hardware. Type 2 is 
“Dynamic Complexity” which recognises the temporal nature of dynamic interactions. Type 3 
is “Evolving Complexity” which recognises organic behaviour within a system. Type 4 is 
“Self-Organising Complexity” which recognises the ability of systems to co-evolve with their 
environment.  
In recent years a specific type of complex system has been identified as Systems of 
Systems (SoS) which are comprised by linking of a number of existing systems together to 
deliver higher levels of functionality or to share resources. Such Systems of Systems are 
becoming increasingly prevalent in engineered systems through using local and wide area 
communications.  Despotou (2011) in his paper “Introducing the Challenges of Dependable 
Systems of Systems” discusses the difficulty in making claims (particularly safety related) 
about the overall performance of a System of Systems pointing out  that “failures in a system 
may propagate through collaboration between elements and transform into different types of 
failures, eventually manifesting as hazards”.  
Hence systems with planned interactions exhibit complexity that increases with the 
number and type of interactions, resulting in emergent behaviours including fault propagation 
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which are very difficult to predict. The next section on automotive electronics will review 
technology approaches being taken in this field, consider which of these types of complexity 
is present in current and future systems and the degree to which this is affecting the 
automotive industry. 
 
2.4 Automotive Electronic Systems 
2.4.1 Complexity of Automotive Electronic Systems 
A typical Electronic Architecture for a premium vehicle is illustrated in Figure 2.4 
based on examples from Audi (Marstaller 2013), BMW (Reichart and Heinecke 2006) and 
Jaguar-Land-Rover (Rivett 2013). The Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are typically 
networked by several domain-orientated CAN (Controller Area Network) buses connected 
via a Gateway module, a high-speed infotainment bus such as MOST (Media Orientated 
System Transport) and a number of sub buses typically using the LIN (Local Interconnect 
Network) protocol. 
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Figure 2.4 – Typical electronic architecture for a premium vehicle 
 
Estimates suggest that a modern premium vehicle has between 70 and 100 ECUs and 
around 100M lines of code (Charette, 2009, Mössinger, 2010). An earlier figure for premium 
cars is up to 70 ECUs in 2004 but noting a trend for a tenfold increase of memory usage 
every 4 years on BMW products (Frischkorn 2004). This highlights that the major increase of 
automotive complexity is in software based functions rather than hardware where the overall 
number of ECU is no longer increasing significantly but each has increasing levels of 
functionality. This is supported by the increasing processing power and memory size of 
ECUs which are becoming open platforms for multiple software applications rather than 
dedicated to a particular function and through increasing networking bandwidth between 
ECUs (Mössinger, 2010).  
Automotive electronics has been shown to exhibit the commonly agreed properties of a 
system of systems including autonomy of elements, evolutionary development, 
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heterogeneous elements, sharing of resources, geographic distribution and emergent 
behaviour (McMurran, McKinney, Tudor and Milam  2006).  
A further dimension of the complexity of automotive electronic systems is through 
being real-time embedded systems. Herman Kopetz, one of the foremost authorities on the 
design of distributed systems, defines a real-time computer as “one where the correctness of 
the system behaviour depends not only on the logical results of the computations but also on 
the time when these are produced” (Kopetz 2011, p19). He goes on to note that real-time 
computer systems are always part of larger real-time systems and that these are often part of 
distributed systems where nodes are connected by a real-time communication network. He 
also makes the distinction between hard real-time systems where deadlines must be met 
under all conditions and soft ones where there are no deadlines or it is permissible to miss 
deadlines occasionally. He also describes embedded systems as products with real-time 
computer based control systems and notes typical characteristics of these including; being 
designed for a mass market, having a man-machine interface, a tendency towards static 
structures analyzable at design time that are more robust, a maintenance strategy and limited 
amounts of energy.  From these definitions it can be seen that an automotive electronics 
network is a distributed, hard real-time, embedded system as it encompasses hard deadlines 
in interacting with users and systems under control such as engines, brakes, etc. and makes 
extensive use of real-time communications such as CAN busses. 
 
2.4.2 Impact of Increasing Complexity of Automotive Electronic Systems 
The scale and seriousness of the issues of managing complex software faced by the 
automotive industry is underlined by the following comments made by Mark Chernoby, the 
Senior VP for Engineering of Chrysler, in a recent interview reported by Ponticel (2013). 
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“By far the biggest challenge right now is managing software. The software on vehicle 
has grown to millions and millions of lines of code, done by a wide range of suppliers, some 
of it internal, some of it external, and each one off in a corner doing their own little work. 
Getting this software to work right, to talk together at the right time, to perform the right 
functions, by far I think is the biggest challenge we face today, in my view.” 
The problems of increasing complexity are also recognised by key industry and 
academic leaders in Europe too including Heinecke et al (2008) who state “The OEMs are 
generally struggling to understand and control the emerging behavior of the complex 
distributed functions, resulting from the integration of subsystems.” 
Kopetz (2011 p19) states "Automotive manufacturers view the proper exploitation of 
computer technology as a key competitive element in the never ending quest for increased 
vehicle performance and reduced manufacturing costs". This is reflected in some 
manufacturers setting up specific divisions to focus on these technologies e.g. BMW Car IT 
Gmbh (www.bmw-carit.com), Audi Electronics Venture Gmbh (www.audi-electronics-
venture.com) and VW subsidiary Carmeq GmbH  (www.carmeq.de ). 
The problem for automotive is not just one of increasing complexity but also 
compounded by the relatively short lifecycles for such a complex product. Heinecke (2010) 
from BMW refers to this as “Dynaxity” a portmanteau of dynamic, which he relates to rate of 
change and complexity, which he relates to the number of system elements and the number 
and type of connections. Heineike also notes the differences in lifecycles between different 
functional areas of the vehicle, especially those driven by consumer electronics that will 
require continual updates. The updating of parts of a complex system then leads to problems 
of ensuring compatibility with the existing parts (Frischkorn, H., 2004, Pretschner, Broy, 
Krüger and Stauner, 2007). 
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However whilst the general issues of increasing complexity of automotive electronic 
systems are acknowledged, the industry is naturally reticent to publish specific figures 
relating to the incidence and cost of these issues. To give a quantitative view on the incidence 
of issues published data from Warranty Direct Reliability Index (2013) was analyzed. The 
data covers some 50,000 vehicles they have under warranty of varying age and mileage 
providing they have at least 50 examples of particular model. There is a breakdown of the 
average percentage of faults in vehicles under warranty into component areas which was used 
to do a comparative analysis shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Comparative analysis of source of vehicle faults from Warranty Direct Reliability 
Index 2013 
 
The results show electrical components to be the biggest source of failure by some 
margin noting that the high figures for axle & suspension include items which would be 
expected to wear out such as joints, rubber boots and shock absorbers. What these results will 
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not show is the early life failures which are covered under the manufacturer’s warranty; it is 
likely software related failures would be detected and rectified during this period. 
Further evidence of issues in the public domain is where manufacturers have to do 
safety-related recalls to proactively fix a fault. Recalls are a major issue for car 
manufacturers in terms of customer dissatisfaction, loss of brand image and cost. There have 
been several high profile recalls due to safety related software issues (Charette, R. N. 2009) 
most recently that GM are recalling about 33,700 vehicles to fix a software issue (Reuters 
2013). As the vast majority of software in a vehicle is not safety-related and not subject to 
recalls, issues are not in the public domain but it is reasonable to assume that these occur at 
far higher incidence rates than safety related issues due to greater amount of code and not 
being subject to as high a degree of rigour in development process. This assessment is also 
shared by partners in the ATESST project which included OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers who 
state “as much as 35% of vehicle failures today stem from errors related to embedded 
systems, forecasted to reach 63% in 2010 if no action plan is considered” (Cuenot et al 
2007). 
 
2.4.3 Existing approaches to managing Complexity of Automotive Electronic Systems 
Two prominent industry figures Mössinger (2010) of Robert Bosch and Heinecke 
(2010) of BMW both conclude that to cope with complexity and rate of change, standards for 
open systems and sharing and reuse of software are absolutely vital, Heinecke referring to it 
as “the Survival Strategy”.  
The major automotive initiative in this respect is AUTOSAR (Automotive Open 
System Architecture), which aims to create a standard operating environment of basic 
software as illustrated in Figure 2.6 (www.autosar.org). On top of standardized basic software 
components AUTOSAR middleware gives a run time environment (RTE) which is common 
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to all ECUs and supports the sharing, reuse and flexible deployment of software components 
with an AUTOSAR interface. 
 
Figure 2.6 AUTOSAR Automotive Open System Architecture (www.autosar.org) 
 
As well as the base layer software and run time environment AUTOSAR also includes 
an underlying methodology and toolset for the deployment of software functions. This is 
done initially through linking software components through a Virtual Functional Bus (VFB) 
which abstracts communication layer away from the application software hence improving 
composability (the ability to guarantee that a component property is preserved when 
23 
integrated) and reusability of software components (Heinecke, Damm, Josko, Metzner, 
Kopetz,Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, and Di Natale, 2008). This is illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 AUTOSAR process for deploying standard software components (AUTOSAR 
2013) 
 
The AUTOSAR methodology uses a series of design artefacts, such as ECU 
descriptions, system constraint descriptions and interface databases, and tools which enforce 
a contractual approach to the interactions between software functions. In a related initiative 
called Artop, an AUTOSAR Tool Platform or ecosystem is being developed to create an 
integrated development environment (IDE) for standard AUTOSAR tools and more advanced 
tools to enhance the design and development process (Knüchel, Rudorfer, Voget, Eberle, 
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Sezestre and Loyer 2010). The structure for the Artop tool platform is illustrated in Figure 
2.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Artop AUTOSAR Tool Platform (Artop 2013) 
 
AUTOSAR is not the only automotive open-source initiative. The GENIVI initiative is 
driving the broad adoption of an In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) open-source development 
platform based on a Linux operating system (GENIVI 2013). From a robustness perspective 
the opportunity from having standardised software elements must be balanced against the 
risks of taking commercial off-the-shelf software from a wider and potentially less mature 
supplier base. 
Another area highlighted by Mössinger (2010) and Heinecke (2010) where there are 
significant developments is that area of higher bandwidth and more deterministic networking 
protocols such as Flexray and Ethernet.  Heinecke et al (2008) note that these busses can 
support new more integrated topologies with less physical interconnections and ECUs and 
supporting the partitioning of a single physical communication channel to reduce temporal 
interference and improve error containment. 
Flexray was first introduced by BMW,  Schedl (2007) gives the motivation for this is be 
driven by CAN bus bandwidth limitations, unacceptable delays caused by multiple gateways 
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and unacceptable levels of complexity using multiple CAN buses. This led to additional costs 
for system integration and warranty and a need for deterministic behaviour. More recent 
work (Scheickl, Ainhauser, Gliwa, 2012) has used timing extensions from the AUTOSAR 
environment to apply tools for the specification and verification of timing constraints to 
optimally exploit Flexray network’s deterministic capabilities. 
Hyung-Taek, Volker and Herrscher (2011) note there is a gathering pace for higher 
bandwidth and lower cost busses initially for diagnostics and software updates and as a lower 
cost higher bandwidth infotainment bus but future potential to provide additional high speed 
data communication between larger ECUs, for instance for future driver assistance 
applications. Figure 2.9 illustrates a roll-out strategy for Automotive Ethernet described by 
Hank, Suermann and Müller (2012) culminating an automotive Time-Triggered version 
providing a high bandwidth deterministic network backbone. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Roll-out strategy for Automotive Ethernet described by Hank, Suermann and 
Müller (2012) 
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Finally the other key approach adopted within the automotive industry, noted by 
Mössinger (2010) and Heinecke (2010) among others, is model based development methods. 
To date the main focus of this has been at a functional level to support the auto-coding of 
software from models but is now starting to be used at higher levels to model systems and 
architectures which will be further examined in Section 2.9. 
 
2.5 Agile Software Development Methods 
If software development is one of the major challenges of coping with complexity for 
the automotive industry then it is worthwhile considering what lessons can be learned in the 
wider software development community. One of the key developments in this field is that of 
the practice of agile software development. Highsmith, one of the founding fathers and 
leading proponents of agile software techniques, defines agility as “the ability to both create 
and respond to change in order to profit in a turbulent business environment” and “the 
ability to balance flexibility and stability” Highsmith (2004). 
Larman (2004) describes how software developers have learned that software 
development is subject to emergent behaviour and have adopted agile and iterative 
development techniques. An early software development model was the waterfall model 
whereby the outputs of one stage cascade to the next stage and the outputs are developed in a 
linear sequential fashion. This model has been augmented to add a mirror image test and 
validation stream in the V-Model. This model also has been adopted on a wider basis e.g. 
vehicle product development system is often based on a V-Model. However in practice there 
are issues in implementing sequential models as projects become more complex and difficult 
to predict. The key learning from the software development community from the widespread 
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adoption of agile practices for successfully delivering complex products is to conduct 
iterative and incremental development which leads to progressive integration and testing. 
 
2.6 Quality methods 
This section reviews “traditional” quality methods used within automotive industry to 
consider their applicability to robustness of complex electronic systems. 
 
2.6.1 Failure Mode Avoidance (FMA) 
The standard approach within automotive to eliminating failure modes is through 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) which is formalised in SAE standard J1739 
(SAE 2009). FMEAs have traditionally been reliability focused and have dealt with hardware 
failure modes which has limited use in the context of robustness which encompasses 
variations and non-transient events.  
Campean and Henshall (2012) recognise the challenges of complexity in automotive 
electronics and advocate a combination of failure mode avoidance (FMA) based on quality 
techniques such as FMEA, interface matrix, P diagram, boundary diagram, with systems 
engineering. They propose an approach for failure mode avoidance with increased emphasis 
on function and specific attention to interfaces. Much of their proposed methodology is good 
practice and inherent in systems engineering.  For example the authors introduce techniques 
for functional analysis e.g. System State Flow Diagram as new techniques, however 
fundamentally these appear similar to existing diagrams within established  modelling 
languages, such as the Systems Modelling Language (SysML), which are already relatively 
mature with supporting toolsets. 
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From complex systems perspective the biggest concern is that the methodology 
proposed by Campean and Henshall does not appear to take into account emergent behaviour 
with their stated FMA paradigm vision of “right first time through design” and reliance on 
desktop analysis methods. This is counter to the experience from agile software development 
methods which recognise that software development is inherently “discoverative”, i.e. some 
aspects of the design will only become apparent during its implementation, and the need for 
an incremental iterative approach. A more realistic approach for complex systems  is failure 
mode discovery not failure mode avoidance. Failure mode avoidance is useful but 
insufficient for complex systems where is not possible to anticipate failure modes without 
actually implementing the design. 
Recent work by Johannesson, Bergman, Svensson,, Arvidsson, Lönnqvist, Barone, and 
Maré, (2013) has suggested methods of extending FMEA to incorporate robustness issues 
notably through tools for handling failures due to variation. They discuss uncertainties in 
design due to noise factors effecting the system but also in terms of uncertainty due to lack of 
knowledge in the fidelity of a model or of true customer usage patterns. They suggest the use 
of Ishikawa (fishbone) diagrams to investigate the sources of variation while noting the 
importance of a thorough understanding of the problem area. They then propose a Variation 
Mode and Effects Analysis (VMEA) which can be repeated through the design phases as 
understanding of noise factors increases. The VMEA consists of understanding the sensitivity 
of key product characteristics (KPCs) to noise factors (NFs), this is done initially by expert 
judgment firstly by a rating on a coarse scale then a wider scale they term a sensitivity fan. 
Subsequently when analytical or numerical relationships are known then a “probabilistic 
VMEA” could be carried out. The focus of the methodology seems to be purely mechanical 
systems and it is not clear how this would take into account more complex interrelationships, 
large scale systems or discontinuous nature of electronic or software based systems. 
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2.6.2 Design for Six Sigma 
Yang and El-Haik (2003) give a comprehensive overview of Design for Six Sigma 
(DFSS). They state that the ultimate goal of DFSS to “design it right the first time” by 
anticipating the effect of conceptual or operational design vulnerabilities. Again this 
assumption of designing it right first time is in conflict with the property of  emergence found 
within complex systems. 
Yang and El-Haik attribute conceptual vulnerabilities to the violation of design axioms 
and principles.  The first axiom is to maintain the independence of the functional 
requirements to reduce coupling, i.e. to ensure design parameters can be changed while only 
affecting a single functional requirements. The second axiom is that the best design should be 
the one with the least information content. The less information specified to manufacture or 
produce the design, the less complex it is. While these axioms may work for purely 
mechanical systems they are implausible for complex electronics and software based systems 
where they are by definition interdependent and typically suffer from insufficient 
specification. 
Yang and El-Haik attribute operational design vulnerabilities to the lack of robustness 
in the use environment.  A P-diagram is used to understand noise factors and to minimize 
their impact on the desired output. This is through developing a transfer function in a form of 
a mathematical or an analytical model to predict the optimum combination of design 
parameters that minimise the effects of variation. Again applying this approach to more 
complex electro-mechanical systems would be much more difficult due to the complexity of 
defining the transfer function. 
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2.7 Design Methods for Robust Systems 
In this section approaches taken in across various domains to designing robust complex 
systems will be reviewed. 
 
2.7.1 Design principles for complex systems 
Schulz and Fricke (1999) identify robustness as one of 4 critical characteristics of a 
system architecture to support their concept of “Design For Changeability”. This is 
robustness to failures resulting from changes in the systems design and configuration as part 
of  an ability for an architecture to evolve but this property is also important whereby an 
architecture may have high variant complexity as is typical in automotive.  They then identify 
the basic design axioms that they correlate to robustness in this context as; Ideality/Simplicity 
- systems with only necessary functions and simple interfaces with loose coupling but strong 
cohesion across modules, Independence - such that changes in one part of the system do not 
require changes in other parts, modularity/encapsulation again reflecting need for strong 
cohesion but loose coupling, as well as redundancy and reliability. 
This need for simplicity in interfaces is consistently stressed by Kopetz. In Kopetz 
(1999) he argues in order to cope with the complexity of distributed real-time systems it is 
necessary to decompose them into autonomous elements with simple “elementary” interfaces 
to support “composability”.  Composability means that a property of the constituent parts e.g. 
timeliness and accuracy of data, ability to perform a function, of the system will still hold 
true when the system is integrated. An elementary interface is one which is unidirectional e.g. 
one node broadcasting out a continuously updated value. A composite interface is one where 
there has to be an interaction between nodes e.g. handshaking where an acknowledgement is 
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required or queuing whereby the send has to wait for the receiver to clear their incoming 
message queue before transmit can be successful.  
Kopetz goes on to classify interfaces as; Event triggered, Client Server or Time 
Triggered. Event triggered interfaces are where an event leads to a single message hence each 
message must be received and acted on by the receiver according to the temporal order of 
events. While holding the potential to be fast acting in a simple system, this may not be 
maintained in a more complex system with many incoming messages. A further evolution of 
this is the client-server interface where a request response transaction takes place, whereby 
the initial request is an example of an event triggered interaction hence having the same 
issues of composability. Time triggered interfaces are of the elementary type whereby a 
status signal is periodically broadcast to a predetermined schedule which the receivers 
monitor and take action when a specific condition becomes true. In this case the control flow 
is unidirectional and provided the update rate is adequate is fully composable. From the 
author’s experience all types are used within automotive. The tendency within CAN 
networks is to use time triggered approach or a hybrid of events and time triggered whereby a 
change in status of a broadcast signal is indicated by an update bit. This means a receiver has 
only to continually monitor the update bit. However within MOST infotainment networks the 
control is based on a composite approach, the implications of this are examined in Chapter 4. 
 
2.7.2 Fault tolerance design approaches 
The "Byzantine Generals Problem" was used in a landmark paper by Lamport, Shostak, 
and Pease (1982) to illustrate issues of fault tolerance in computer systems whereby in the 
presence of one or more malfunctioning parts (or traitorous generals in the illustration) 
algorithms must be used to ensure the properly functioning parts of the system can reach 
agreement. The original paper postulated solutions for getting correct agreement but noting 
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that this is only achieved with inherently expensive solutions, in terms of time and resources, 
unless assumptions are made about the type of failure. 
Some 20 years later Driscoll, Hall, Sivencrona, and Zumsteg (2003) review Byantine 
failure properties and “difficulties” in approaches to fault tolerance from a practitioner’s 
perspective. They state that humans have difficulty in relating to and understanding the 
significance of extremely low incidence faults and incorrectly assuming them to occur with 
zero or low probability, whereas in fact such problems can be caused by many known failure 
mechanisms. They point out studies which suggest with increasing speed and decreasing 
geometries the reliability of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) integrated circuits is 
decreasing. They also highlight increasing use of distributed systems for high integrity 
applications, such as automotive "X by wire", where consensus is required across the system. 
Both of these factors increase the need to avoid Byzantine failures where consensus actions 
are required yet industry has apparently not given as much consideration as academia.  
Driscoll et al. (2003) give a typical example of a Byzantine problem as a logic signal 
stuck or during an extended rise time being at an indeterminate voltage level whereby 
multiple receivers can interpret the signal differently depending on their own thresholds.  
Another example is an event that occurs exactly on its deadline which is seen as some 
observers as acceptable but not by others due to very small differences in clock 
synchronisation. A further example was a badly terminated signal bus causing reflections 
which led to different signals depending whether receivers were at a node or an anti-node.   
They also give an example whereby one type of aircraft was nearly grounded despite 
being designed with high levels of redundancy as an unforeseen systematic fault occurred in 
the supposedly independent elements. They note the use of Time Triggered communications 
protocols developed for automotive which allow synchronisation of nodes and deterministic 
communications, gaining acceptance within aerospace but have concerns this leaves the 
33 
protocol itself vulnerable to Byzantine failures citing tests where fault injection has caused 
individual nodes in a system to divide into two cliques. 
They also note that a common fallacy is to assume low incidence faults occur 
uniformly distributed in time whereas in practice the precipitating events may occur at 
specific times which will cause them to be clustered.  
They identify 3 generic approaches illustrated with examples to dealing with Byzantine 
failures.  The first approach is “Full Exchange”, as used in SPIDER (Scalable Processor 
Independent Design for Electromagnetic Resilience), which is based on the approach 
suggested in the original Byzantine Generals paper with peer to peer communications 
between all nodes. The second approach is “Hierarchical Exchange”, used in Honeywell's 
SAFEbus, which uses private exchanges within sub-sets of nodes then exchanges between the 
sub-sets. The final approach is “Filtering” used in TTP (Time Triggered Protocol) star 
topology whereby a truly independent bus guardian is added to filter any asymmetric 
manifestations of known types of Byzantine fault, such as delayed signals. They note that a 
form of filtering is also used in other approaches by discounting nodes from subsequent 
rounds of exchanges. 
Driscoll et al (2003) make a final statement on practical approaches to Byzantine 
failures as follows, “Anyone designing a system with high dependability requirements must 
thoroughly understand these failures and how to combat them.”  
Arora and Kulkarni (1998) seek to simplify achieving fault tolerance by splitting the 
task between two classes of components one termed “Detectors” and the other “correctors”. 
Detectors are system components which ascertain whether a system is working correctly and 
include error detection codes, watchdogs and alarms. Correctors are system components 
which attempt to bring system back to a correct state including error correction codes, voters 
and reset procedures. 
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In Powell (2011) the results of a collaborative research project to develop a Generic 
Fault-Tolerant Architecture for Real-Time Dependable Systems by aerospace, military and 
rail partners to bring down cost of fault tolerance are discussed. However in common with 
the methods previously reviewed they still rely heavily on redundancy at a level not 
affordable for non-critical functions in a cost-sensitive product. 
 
2.7.3 Fault recovery approaches 
Arshad, Heimbigner,  and Wolf  (2004) describe a planning-based approach to recovery 
from failure of a distributed system in which the effects of a failure are assessed and one of a 
number of approaches to recovery are dynamically selected. This approach is targeted at 
large scale IT networks and seems too complex and potentially time consuming for an 
embedded system, where having a single default recovery path for each node and levels of 
immunity or graceful degradation to loss of other nodes seems a more practical approach. 
However the approach to failure modelling, whereby dependencies to a failure in the system 
are modelled as failed, affected or normal, could be of use as part of an offline analysis of the 
robustness of a design to failure - particularly where there is potential for cascade failures. 
Work on the “survivability” of large scale critical system architectures  under the name 
of the Willow Architecture is described by Knight, Heimbigner, Wolf, Carzaniga, Hill, 
Devanbu and Gertz (2001).  This is aimed at critical national and defence architectures and 
features a range of mechanisms to deal with faults (including attacks) encompassing fault 
prevention, fault tolerance and fault removal through redundancy, fault monitoring and 
proactive and reactive reconfiguration.  
Similar approaches have been proposed at a vehicle level notably by Amor-Segan, 
McMurran, Dhadyalla, and Jones (2007) as part of a "Self Healing Vehicle". While such 
approaches for reconfiguration have not yet been applied in any production vehicle to the 
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authors knowledge, the concepts of having a standard operating environment in multiple 
ECUs  being pursued in AUTOSAR and the increase in processing power of automotive 
microprocessors and in bandwidth of bus systems such as Flexray make this an increasingly 
viable concept. 
Kopetz (2011, p14-15) discusses “fail-safe real-time systems” whereby a safe state can 
be reached sufficiently quickly in the event of an error being detected and “fail operational 
real-time systems” whereby a minimum level of service is required to avoid a catastrophic 
event e.g. an aircraft flight control system. For a fail-safe system to work the error detection 
must have very high reliability and is often achieved by the use of watchdog devices which 
will invoke the fail-safe state if a periodic heartbeat signal is not received. For fail-
operational systems redundancy is required to maintain the level of service in event of a 
failure. 
 
2.7.4 Self Stabilization 
A good overview of self-stabilization is given by Dolev (2000). A distributed system 
can be said to be self-stabilizing if it returns to known good state after starting in an arbitrary 
state. This arbitrary state could be the result for transient failure such as a power interruption 
or processor crash or corruption of variables. Hence self-stabilization can be considered as a 
universal fault recovery mechanism. There is also a weaker form of the concept called 
Pseudo-self-stabilization whereby a system may deviate from legal behaviour a defined 
number of times before reaching a good state. 
An important distinction in designing self-stabilizing algorithms is whether the 
distributed system is synchronous with some form of universal clock or asynchronous with 
each node having its own timebase. Self-stabilizing algorithms must run continually and 
repeatedly communicate with neighbouring processors. For distributed systems consisting of 
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identical elements randomization can be used to defeat symmetrical properties which may 
prevent stabilization. There are a large number of algorithms typically aimed at distributed 
networking management tasks such as leader election and mutual exclusion algorithms and 
distributed reset (Arora, A., and Gouda, M., 1994).  
Self stabilization may have merit in a distributed automotive system context for 
improving robustness but would come with an overhead in terms of processing and 
communications to run the necessary algorithms. 
 
2.8 Safety engineering 
Kopetz (2011 p14-15) points out that Safety is akin to reliability but in the context of 
critical failure modes. This section reviews safety engineering practices to determine whether 
any could be adapted to use in a robustness context. 
2.8.1 Safety Standards 
In the early 1980s and 90s it became recognised that reliability was a property that 
could not be added to software or robustly proven to exist at extreme levels required for 
safety critical systems through validation  but must be inherent in the degree of rigour applied 
to the design and development process (Butler and Finelli 1991, Littlewood and Strigini 
1993). This has led to the introduction of standards for the development of safety critical 
software controlled systems. A generic standard was first published by the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in multiple parts between 1998 and 2000 under the title 
of “IEC 61508 Functional safety of Electrical/Electronic /Programmable Electronic Safety-
Related systems” (Brown 2000). IEC61508 uses a risk-based approach for determining the 
required performance of safety-related systems, requiring a hazard analysis and risk 
assessment to ensure risk is reduced to a tolerable level. As part of this a Safety Integrity 
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Level (SIL) is assigned which determines the level of rigour required for the development of 
software based systems (IEC 2005). 
IEC 61508 was always intended as a generic standard which would have sector specific 
implementations. The automotive industry subsequently developed such a standard 
ISO26262 which is better adapted to the specific requirements of  real-time embedded 
systems, automotive development and life cycles,  manufacturer / supplier relationships and 
‘consumer-goods’ (Rau and Weiss 2008). 
Both IEC61508 and ISO26262 give recommendations (but are not prescriptive) as to 
techniques which are suitable for implementing systems at various safety integrity levels. 
These techniques have been reviewed and categorized into the areas of  design methods, 
design analysis, fault detection and diagnosis, fault tolerance, defensive programming and 
verification methods. 
Design Methods 
The first area the standards address is the approach to the design in requiring structured 
design method and strongly recommending the use of semi-formal methods such as models 
or state transition diagrams to specify the design. In doing this they reflect much of current 
design practice. The standards also mention formal methods but only recommend for highest 
software integrity levels. 
They also enforce good practice regarding selection of suitable programming language 
which supports strong typing and using defined subset of the language. They recommend the 
use of coding standards, style guidelines and naming conventions for modelling and in-house 
conventions for documentation maintainability. They also recommend that design tools 
should be well proven and for higher integrity levels be certified. 
The safety standards also echo the design principles for complex systems in requiring a 
modular hierarchal design with precisely defined simple interfaces that avoid complexity of 
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hardware and software components where possible. The standards also make the point that 
the design should be maintainable during service and testable during development and 
operation. The safety standards also echo the AUTOSAR principles of reuse of a library of 
trusted and verified software modules and components but with a goal of increasing 
reliability rather than reducing effort. 
Design Analysis Techniques 
A major part of the recommendations of the safety standards relate to design and 
analysis techniques to; identify safety hazards in systems, the possible causes and 
consequences and to determine actions to prevent or mitigate them. Techniques for failure 
analysis include; Inductive Analysis techniques such as Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and 
common cause failure analysis of diverse software or redundant hardware. 
Other analysis techniques recommended, which could be relevant to robustness, 
include: reliability block diagrams which model separate conditions which must be fulfilled 
for successful operation, Markov models which use probability chains to predict reliability, 
safety or availability of a system and sneak circuit analysis which attempts to identify latent 
hardware, software or operator actions could cause the system to malfunction under certain 
conditions.  
The use of simulation and modelling is also recommended to ensure the system meets 
specified requirements including use of Monte Carlo simulations. Monte Carlo simulations 
can be used to simulate stochastic phenomena such as noise or to produce large samples of 
data from which statistical results can be obtained. 
When changes are made to one part of system, a recommended technique is impact 
analysis in order to understand the potential effects on the wider system hence the rigour that 
must be applied to the development and how widespread verification activities have to be. 
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The safety standards also recommend the use of safety cases which are structured 
arguments as to why the designers of a system would consider it to be safe for a given context 
of use linking safety objectives to supporting evidence e.g. test results. This technique could 
clearly be applied to argue the robustness of a system and is investigated in more detail in the 
next section. 
The standards also recommend the use of design reviews to ensure the design is well 
structured and documented such that they can be communicated and to systematically engage 
wider peer and expert input and experience into the design. Again a similar concept of design 
peer review would be equally applicable for robustness. 
Fault detection and diagnosis 
The software safety standards recommend a series of mechanisms for error detection. 
These include; range checks of input and output data, plausibility checks, detection of data 
errors, external monitoring facility, temporal and logical program sequence monitoring, 
watch-dog timers, input-output, communication, memory and hardware monitoring, 
comparators and voters between independent processing units, failure detection by redundant 
hardware, and reciprocal comparison by software. 
A number of the fault detection and diagnosis measures recommended by the safety 
standards could be implemented at little or no additional piece cost. However, noting 
Kopetz's (2011) comments, these must be implemented to a high degree of reliability if they 
are not to make the system less robust through false positive detections.  
Fault Tolerance 
The safety standards recommend mechanisms for error handling including; static 
recovery, graceful degradation, independent parallel redundancy and correcting codes for 
data. 
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Defensive programming 
They also recommend the use of defensive programming techniques which detect 
anomalous control flow, data flow or data values during program execution and react to these 
in a predetermined and acceptable manner. Specific defensive programming techniques they 
recommend include; failure assertion programming, diverse programming, recovery blocks, 
backward and forward recovery and retry fault recovery mechanisms. 
Verification Methods 
The safety standards also recommend a wide range of verification techniques beyond 
requirements based functional testing. A major theme of interest for robustness is that of 
black box interface testing whereby input data is selected to exercise a statistical coverage of 
all specified input cases, error cases boundary cases, including dynamic analysis and testing. 
Of particular note are the methods recommended for deriving test cases which include; 
analysis of requirements, analysis of external and internal interfaces, generation and analysis 
of equivalence classes for hardware-software integration, analysis of boundary values, error 
guessing based on knowledge or experience, analysis of functional dependences, analysis of 
environmental conditions and operational use cases and analysis of field experience. 
The need for domain knowledge is particularly noted for fault insertion testing and 
error guessing where looking for emergent behaviour. This is well stated in part of ISO26262 
as follows "field experience, and testing experience and intuition combined with knowledge 
and curiosity about the system under test may add some uncategorized test cases to the 
designed test case set". 
Other robustness relevant tests are stress tests which "verifies the test object for correct 
operation under high operational loads or high demands from the environment" and model-
based testing. For model-based testing they recommend back to back comparison test 
between model and code whereby the model can be used as a test oracle. 
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For the highest levels of safety criticality the use of formal methods to prove the 
correctness of program or specification mathematically rather than empirical verification is 
recommended as a possible technique. Formal methods will be examined in Section 2.11. 
 
2.8.2 Safety cases 
The developers of safety critical systems have to justify that their system is acceptably 
safe to relevant stakeholders including regulators and potentially in legal proceedings through 
a “safety case”. A safety case has been defined in following terms “A safety case should 
communicate a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a particular system is 
acceptably safe to operate in a particular context” (Kelly and Weaver 2004). The safety case 
should clearly argue how evidence provided, e.g. test results or specifications, fulfills the 
safety requirements of the system resulting in a system that is acceptably safe. Kelly and 
Weaver make the observation that safety arguments are frequently badly explained and 
ambiguous. They propose the use of a diagrammatic technique known as Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) as a more clear and structured method of making safety arguments. GSN has 
symbols representing Goals, Solutions, Strategies, Contexts, Assumptions and Justifications 
with arrows representing relationships. Hence a goal can be seen in a particular context to be 
solved by particular solutions for which evidence exists. These safety arguments are 
constructed in a hierarchical form and strategies can decompose a high level goal into sub-
goals.  
Proven strategies and solutions to meeting safety goals can be re-used.  An issue with 
re-use is to ensure the solution is not simply cut and pasted to a context in which it may no 
longer be appropriate - Kelly and McDermid (1997) refer to this as “applicability”. Kelly and 
McDermid show how generic arguments can be constructed as “patterns” in GSN so can 
support and systematize re-use while ensuring that the rationale behind an argument and the 
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context are clearly understood. This notion of safety case patterns has been subsequently 
extended to illustrate flawed or weak arguments which should be avoided – so called “anti-
patterns” (Kelly and Weaver 2004). 
Modular approaches to developing safety cases using GSN have been developed (Kelly 
2001, Bates, Bate, Hawkins, Kelly, and McDermid, 2003). The intent of this work is to allow 
safety cases to support increasing use of modular architectures within avionics which may be 
used in different configurations and up-graded. This work concludes that the safety case has 
to also have a well-constructed architecture with defined partitioning in order to reason 
independently about different parts of the system and allow a composition of safety cases as a 
series of modules. 
The concept of extending the safety case to cover dependability has been examined by 
Despotou and Kelly (2004). Dependability as well as safety also encompasses aspects such as 
security, maintainability and availability and they highlight that these aspects may be in 
conflict and so there may be a need to trade-off between them. They show that it is possible 
to view this as a modular argument using GSN with the top level dependability argument 
being composed of arguments for the individual attributes plus an argument for the trade-offs 
between them which relies on a trade-off methodology.  
Habli, Ibarra, Rivett, and Kelly (2010) propose methods of how to integrate the 
development of a safety case with model based development, illustrating it with a case study 
of an automotive air suspension system. Specifically they consider how a GSN safety case 
can be integrated with a SysML model being used in a model based design process, pointing 
out that since both SysML and GSN are diagrammatic,  hierarchical and modular techniques 
they are both compatible and can allow the analysis of complex systems to be broken down 
into more manageable chunks.  
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Habli, Hawkins, and Kelly (2010) point out that safety assurance of software is reliant 
on the processes used to develop the software but contest that there needs to be a more 
explicitly defined argument linking the processes to the software assurance required for a 
particular function as not all functions presenting the same degree of risk and hence require 
the same rigour.  They propose linking the process based argument to the product argument 
including factors such as tool and method integrity, competence of personnel, and 
configuration management. 
An interesting question the authors pose in their conclusions is whether for complex 
systems which can suffer systematic failures in the hardware integration - is there a need to 
move from an integrity based argument (typically based on failure rates of constituent parts) 
to an assurance argument  addressing the potential sources of systematic failures e.g. the 
development processes employed? Their conclusion is that wherever there is complexity 
regardless of implementation or process there is a need for an assurance argument. 
Safety cases are a systematic, yet flexible method which could potentially be applied to 
the analysis of how a system can be argued to be robust encompassing various facets 
including design features and design methods.  
 
2.9 Modelling Complex Systems 
The ability to model complex systems is both a key challenge and enabler for their 
successful development. Kopetz (2011) states that “the major challenge of design is the 
building of a software/hardware artifact that provides the intended behaviour (i.e. the 
service) under given constraints and where relevant properties of this artifact can be 
modelled at different levels of abstraction by models of adequate simplicity”.  This is an echo 
of a much earlier quote by Lord Kelvin (Thom1904)  “I am never content until I have 
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constructed a mechanical model of the subject I am studying. If I succeed in making one, I 
understand; otherwise I do not”. 
Simplification strategies Kopetz advocates are; abstraction, partitioning, isolation by 
suppressing irrelevant detail and segmentation referring to the temporal decomposition of 
behaviour in into sequential parts. He goes on to give a useful definition of a model as “a 
deliberate simplification of reality that is relevant for a particular purpose”.  
While it is impossible to close the lid on the Pandora's box of increasing functional 
requirements, can complex systems of systems be usefully modeled at a level of abstraction 
that allows robustness properties to be examined? This section will review two major areas of 
on-going work in the field of modelling complex systems. Firstly architectural modelling 
approaches will be examined both automotive specific and more generally applicable work 
on system of systems. Secondly co-simulation approaches will be reviewed which attempt to 
make a dynamic model on a large scale system by linking concurrent simulations of 
constituent parts. 
 
2.9.1 Architectural Modelling Approaches 
2.9.1.1 EAST-ADL 
The major body of work in developing a system level model approach to automotive 
electronics has been the EAST-ADL which has been developed as a standardized approach 
through a series of European collaborative projects. There is extensive literature from the 
project but a good overview can be derived from the ATESST2 Project Brochure (ATESST2 
2010) which describes the status at the end of the project. Ongoing information is also 
available from the EAST-ADL Association website  (http://east-adl.info) and from the 
website of the current  MAENAD project (http://www.maenad.eu). 
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EAST ADL is an approach to automotive system modelling based on an architecture 
description language (ADL) that keeps information in a single data structure. The claimed 
benefits are achieved in improved development time, cost efficiency, quality and 
dependability. EAST-ADL was initially developed in the EAST EEA and more recently 
further refined in the ATESST project including compatibility with newer standards such as 
AUTOSAR and increased dependability analysis. 
The scope of EAST ADL is functions, hardware and software for automotive embedded 
systems and environment. This  defines architectural elements and a number of views that 
give useful abstractions of the overall system for specific purposes during system 
development lifecycle. Figure 2.10 illustrates the EAST ADL abstraction levels and 
extensions. Specific use cases include; feature modelling, variant analysis, environment 
modelling, structural and behavioural modelling of software and hardware, requirements 
modelling including traceability, timing and failure analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 EAST ADL abstraction levels and extensions (East ADL association website) 
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The vehicle level represents an implementation independent model of vehicle feature 
content and properties. The analysis level contains a more detailed breakdown of 
functionality, but still abstracting hardware and software deployment, including interactions 
between functions. The design level then maps the features and functions to hardware and 
software architectures taking into account issues such as re-use of carryover components and 
use of off-the-shelf standard design elements. The implementation level details the software 
architecture at component level for basic software, standard software functions and 
application software in an AUTOSAR compliant manner. 
The modelling approach used in the EAST-ADL language is through a meta-model 
which defines stereotypes for model entities which are implemented as a UML2 profile. This 
profile can then be used to create model diagrams in a UML tool with stereotyped entities 
such as vehicle features which already have defined property types. While EAST-ADL is 
based around UML2 it also makes use of some of the extensions found in SysML, which is in 
itself a UML2 profile, such as for requirements traceability. The models give the overall 
system architecture including interrelationship between functions but a function's internal 
behaviour is typically defined by other techniques. 
EAST-ADL can support timing analysis between top down timing constraints of the 
functions and the bottom up properties of the implementation utilising the AUTOSAR 
Timing Extension. Timing requirements such as end to end delay or synchronicity can be 
modelled as constraints on event chains as illustrated in Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11. EAST-ADL Event Chain with associated timing constraint (ATESST2 2010) 
 
EAST-ADL supports requirements traceability and decomposition including those of 
system properties which may be safety relevant, hence it can facilitate ISO26262 processes. 
EAST-ADL model levels can be mapped on to ISO26262 process requirements and EAST-
ADL has defined a dependency package to support analysis such as ASIL (Automotive Safety 
Integrity Level) decomposition and error modelling. The EAST-ADL error model describes 
behaviour during a fault condition and attempts to show how this could propagate throughout 
the system using explicit error propagation ports and connections (see Figure 2.12). These 
information interdependencies within the system can be used by external tools for safety 
analysis such as HiP-HOPS tool (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies) for static safety analysis in terms of FFA, FTA, and FMEA.  
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Figure 2.12. EAST-ADL error model (ATESST2 2010) 
 
This illustrates a key point regarding EAST-ADL that is fundamentally a structural 
model showing entities and their relationships does not attempt to contain the behavioural 
properties of functions which require other modelling tools such as Simulink or Modelica. It 
is not apparent nor claimed that this will identify any form of emergent behaviour without 
any use of behavioural diagrams such as state charts, activity diagrams, message sequence 
charts. However by defining the relationships between behavioural models EAST-ADL can 
provide a structure to support the integration of multiple behavioural models for analysis at a 
system or system of systems level. Section 2.11 on formal methods will review work to use 
EAST-ADL to facilitate formal analysis techniques. To enable linkage between tools EAST-
ADL has implemented an Eclipse-based tool platform centered around a UML2 modelling 
and profiling environment called Papyrus UML. 
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2.9.1.2 COMPASS 
Fitzgerald, Larsen, and Woodcock (2014) give an overview of the vision of the 
COMPASS project in creating a collaborative development environment for the development 
of Systems of Systems. Their approach, illustrated in Figure  2.13, is based on an interlinked 
tool architecture comprising of; a SysML modelling tool (Artisan Studio) for modelling the 
system of systems architecture, a platform for developing more detailed models and 
conducting static analysis including formal methods and dynamic simulation and analysis 
(COMPASS Overture) and a real-time testing platform (RT-Tester) for the development of 
test cases and conducting automated testing. 
 
Figure 2.13 Overview of the COMPASS toolset (Fitzgerald, Larsen, and Woodcock, 2014) 
 
50 
To facilitate the modelling of system of systems and exchange of data between tools 
the project will develop a modelling language called the COMPASS Modelling Language 
(CML). CML is based on experience of VDM (Vienna Development Method) state based 
formal method and the CSP/Circus process-based formal methods. The project also aims to 
support fault modelling and analysis at both an architectural level for the whole system of 
systems and detailed level for constituent systems. 
 Andrews, Ingram, Payne, Romanovsky, Holt and Perry (2014) describe the project’s 
approach to fault modelling using a set of SysML diagrams. This fault modelling profile uses 
structural diagrams (block definition diagrams) and behavioural diagrams (activity and 
sequence diagrams), to give views on nominal behaviour, fault activation, erroneous 
behaviour, fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms. These support understanding of the 
fault behaviour and the definition of the recovery mechanisms. The models are not 
executable but future work is to develop semi-automatic translation to the CML to allow 
formal verification of dependability related properties of fault tolerance models.  
To address issues of confidentiality in sharing models of constituent systems, a contract 
approach is being developed to develop abstracted behavioural formal models of the system 
interface (Bryans, Fitzgerald, Payne and Kristensen, 2014). The project’s strategy to tackle 
the issues associated with testing large scale models is to use knowledge gained from testing 
the individual systems. 
 
2.9.2 Co-Simulation Modelling Approaches 
2.9.2.1 DESTECS 
Broenink, Kleijn, Larsen, Jovanovic, Verhoef and Pierce (2010) describe the goals of a 
European collaborative project called DESTECS (Design support and tooling for dependable 
embedded control software). The DESTECS project advocates a collaborative and 
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multidisciplinary approach to development of models of embedded systems and its major 
output is an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) to support this. The approach to 
creating this IDE is through a co-simulation of a discrete time VDM (Vienna Development 
Method) model of the control system and a continuous time model of the plant using a 
physical modelling tool called 20-sim. VDM was selected over the rather more obvious 
choice of Matlab Simulink as it more directly supports formal analysis. 20-sim is a product 
developed by one of the partners but they claim similar functionality to state of the art 
physical modelling tools based on the Modelica language such as Dymola. A key 
development within the project is a "tool connector" which enables the co-simulation as well 
as being responsible for model analysis such as fault scenarios and regression testing. The 
DESTECS approach is illustrated in Figure 2.14.  
 
 
Figure 2.14 DESTECS co-simulation approach to modelling embedded systems (Broenink et 
al, 2010) 
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Fitzgerald, Larsen, Pierce and Verhoef (2013) describe the approach to co-model 
construction is explained as firstly developing a fully discrete event model to gain confidence 
in the control approach which is subsequently replaced by a more accurate continuous time 
model. A contractual approach to the interface between the discrete event and the continuous 
time model is taken defining the nature of communication between these two models. The 
exchange between the two simulations is intended to be limited to shared time base, variables 
and events in order to minimize impact on models running in their own optimized 
environments. Part of the work of the project was to model abnormal behaviours and 
countermeasures in order to test and improve the dependability of the control system.  
 
2.9.2.2 Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) 
The Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) standard to enable the exchange of dynamic 
models and co-simulation is described by Blochwitz et al (2012). FMI was initially developed 
in a European collaborative project named MODELISAR producing a first version of the 
standard in 2010 which the authors state is supported by more than 30 tools. The project was 
initiated by Daimler AG to enable integration and exchange simulation data from a number 
of different suppliers using different toolsets see Figure 2.15.  
 
 
Figure 2.15 FMI Concept for Model Exchange and Co-Simulation (Blochwitz et al 2012). 
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The model exchange is enabled by a modelling environment generating a C code 
version of their model that can be imported and used in other modelling environments. Co-
simulation is achieved through Master algorithms that control data exchange of explicitly 
defined variables and synchronisation of slave simulations, including their solvers, through a 
set of C functions. 
Blochwitz et al (2012) describe the main areas of improvement for the second version 
of FMI which include; explicitly defining the causality of exchange variables, allowing 
variables to be externally tuned during simulation, the ability to restart a simulation from a 
saved state, improved time event handling and unit definition. A number of examples of the 
use of FMI are given, such as software in the loop simulation for transmission controllers at 
Mercedes-Benz, but none yet at a system of systems level.  
 
2.10 Robustness Test Methods 
This section reviews literature on robustness testing which is a subset of non-functional 
testing. A fundamental issue in this type of testing is experimental design for testing large 
scale systems with many variables. George Box (2000), a renowned academic in the field of 
experimental design, argues for an iterative exploration and discovery experimental approach 
where results of tests are available in a short period of time, particularly where there are a 
large number of experimental variables. He describes an iterative learning approach to 
experimentation and identifies six possible options for modification of experiment after 
initial test. These are to; move to a new location, add another fraction, rescale, drop and add 
factors, replicate or augment.  
A systematic approach to black-box test case design initially developed by 
Grochtmann, Grimm and Wegener (1993) is the Classification Tree Method (CTM). The 
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CTM method is a type of partition testing whereby important input factors are classified and 
further broken down into subclasses. These can be represented in a tree structure similar to a 
UML class diagram as illustrated in Figure 2.16 and test cases are shown graphically as the 
intersection nodes of the horizontal lines with selected classes. 
 
Figure 2.16 Classification Tree (Grochtmann, Grimm. and Wegener, 1993) 
 
The advantages of this method are that it can give a stepwise, graphical mechanism for 
defining large-scale automated tests which can be supported using a Classification-Tree 
Editor (CTE) tool. Through intensive industrial application CTE tool has been extended to; 
avoid selection of invalid test cases, be able to set different priorities levels to classifications 
and to generate automated test scripts (Lehmann and Wegener, 2000). 
However CTM is concerned with input states and does not directly address an 
important factor in embedded systems of dynamic behaviour. Lehmann (2000) proposes a 
method for testing dynamic functional behaviour entitled Time Partition Testing (TPT). TPT 
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breaks down dynamic behaviour of a system into a number of discrete elements, e.g. 
initialisation, which are called testlets. Testlets define input and expected output behaviour of 
system over a time series which may have a definite span or continue to run indefinitely.  By 
assembling a series of testlets paths of execution by the system can be defined from 
initialisation to shut down which can be used as test cases for the dynamic behaviour of the 
system in an automated testing environment. Bringmann and Krämer (2006) describe the 
further development of the TPT method through the development of a test language used to 
formally defined testlets and by the use of classification tree method and editor as a means of 
graphically defining test cases through assembling a series of variants of testlets as illustrated 
in Figure 2.17. 
 
Figure 2.17 Use of Classification Trees to define TPT test cases (Bringmann and Krämer, 
2006) 
 
Bringmann and Krämer (2006) claim the unique feature of Time Partition Testing is the 
way test cases for continuous behaviour are modeled and systematically selected. A further 
but important benefit they note is that the method is capable of being reactive, i.e. modifying 
56 
the test case execution dependent on the behaviour of the device under test.  They describe 
the overall TPT process from requirements to test report, shown in Figure 2.18, and state that 
it is being successfully used by DaimlerCrysler and several of their suppliers. 
 
 
Figure 2.18 TPT test process (Bringmann and Krämer, 2006) 
 
While TPT offers a systematic approach to testing of continuous systems it does not 
explicitly include the discoverative iterative approach recommended by George Box (2000). 
Afzal, Torkar and Feldt (2009) review search based techniques, which use meta heuristics to 
search test space for levels of fitness against a given test criteria, known as Search-based 
Software Testing (SBST), specifically focusing on application to non-functional testing.  The 
non-functional properties they covered specifically in the search were usability, safety, 
robustness, capacity, integrity, efficiency, reliability, maintainability, testability, flexibility, 
reusability, portability, interoperability, security, performance, availability and scalability.  
Of interest to this research is that robustness was not the focus of any of the work although 
clearly execution time can be a factor in robustness related failures. One reason may be that 
the SBST method is not well suited as it may be difficult to define a suitable fitness function 
for this characteristic which gives some level of continuous indication of robustness. Another 
reason may well be that this survey was focused on software testing while it may be best to 
consider robustness at a higher level of testing which includes more factors such as hardware 
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variations or system interactions that can cause robustness failures rather than just the 
software. 
More recently work specifically focused on robustness testing of automotive 
electronics against the effects of low voltage transients is reported by Dhadyalla, McMurran, 
Amor-Segan, Li, et al. (2010). The approach described uses weighted pseudo-randomly 
generated test sequences to achieve balance of coverage of complete test space and focus on 
areas where experience has shown faults most likely to occur while allowing automated 
testing within a reasonable period of time. The approach described supports component, 
system, and system of systems (full vehicle) testing but is limited to a single critical, variable 
of supply voltage. The presence of Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) was used as a fitness 
function. 
Becci, Dhadyalla, Mouzakitis, Marco and Moore (2013) expand on this approach to 
cover higher number of interacting factors through the use of Sequence Covering Arrays 
(SCA) in an approach they entitle Non-Functional Sequence Testing (NFST). This approach 
recognises the importance not just of the order of events in real-time system but also their 
relative timing. In the NFST approach, illustrated in Figure 2.19, sequence covering arrays 
are used to generate efficient design of experiments covering all orders of events and assigns 
a time vector between events which is subject to pseudorandom variation according to an 
inverse exponential distribution. The test which is conducted on a Hardware In Loop test 
environment consists of a system initialisation and initial event followed by an NFST 
sequence of events at pseudo-randomly varied intervals, followed by a “prove-out” test. The 
prove-out test determines whether the random sequences were able to alter the system 
functionality, i.e. has the system been able to recover to known good behaviour. 
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Figure 2.19 NFST approach (Becci et al, 2013) 
 
The approach, while having similarities with TPT in generating test sequences from 
combinations of elements, is different in introduction of pseudo randomness in timing 
between events and in being more concerned with the ability of a system to recover the 
correct functionality rather than monitoring behaviour throughout the test sequence. The 
latter point is important when generating a large number of test cases and looking for 
unspecified robustness failures as there is no readily identifiable test oracle for this.  
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2.11 Formal methods 
The use of formal methods, which mathematically prove the correctness of algorithms,  
models or software are one of the techniques recommended in functional safety standards 
such as IEC61508 and ISO26262 for very high safety integrity level software. An opportunity 
in the context of this thesis would be the use of formal methods to check robustness relevant 
properties in any system, rather than restricting their use to safety relevant properties in a 
safety critical system. 
Woodcock, Larsen, Bicarregui and Fitzgerald (2009) reviewed the state of the art in the 
industrial application of formal methods. They note that, while formal methods can be used 
at any stage in a project, they are increasingly used at earlier stages of specification and 
design. They surveyed 62 industrial projects known to have employed formal methods. The 
projects had a range of start dates, a small number dating back to 1980’s, but the majority 
being started between 2000 and 2008. The projects covered a range of application domains, 
of which transport was the individual domain with most projects (16) but it was not specified 
what aspect of transportation this covered. Examples of projects are given from aerospace 
and rail domains but none from automotive. Figure 2.20 shows the results of the survey in 
terms of the specific techniques that were used in projects illustrating the bias towards the 
formalization of the up-front activities, especially of specification and modelling. 
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Figure 2.20 Techniques the survey of formal methods application by Woodcock et al. 2009 
 
Respondents’ experiences were generally favourable in terms of reductions in time and 
cost but they found it difficult to judge the actual savings from a reduction in issues later in 
projects from the increased effort to deploy formal methods in the early phases. Only half of 
the respondents reported the cost consequences and a key finding is there is still a lack of 
evidence for the cost benefit of such methods. 
Respondents were highly favourable in terms of increased quality with 92% citing an 
improvement compared to other techniques. Overall in 95% of cases it was judged that the 
use of formal techniques were successful. While these early adopters are likely to be 
advocates of the techniques it is indicative of wider potential. 
Challenges were noted in areas of: the use of tools by those who are not formal 
methods specialists (“mere mortals”), integration within existing toolsets, lack of automation 
and the speed of response. The authors build on this by commenting on the potential for 
lightweight formal methods focused on tool supported automated verification of particular 
properties of sub-systems. Specifically they note that “the increasing capability of automated 
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formal analysis makes it possible to have an impact on larger-scale developments, not 
necessarily critical, that are driven by the need to reduce time to market, defect rates or costs 
of testing and maintenance.” This aligns to the contention within this thesis that design 
methods used for safety critical systems can be viably used to increase the robustness of 
system that are not safety critical. 
Given this potential for the use of formal methods in other domains what evidence 
exists for the use within the automotive domain?  The use of formal methods within 
automotive has previously been reported as being limited in a 2008 survey by Rao, 
McMurran and Jones (2009). The reasons for this were, as previously noted by Rushby 
(2002), that formal methods still require a high degree of effort both human and machine 
(“brute force”) and focus on the steady state operation not conditions such as initialisation.  
However more recent research is attempting to overcome these shortcomings through 
mechanising formal verification of models. Both the model frameworks discussed previously, 
EAST ADL and Compass have been and continue to be a focus for formal analysis using 
model checkers.  
Qureshi, Chen,  Persson, and Törngren (2011) describe work to transform execution 
timing constraints described in East-ADL models to be used by the UPPAAL tool, a formal 
model checking tool which can check for reachability, safety and liveliness properties of real-
time systems. They highlight this is as ongoing work with outstanding research challenges.  
Chen, Feng, Qureshi, Lönn and Hagl, F. (2013) report on transforming East-ADL 
behaviour models to permit formal analysis using a model-checker called SPIN. While East-
ADL does not model behaviours it does allow a declaration of triggering policies e.g. time 
triggered event triggered, timing and synchronization constraints. Additionally a new East-
ADL package has been recently added referred to as behaviour description annex  which can 
provide links to related behavioural models for example in Matlab Simulink. Chen et al 
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demonstrate how various behaviour constraints can be modelled in East ADL and a subset 
(not all) transformed into a format which can be used by the SPIN model checking tool and 
used to check the related behavioural model referenced in the behaviour description annex. 
The case study doesn’t make clear the degree of success achieved however it is worth noting 
that SPIN was successfully used by NASA (2011) in their investigation of alleged unintended 
acceleration events in Toyota vehicles. 
The COMPASS project  (Oliveira, Sampaio, Antonino, Ramos, Cavalcanti and 
Woodcock, 2012)  aims to translate its modelling language (CML), derived from SysML 
description of a system of systems, into a format amenable to formal verification in this case 
using the Circus tool which uses CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) semantic 
models. Again this work is at an early stage. 
Rajeev, Mohalik and Ramesh (2013) report on the formal verification of 
Simulink/Stateflow models using Matlab Simulink Design Verifier. They discuss the types of 
requirements that can be verified, pointing out that these must firstly be capable of being 
formally, i.e. precisely, stated and must be included in the model i.e. cannot verify system 
interactions not included in the model, and they propose a categorization for these. They 
propose a methodology based on specification templates and report successful results on case 
studies based on individual controllers rather than distributed systems. 
Matsubara, Sakurai, Narisawa, Enshoiwa, Yamane and Yamanaka  (2013) present an 
approach using a technique called “program slicing” to limit verification targets in order to 
avoid failure to complete verification through state explosion. In this approach hardware and 
software are modelled. The software is a limited subset of the source code related to 
variables of interest which is converted to software model. The hardware, parts of software 
and controlled equipment are modelled more abstractly as an external environmental model. 
These are combined into a verification model which can be checked using a model checker 
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such as SPIN. They have applied this approach to find logic and timing related malfunctions 
to several automotive control systems confirming the usefulness of the method. They also 
highlight usefulness of this technique in regression testing after revisions to source code. 
From the above examples it can be seen that there is potential in formal methods in 
automotive electronic applications and that, although the tools and their application may not 
yet be sufficiently mature and lightweight beyond that of high integrity systems, a framework 
for robust design should incorporate them as an approach. 
 
2.12 Discussion  
From the literature robustness can be defined as dependability of a system with 
particular respect to external faults. Taking this definition of robustness as a specialised case 
of dependability and considering the base definitions of dependability raises the following 
discussion points.  
The first definition of dependability given by Avižienis et al (2004) is one of it being 
the “ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is 
acceptable”. This highlights a need to specify what service failures are acceptable as a result 
of external failures and how often they can occur in order to have a measure of what is 
acceptably robust. While for safety critical functionality this may be straightforward for other 
functionality it may not be obvious, particularly without prior knowledge of what external 
failures could occur. This may require the specification of; degraded modes of operation,   
events that must not take place or availability targets. A related question for non-safety 
critical automotive systems is what are the key dependability characteristics and which are 
most impacted by external faults? 
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The second definition of dependability given by Avižienis et al (2004) is “the ability to 
deliver service that can justifiably be trusted ” which raises the issue of what are the methods 
to gain assurance that the system can be trusted to be robust? 
Complex systems are characterised by having interdependencies which make them 
inherently non-linear and difficult to model or abstract and exhibit emergent behaviour not 
recognised during the original design. Automotive Electronics are complex embedded 
Systems of Systems which are interconnected by design, have a high degree of “Dynamic 
Complexity” due to the temporal nature of dynamic interactions. There is evidence of the 
scale of issues of automotive electronics but not of the specific causes . The current 
automotive approach to cope with complexity and rate of change are standards for open 
systems, sharing and reuse of software and model-based development.  
Robust design techniques, e.g. Design for Six Sigma, are mechanically focused and 
have an emphasis on a “Right First Time” philosophy and an expectation that failure modes 
are known in advance that fundamentally misses the issue of emergence. This contrasts with 
the learning from the field of software development, particularly agile methods, on emergent 
issues which is to develop iteratively and incrementally to allow continuous integration and 
test. Hence any robust design process framework for complex systems needs to build in an 
iterative approach. 
While there are explicit design methods for achieving mechanical robustness, for 
software-based systems the main concern appears to be reliability and prevention of fault 
conditions in the first case. This may be because the major research efforts and standards 
focus on high dependability systems but this tends to lead to solutions such as guaranteeing 
high reliability or redundancy which may not be appropriate for non-safety critical systems 
which nonetheless need to be robust to meet customer expectations. This primacy of 
reliability over robustness in the literature may reflect research being driven by the demands 
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of high integrity systems such as for aerospace or safety critical automotive applications 
rather than the increasing demand of mass complexity of the majority of automotive 
applications and consumer goods. 
However there are many good design principles which do not entail additional cost but 
are not fully recognised in the automotive field. For example there seems to be little or no 
published work considering the application of concepts of self-stabilization within the 
automotive domain. It may be that the principles of self-stability are implicit in automotive 
design and often fail-safe is achieved by reverting back to sufficient level of mechanical 
control e.g. in braking and steering systems with a reboot of the microprocessor to re-invoke 
the additional electronically controlled functionality. However this may benefit from some 
explicit consideration. Certainly it suggests a need for systematic knowledge capture and 
dissemination which while being beyond the scope of this work should be included as an 
element in a framework for design for robustness.  
There are other lessons to learn to from safety critical approaches such as the need to 
do upfront risk analysis to determine where design effort to address systematic risks needs to 
be. Safety cases are a specific tool which it is proposed to investigate whether they can be 
adapted to designing for robustness.  
The use of formal methods has significant potential within automotive and is the 
subject of on-going pilot and research projects focusing initially on high integrity 
applications. This should pave the way for lightweight methods and tools which then can be 
used for robustness analysis of all systems. To enable this requires design artefacts for formal 
analysis, models in particular, which encompass robustness critical attributes and the 
knowledge of what are the specific properties that need to be checked to prove robustness. 
While the development of the formal methods tools and techniques is outside the scope of 
this thesis, the framework for robust design should recognise the potential to apply such 
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methods to robustness issues and provide enabling capabilities for this in terms of models 
and the understanding of the specific properties that need to be checked to prove robustness. 
A significant question arising from the literature is: can complex systems of systems be 
usefully modeled at a level of abstraction that allows robustness properties to be examined? 
There is extensive work ongoing on modelling complex systems which can provide a 
framework but whether modelling right things in terms of robustness is debatable in the 
absence of a clear understanding of robustness issues. 
This highlights the importance of domain knowledge in complex systems. Domain 
knowledge has been identified as critical in the literature for: developing design guidelines, 
recognising critical robustness factors, modelling and abstraction and identification of areas 
of focus for robustness testing. For example the final statement of Driscoll et al. (2003) on 
practical approaches to Byzantine failures is “Anyone designing a system with high 
dependability requirements must thoroughly understand these failures and how to combat 
them.” However there is a lack of domain knowledge for automotive electronics robustness 
issues in published literature, this may be due in part to an unwillingness to put such 
information to the public domain and in part due to a lack of specific systematic robustness 
focused studies. Hence to meet the objectives of this thesis a systematic study of robustness 
issues is required to build domain knowledge.  
Test methods addressing robustness is an area where there is a growing body of work 
which should be included in a design for robustness framework but not subject to specific 
development within the scope of this thesis. 
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2.13 Conclusions  
From this literature review the key opportunities for contributions to knowledge in the 
field of robust design of automotive electronics are as follows: 
1. Development of domain knowledge of impact in terms of prevalence, dependability 
characteristics impacted and the causes of robustness related failures in the area of 
automotive electronics. 
2. Development of a design for robustness framework for complex automotive electronic 
systems. This should leverage best practices identified during the literature review but 
should include the following two areas identified for further new work. 
3. Adaptation of safety cases to robustness to enable structured arguments for assuring the 
robustness of a system. 
4. Development of an approach to robustness modelling based on understanding what are 
important factors to model pertaining to the robustness of automotive electronics. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is based around achieving these contributions. The next 
chapter will focus on the development of domain knowledge of robustness failures in the 
field of automotive electronics. 
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Chapter 3 - Case Study Review of Automotive Electronics 
Robustness Issues 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 a literature search was conducted to understand the nature of complex 
systems and potential methods which could be employed to improve their robustness, i.e. 
their ability to provide specified acceptable levels of service during and after external faults. 
It also highlighted a lack of published literature relating to domain knowledge of the impact 
and the causes of robustness related failures in the area of automotive electronics. In this 
chapter a case study of a significant number of automotive electronic issues is undertaken to 
firstly confirm that robustness is indeed an issue in automotive electronic systems, to 
consider what dependability characteristics are effected and to identify and analyse the types 
of faults that lead to root causes of robustness failures. This research is intended to be 
informative for the subsequent work developing a design for robustness framework and 
supporting methods to ensure it is well targeted.  
This chapter presents the methodology, results and conclusions from this case study 
review including discussion of the validity and reliability of the results. The details of 
specific issues are not divulged but the findings are most significant at an aggregated level in 
terms of direction of the work to address the wider set of issues rather than a particular 
instance. 
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3.2 Case Study Methodology 
3.2.1 Case Study Questions 
The specific questions which the analysis would seek to answer to ensure the subsequent 
work developing a design for robustness framework and supporting methods is well targeted 
are as follows.  
 What is the prevalence of robustness issues in automotive electronics? A fundamental 
question relates to whether robustness related issues are really a major problem. Although 
this was an assumption based on experience of the field there was not substantiating 
empirical analysis available to indicate the actual proportion of problems with robustness 
related issues.  
 What are the impacts of robustness failures, specifically what dependability attributes are 
affected?  
 What are the types of faults that lead to robustness failures at a generic and specific level? 
Are these faults related to hardware or software or both? What is nature of the activation 
mechanisms which cause these faults to lead to service failures. 
 What are significant robustness related parameters?  For those issues that were robustness 
related then the analysis should identify what are the contributory factors resulting in 
faults. 
 What were the subsequent actions resulting from the issues e.g. changes to design, design 
process, specifications or validation methods? Understanding for a number of specific 
issues this may give an insight into where weakness may exist at a more general level. 
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3.2.2 Selection of Cases to Review 
The criteria for selection of the case studies were as follows. The case studies must be 
examples of service failures in automotive electronic systems as these are the specific focus 
of this work. The system exhibiting the service failures must be electronic involving some 
form of programmable hardware, not purely electrical e.g. failures in wiring harnesses. The 
service failure should have occurred in the operational use phase, i.e. when the vehicle has 
completed its development program, to ensure that faults are ones which had not been 
detected by current methods and were of particular concern as the customers could 
experience service failures.  The faults should be representative of all faults within these 
criteria to be sure that conclusions on the prevalence of robustness faults are valid. The case 
study issues need to have been analyzed in depth and the true route causes identified and 
documented in detail. The case studies should be sufficient in number to support the validity 
of conclusions. 
Two sources of information which fitted these criteria were identified to be used for the 
study from a single automotive manufacturer. The first was known as “Prevent Action 
Closure Papers” (PAC). These were the documents for significant issues which had led to 
either; service actions to repair vehicles in the field or  “gateholds” where new vehicles are 
quarantined for repairs before shipping. These were issues that were deemed of a level of 
concern that they would be formally reviewed by senior management to ensure that not only 
was the particular issue fixed but also that it would not re-occur. The documentation 
contained a description of the issue and its impact, the design or process related root causes 
and the actions taken to prevent the recurrence of the specific concern and similar concerns 
in the future.  25 PAC papers were provided for review based on being most recent examples 
and discussed with the Departmental Quality Manager. Of these 18 fitted the selection 
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criteria, the reason for rejection of 7 issues being that the example was a purely electrical, as 
opposed to electronic, issue. 
The second source of data was 6 Sigma Project reports. 6 Sigma is a data-driven 
problem solving technique that seeks to systematically identify and remove sources of defects 
and variations that lead to quality issues, often by the application of statistical methods 
(Pande, Neuman and Roland, 2001). The data provided conformed to the steps in a 
“DMAIC” process, named after the phases of Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and 
Control. In the Define phase the key issue which is to be addressed is identified in detail and 
in particular what the customer effect is. In the Measure phase data is gathered relating to the 
problem including assessment of process capability. The Analyze phase seeks to get to the 
true route cause of the problem followed by the Improve phase where the effectiveness of 
potential solutions is measured and optimized. The Control phase ensures new solutions are 
introduced into production rigorously with adequate methods to ensure their effectiveness is 
monitored. There is a final Replicate phase where measures to prevent the same problem 
happening on future products or on other product lines are put in place, evidenced and signed 
off. 26 completed 6-Sigma projects were reviewed including discussions with the relevant 6 
Sigma “Master Black Belt” who is the champion and coach for 6-Sigma within the particular 
department. Of these 18 were selected as meeting the necessary criteria. 
 
3.2.3 Analysis Method 
To conduct the analysis of the case studies against the identified questions as 
objectively as possible, criteria for the categorization were developed, based where possible 
on existing definitions. 
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3.2.3.1 Prevalence of robustness issues  
Based on the definitions identified in the literature review a robustness failure 
pathology to be used within the analysis was developed which is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Robustness failure pathology used within case study analysis 
 
This pathology is in line with the definition of robustness failures being those which 
occur as a result of an external fault. Failures in which no fault occurred external to the 
system controlling service delivery are not considered robustness failures. The boundary of 
the system is considered to be the programmable device with responsibility for controlling 
delivery of the failed service and any dedicated sensors and actuators. In cases where the 
service is delivered through a human machine interface device, such as a display screen, the 
programmable device with the responsibility for the service is that providing the source not 
the device controlling the interface. The primary fault is the direct cause of error that is 
propagated into the system causing the service delivery failure either directly or indirectly 
through activation of a dormant fault within the system. The primary fault may in turn have 
been caused due to errors as a result of other precipitating faults. An activation pattern of 
inputs may be required to create conditions for the error at the system boundary to lead to the 
service failure. 
73 
 
3.2.3.2 Impact of robustness issues 
The primary impact of robustness of the faults on dependability attributes is assessed 
by selecting one only of the following: 
• Availability: readiness for correct service (service not provided to user) 
• Reliability: continuity of correct service (service interrupted or degraded) 
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment 
• Integrity: absence of improper system alterations 
• Maintainability: ability to undergo modifications, and repairs   
  
In cases where there are more than one dependability attribute impacted then the most 
severe, in terms of effect to the end user, is selected. 
 
3.2.3.3 Fault categorisation 
The fault categorization scheme is based on the elementary fault classes defined by 
Avižienis et al (2004) illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Elementary fault classes defined by Avižienis et al (2004) 
 
Further classification and tailoring of this scheme was found to be necessary. Avižienis 
et al (2004) is ambiguous for the first fault class in that it is termed as the “phase of creation 
or occurrence”. In the case of elusive faults they may be created during development but not  
seen to occur until operation. To remove this ambiguity the case study considers purely the 
phase in which the fault is created. This requires an element of judgment as to whether it is 
reasonable that the issue could have been prevented if the right tools and techniques had been 
available to predict the fault and add preventative measures in the development of the system 
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or whether the fault could only be apparent in the operational use phase of the system. The 
original work appears to give little consideration to mass production of systems whereby 
manufacturing is an important area where faults could be created so this has been added a 
distinct category. 
The system boundary was defined as the boundary of the system exhibiting the service 
failure. By the definition all faults which originate outside the system boundary and 
propagate errors into the system by interaction or interference are robustness faults. 
At this stage it is necessary to augment the taxonomy to distinguish between the 
primary fault at the system boundary and the precipitating faults which may have led to this 
through fault propagation. For example in the case of a system which exhibits a service 
failure as a result of interaction with another system which has experienced electromagnetic 
interference, the primary fault is an interaction fault and the secondary fault is a physical 
fault. 
The phenomenological causes of the error at the system boundary are either natural 
faults which are physical hardware faults resulting from natural phenomena, e.g. extreme 
temperatures, without human participation or are else deemed to be human-made. The 
dimension parameter notes whether this error effects hardware or software of the system 
controlling the service delivery.  
From the data provided it is not possible to reliably determine the objective, intent and 
capability of human made failures so these factors are omitted from the analysis. 
Persistence is defined as the persistence of the fault as opposed to the service failure, 
noting that a transient fault can lead to permanent service failure and vice versa. At this stage 
the activation pattern is not accounted for i.e. if the error caused by the fault is permanently 
at the boundary of the system then it is deemed a permanent fault even if it requires a specific 
activation pattern to cause a service failure. 
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3.2.3.4 Phenomenological Fault Causes  
As well as classifying by the elementary fault classes above, to answer the question of 
what are the phenomenological causes of robustness issues at a more specific level a bottom 
up classification scheme will be used in parallel. In this approach the adjudged failure causes 
will be used to create specific classes of fault causes with each fault cause being allocated to 
an existing class, either directly or through generalisation of the class, or creating a new 
class. This is done for both the cause of the primary external fault and for the precipitating 
faults. 
 
3.2.3.5 Activation pattern 
To gain insight into the activation patterns for the robustness faults to manifest 
themselves as failures for each issue the number of factors and the specific factors are noted. 
The factors can be considered as the independent variables which would need to be 
controlled in an experiment to make the error manifested itself as a service failure. 
 
3.2.3.6 Resulting Actions 
A bottom up classification scheme will be used to create specific classes of resulting 
actions which have been taken as a result of the issues. In the case of design changes specific 
classes for software, hardware or both will be used to categorise resulting actions.  
 
3.2.3.7 Earliest Potential Detection Point 
A key question in looking to implement effective solutions to robustness issues is; what 
was the earliest point at which a particular issue could have been detected. This analysis 
requires a degree of subjective interpretation in many cases as to what was considered 
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reasonable, as it could be argued that if you had perfect foresight and complete specifications 
then most issues could be picked up in Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) at the 
specification stage.  The detection points selected were based on stages from a V-Model 
view, shown in Figure 3.3, of the system development lifecycle running from requirements, 
specification and modelling on the left-hand side and unit, system and vehicle test at the 
right-hand side.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Systems V-Model in automotive application 
 
Additional categories were added for diagnostic validation and manufacturing test at a 
component and vehicle level. 
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The analysis was carried out by the author reviewing each test case and for each issue 
completing a categorisation on a spreadsheet based around the definitions above to give 
comparable results for from which conclusions could be drawn. 
 
3.3 Case Study Results and Analysis 
3.3.1 Overall Occurrence of Robustness Issues 
From the 34 selected case studies of automotive electronic failures a total of 43 issues 
were identified for analysis, as some case studies covered multiple issues. These were 
analysed according to the robustness failure pathology and fault categorization identified in 
the methodology.  26 of the 43 (60%) of all issues were categorized as robustness related, i.e. 
due to faults external to the system controlling the service delivery.  
 
3.3.2 Impact of robustness issues 
The primary impact for the robustness faults only in the case studies on dependability 
attributes is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Primary impact of robustness faults in case studies on dependability attributes 
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From this it can be seen that the primary impact is that the service provided to the user 
is degraded in 58% of cases and its availability is reduced in 38% of the cases. In no cases 
were there any safety impacts but it is possible that if such cases existed they were not 
disclosed. That there are no integrity issues is not unexpected as the vehicle systems, unlike 
IT systems, are not “open” and require specialist tools to access and make changes. 
 
3.3.3 Fault Categorization 
The categorisation of fault according to the defined elementary fault classes is shown in 
Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Categorization of case study faults according to the elementary fault classes 
 
Overall it can be seen that the vast majority (86%) of the issues were adjudged to have 
been created in the development phase, with a smaller amount (12%) during manufacturing 
and only a single issue adjudged to have been created in the operational phase. 
The non-robustness related issues (40% of total) related predominantly to component 
design (fault Types 1-4 - 34%) and manufacturing issues (Types 9 & 13 – 7%) internal to the 
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system. Some of these were elusive faults, such as failure of micro-processor initialisation at 
very low incidence, but were internal to the system, rather than the result of any error 
propagated into the system and so not robustness issues. 
Of the robustness issues the most prevalent fault type is Type 6, accounting for 44% of 
all issues and 73% of the robustness issues. These are transient faults, created in the 
development stage, originating outside the system and affecting software. These were 
typically types of communication faults. The next most common robustness issue is Type 8 
but with a relatively low level of 7% of all issues and 12% of the robustness issues. Type 8 
issues are caused by transient faults, created in the development stage, originating outside the 
system, and affect hardware. In these cases the error at the interface is physical in nature, e.g. 
electrical or electro-magnetic signal, but not naturally occurring. 
 
3.3.4 Robustness Issues – Phenomenological Fault Causes 
For the robustness issues the phenomenological fault causes for both primary external 
fault and for the precipitating faults were classified. Figure 3.4 shows the Primary 
phenomenological causes of robustness issues that are the errors seen at the boundary of the 
system controlling service delivery. 
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Figure 3.4 Primary phenomenological causes of robustness issues 
 
The causes are dominated by those leading to communication errors (73% of total), the 
most significant of which is the timing of interaction. This causal class includes race 
conditions, early and late interactions that lead to anomalous results and service failures. The 
next most significant class is erroneous or missing input signals whereby an external system 
either provides a wrong value of input or failed to provide an input leading to failure in 
service delivery by the receiving system. The final classes relating communication errors are 
spurious communications or corrupted messages where the receiving system receives invalid 
inputs. 
Non-communication related causes include errors in external configuration files which 
set the behaviour of the system, and physical phenomenon where variation has exceeded 
specified or expected levels. 
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Figure 3.5 shows the precipitating phenomenological causes of robustness issues which 
were the indirect causes leading to the external faults. Note that some issues had more than 1 
precipitating cause and some did not have any. 
  
Figure 3.5 Precipitating phenomenological causes of robustness issues 
 
The largest single issue relates to low supply voltage transients, which predominantly 
occur when the engine is being started. These cause some ECUs to shut down and re-
initialise while others are still running due to variations in the supply voltages and operating 
voltages of individual ECUs. This in turn leads to communication errors which were seen as 
direct causes of robustness issues. The high number of robustness issues due to the 
initialization and shut down behaviour of the electrical systems corroborates findings 
reported by Huang et al. (2009) which resulted in new verification methods for transient low 
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voltage events. While new verification methods are a partial solution a key question is; can 
such issues be designed out in the first place? 
There were 3 cases where there were unanticipated use cases. These related to user 
interactions with new systems for which there was not an established pattern of user 
behaviour and so were not adequately considered in the design of communicating systems. 
This leads to missing or wrong communications to the service delivery system.  
There were 3 cases where variations in signal latency were the cause of interaction 
timing errors seen by the service delivery system. Other cases where more than one instance 
was noted were faults in components and spurious communications external to the system 
leading to erroneous inputs into the system. 
 
3.3.5 Activation Patterns  
Table 3.3 shows the results of the analysis of the number of factors in the activation 
pattern of the robustness issues in the case studies.  
 
Table 3.3 Number of factors in activation pattern of robustness issues in case studies 
 
There were 2 robustness issues with permanent activation conditions – purely the 
presence of the external fault would lead to a service failure. In these cases the faults 
85 
themselves were of very low incidence. There were a large proportion of the robustness 
issues where only a single factor was involved in the activation pattern.  Further analysis 
showed that in these cases either the activation factor was an analogue value that had to be 
very precisely controlled with respect to timing or level or it was combined with an elusive 
fault. Most issues needed 2 or 3 activation factors which contributed to the difficulty in 
detecting them. Table 3.4 shows the specific factors in activation patterns of robustness 
issues in case studies. 
  
 
Table 3.4 Specific factors in activation pattern of robustness issues in case studies 
 
Particular actions by the user, e.g. invoking of specific functions, was the most 
common factor being necessary for 50% of the issues. Other more significant factors were 
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low voltage transients, which cause shut-down and initialisation behaviours, and particular 
vehicle powermode states where vulnerabilities only exist in specific powermodes. 
 
3.3.6 Resulting Actions 
For failures related to electronics a key question was whether the failures were related 
to hardware or software. A related issue is whether the resulting modifications were related 
to hardware or to software, a working hypothesis being that software changes would be seen 
as the most expedient to implement. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 3.6 
below. 
 
 
 Figure 3.6. Electronics robustness issues - hardware and software causal areas and 
modified areas  
 
From these results it can be seen that the majority of electronics issues due to 
robustness failures were completely software related and in total software was a contributory 
factor in 85% of failures with only 15% being purely hardware related failures. As expected, 
the modifications resulting from electronics issues were predominantly software and in a 
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number of cases a software change was used to protect against hardware issues through some 
form of defensive programming. 
 To further help the understanding of how the design and development process can be 
enhanced to improve product robustness the actions which were taken as a result of the 
robustness issues were analyzed. The results are shown in Table 3.5. Note that the table 
shows the percentage of cases in which a particular action was taken and that in many cases 
there were multiple actions. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Resulting actions to robustness issues 
 
Unsurprisingly in the vast majority (88%) of cases the design had to be changed – the 
exception being manufacturing process changes (12%). While these represent a number of 
specific responses, the generic design documentation was also updated in 69% of the cases 
studied. A question is why it was not always updated in all cases where design changes were 
made and it is suspected that it was in many more cases but not noted in the documentation. 
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The verification method was also noted as being updated in 62% of cases mainly to 
extend the coverage, duration and conditions of the testing. This highlights one of the 
challenges of testing for robustness in that there are many potential parameters involved and 
that simply boundary or limit testing is not sufficient.  
The FMEA was noted as being updated in 42% of cases indicating they are not 
effectively detecting robustness related failures. What is debatable is whether this is down to; 
the process itself, or the rigor with which is applied, or both. Robustness related faults which 
have a multi-factor activation pattern may often be too subtle and dependent on 
implementation factors to be picked up by a desktop analysis.  
Finally the design review process was noted as being updated in 27% of cases. Design 
reviews are typically based on peer review of design artefacts with respect to best practice 
and “lessons learned” checklists of list particular areas of system design where previous 
issues have occurred.  
 
3.3.7 Earliest Potential Detection Point? 
The results of the analysis assessing where the earliest detection point could be for 
robustness issues are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Estimated earliest detection points of robustness related failures studied 
 
The first observation on the results is that the center of the V is potentially most critical 
in the detection of robustness related failures with 73% of the earliest detection points lying 
in modelling, unit test and system test. This is significant and promising result in that 77% of 
the issues could potentially be picked up before vehicle tests which are expensive, have 
limitations in testing robustness as they represent only a few instances of the systems and are 
restricted in their coverage of the overall test space. It is also interesting that for robustness 
related issues so few of them were thought to be reasonably detectable through reviews of 
requirements and specifications. This was as a result of the robustness related failures not 
always being present and manifest but only occurring when both a fault and its activation 
pattern are present. Hence to be able to detect such failures from a purely textual description 
is difficult - it is necessary to build a model, or a prototype to analyze and observe the effects 
of disturbances, variations and interactions. This is not to say that at a general level 
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requirements and specifications cannot be reviewed for areas where robustness may be a 
concern but in terms of finding specific issues there may be insufficient information to detect 
them at these stages. 
Modelling appears to be a major opportunity in terms of the early detection of a 
significant number of failures, particularly those associated with communication failures. A 
key benefit of a model is the speed of iteration of the tests and the ability to introduce 
variation into the model as opposed to a physical part or software code. However with a 
model the key question is what attributes of the system under test have to be modeled and to 
what level of fidelity to get the desired results. From the case studies parameters related to 
robustness issues were identified earlier and these would then have to be incorporated in a 
model. These parameters are mainly not related to the primary function of the system and 
hence are not routinely modeled but are related to the ability of the system to function. 
Normal practice is to model the control logic or functionality of an ECU while making an 
implicit assumption that the underlying processing platform and data will be available as 
required. From the case studies it is clearly apparent that this is not always the case. This 
suggests a key opportunity for investigation is robustness models which represent the ability 
of a system to function and to interact with other parts of the overall system. 
After modelling, unit testing and system testing are the other major areas of opportunity 
to detect failures early in the lifecycle. Unit and system testing are activities which are 
routinely done, yet had not picked up the failures studied. This therefore suggests that the test 
regimes are not conducting the right types of tests to pick up robustness issues. The question 
of what testing should be done is examined in the next section. 
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3.4 Threats to validity of study 
Before considering conclusions, the limitations and threats to the validity of the case 
study need to be considered. 
 
3.4.1 Selection of cases 
The first area to consider is the selection of the case studies and whether they are 
representative of the wider set of automotive electronic issues. There was a conscious 
decision in the selection to consider only issues encountered in the production phase after the 
development lifecycle. Hence the issues are more likely to be the result of elusive faults, and 
should not be taken to be indicative of all faults during complete lifecycle, as it is to be 
expected that vast majority of faults will be found and rectified during development.  
The case studies came from a single vehicle manufacturer so it needs to be considered 
whether they are more widely representative of other manufacturers. It is not possible to 
make a definitive conclusion without further datasets but from statements quoted in the 
literature review it is clear that issues with automotive electronics is a wider industry 
problem. Also the technology underlying vehicles of different manufacturers are similar, 
much of it based on shared standards e.g. CAN communications networks, and using the 
same pool of tier 1 suppliers, hence it seems likely issues will be similar. This still leaves the 
area of methods and tools as potential cause of differences in issues seen between 
manufacturers if a manufacturer has a particular technique for avoiding a type of issue. 
A further concern is whether there is a sufficient quantity of issues? While overall the 
data is a reasonable sample size care needs to be taken over generalising from smaller 
incidences of faults in specific categories. 
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3.4.2 Selection of the categories 
The selection of the categories was based where possible on existing definitions 
although these had to be augmented and clarified in areas to give more precise definitions to 
work from. However the specific issues were categorised on a bottom up basis which was 
based on the judgment of the person completing the studies and so may be less repeatable. 
 
3.4.3 Categorisation Decisions 
A limitation of the case study is that it was not possible to peer review and cross check 
the categorisation decisions as the base data has been given in confidence. This is partially 
mitigated by the work on defining the top down categories, on the fault pathology and 
through iterating the reviews to check self-consistency of decisions. Future work could 
include correlation studies by another researcher using the categories developed on new data 
sources. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
3.5.1 Overview of Results 
The case study was conducted to better understand the root causes of robustness related 
failures at both a technical and a systematic level to provide focus for further areas of work. 
The conclusions from the case study and their implications for an approach to design for 
robustness are given below. 
The first question the case study set out to answer was what is the prevalence is of 
robustness issues in automotive electronics? The case studies showed the issues that are not 
detected through normal verification methods and reach customers are predominantly 
robustness related.  Of the 43 faults analysed 26 (60%) were robustness related issues due to 
faults external to the system controlling service delivery, and hence it can be concluded that 
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robustness failures are a key issue to be addressed. This does not necessary imply that this 
portion of all failures are robustness related as the case studies didn’t include problems that 
were fixed during development or in-service issues that had more minor impacts. However it 
does suggest that current techniques are generally picking up simpler failure modes but not 
more complex robustness related failures which then manifest themselves as issues when the 
vehicle is in service causing customer dissatisfaction. It therefore verifies the need for work 
in identifying improved techniques to prevent robustness related failures. 
It was found that the primary impacts robustness failures are on reliability, with 58% of 
issues studied giving interrupted or degraded service, and on availability to provide the 
correct service in 38% of the issues studied. None of the issues were safety-related but any 
such issued may have been pre-filtered. 
The fault classification scheme identified the most common robustness fault, 
accounting for 44% of all issues and 73% of the robustness issues, as transient faults, created 
in the development stage, originating outside the system, affecting software. The primary 
cause of this type of fault was predominantly communication errors, the most significant of 
which is the timing of interactions (race conditions, early and late interactions) followed by 
erroneous or missing input signals, spurious communications or corrupted messages. In a 
significant number of cases the precipitating cause for such communication errors was shut-
down and re-initialisation of external systems, often due to low voltage transients. These 
types of issues should be the focus of robustness methods to be developed. 
Analysis of activation patterns of robustness failures concluded that while most were 
complex, involving 2 or 3 factors, a significant number (46%) only required a single factor or 
were permanent (i.e. if the fault occurred then so would the service delivery failure). Further 
analysis showed that in these cases either the activation factor had to be precisely controlled 
with respect to timing or level or it was combined with an elusive fault. Any robustness 
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methods need cater for a variety of activation scenarios including at least 3 factors. Particular 
factors which were highlighted were user operations, low voltage transients and vehicle 
power-mode behaviour. While the study highlighted a number of important robustness 
related parameters a methodology for identifying and understanding these as part of the 
system design would be highly desirable. 
The design changes were made in response to the robustness issues in 88% of cases 
with these being predominantly software changes. Other common actions were specification 
changes (69%), verification method changes (62%) and FMEA updates (42%) which suggests 
these processes are not fully effective in preventing robustness issues. Design for robustness 
methods to be developed should therefore seek to augment or improve these. 
The analysis of the earliest detection points suggests some opportunity to “left shift” 
detection to earlier in the development cycle before vehicles tests, particularly if viable 
model based testing approaches can be developed. 
 
3.5.2 Discussion on Implications for Robustness Framework 
Robustness concerns the resilience of a system to maintain a specified level of service 
despite errors caused by external faults and therefore is more about the ability to cope with 
these rather than preventing them occurring as this may not be possible, particularly in a 
Systems of Systems context.  In a number of cases additional robustness was added into the 
system by design changes, e.g. defensive programming, after the occurrence of failures. 
There is a need to capture and classify such measures at a generic level such that they could 
be used as guidance in techniques at a software, hardware and system level to improve 
robustness.  
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While this would help at a bottom up-level there is a need for methods for a designer to 
be able to argue at a top down level whether their system is robust taking into account 
potential impacts from other systems.  
The results give some cause for doubt as to the effectiveness of “desktop” analysis 
methods, e.g. specification reviews and FMEAs, in predicting robustness related failures.  
The potential robustness related issues are too numerous for exhaustive manual evaluation 
especially as they are often due to a complex combination of events (faults and activation 
patterns). This observation should be expected given that the failures in systems of systems 
are often emergent, and limitations in the effectiveness of FMEAs to detect complex issues 
are an expected shortcoming rather than a lack of rigor. 
If predictive techniques such as FMEAs have limitations in detection of robustness 
failures in complex systems then it suggests that more empirically based techniques are 
required at an earlier stage in the development – i.e. there is a need to model and test. This in 
itself presents a number of key questions such as the selection of particular robustness related 
attributes to model and the ability to conduct modular testing on sub-parts of the system 
rather than model the system of systems as a whole. These reemphasize the need for the 
analytical techniques to determine important sources of variation in the system and to 
construct modular arguments for the robustness of a system. 
Fundamental to the robustness of electronic control units is the continued availability 
of the processing platform and the data to implement functions. An area for investigation is 
robustness modelling of non-functional properties, e.g. voltage, initialization, and power-
modes, relating to the ability of the system to function as opposed to the function itself.   
Assuming such models can be constructed then the next consideration is the Design Of 
Experiment (DOE) method to be used to test them. In the case studies the test regimes were 
often updated as a result of failures particularly in relation to coverage and conditions. With a 
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number of independently variable parameters which are continuous in nature the test space 
explodes and, even with simulations, the experiment has to be constrained to match the time 
limitations. For such a design of experiments scalability is highly desirable such that the level 
of confidence increases throughout the testing. It is important to recognize that in the case of 
robustness testing, as opposed to functional testing, the test is not just looking for an expected 
response but for a much wider set of potentially undesirable results.  
This case study has highlighted several potential directions for further work through 
understanding the nature of robustness issues. The next chapter will develop an overall 
framework for design for robustness and identify on specific method development required 
within this framework. 
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Chapter 4 - Development of Design for Robustness Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter utilises the understanding from the case studies into the actual causes of 
robustness issues in complex automotive electronics, both design and process related, and the 
knowledge of applicable techniques derived from the literature review to propose a Design 
for Robustness Framework for automotive electronics.  
 
4.2 Design for Robustness Framework Requirements 
In this section requirements for the Design for Robustness (DFR) framework listed 
based on the findings from the literature review and case studies. 
 
[REQ1] The DFR Framework must support the system designers of individual systems and 
systems of systems during the design and development phases of a project. 
 
[REQ2] The DFR Framework must support the specification of what service failures are 
acceptable as a result of external failures and how often they can occur in order to have a 
definition of what is acceptably robust. 
 
[REQ3] The DFR Framework must provide a method to give assurance that the system can 
be trusted to be robust. 
 
[REQ4] The DFR Framework must support an iterative and increment development 
approach. 
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[REQ5] The DFR Framework must provide a means for upfront risk analysis to determine 
priority areas where design effort to address systematic risks needs to be. 
 
[REQ6] The DFR Framework must recognise the potential to apply formal methods to 
robustness issues. 
 
[REQ7] The DFR Framework must provide a means of modelling robustness relevant 
properties at a useful level of abstraction. 
 
[REQ8] The DFR Framework must provide the ability to model interactions between systems 
including fault insertion. 
 
[REQ9] The DFR Framework must address transient faults originating outside the system 
affecting software which are typically types of communication faults including: race 
conditions, early and late interactions, erroneous or missing input signals, spurious 
communications or corrupted messages. 
 
[REQ10] The DFR Framework must incorporate robustness related parameters of low supply 
voltage transients, ECUs shut down and initialisation, powermodes, and user operations. 
 
[REQ11] The DFR Framework must cater for activation patterns including at least 3 factors. 
 
[REQ12] The DFR Framework must provide a methodology for identifying and prioritising 
robustness related parameters as part of the system design. 
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[REQ13] The DFR Framework must provide a means of incorporating best practice design 
guidelines. 
 
[REQ14] The DFR Framework must incorporate a means of systematic knowledge capture. 
 
[REQ15] The DFR Framework must incorporate best practice test methods, including 
scalability such that the level of confidence increases throughout the testing. 
 
[REQ16] The DFR Framework must be capable of detecting undesired results from 
verification tests not just expected response. 
 
4.3 Overall design for robustness framework 
An overall framework for design for robustness is proposed as shown in Figure 4.1. 
This framework starts with an initial design analysis based on experience, variance analysis 
and the development of robustness case. Beyond this an empirical approach is taken learning 
lessons from agile software development to iteratively deploy and test executable design 
artifacts from as early a stage as possible. In designing these test artifacts an input should be 
the design requirements identified in the robustness case as well as from robust design 
guidelines which should be embodied in standards, training and peer review processes. 
The two items highlighted in orange boxes of robustness cases and robustness models 
will be the subject of development of new techniques within the thesis, the items in the grey 
boxes largely utilise existing techniques identified within the literature review. 
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Figure 4.1. Framework for robust design of complex automotive electronics systems 
 
The interactions between the individual elements shown by the numbered arrows are as 
follows: 
1. Details of robustness factors and associated use cases for the design of experiment. 
2. Design requirements to support the robustness case. 
3. Design guidelines based on prior to knowledge and experience of the domain. 
4. Details of the design of the experiment to be carried out in the testing phase. 
5. Models, code or physical parts to be tested. 
6. Test results for analysis. 
7. Requirements for re-testing based on analysis of test results. 
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8. Requirements for changing design of experiment based on analysis of test results. 
9. Requirements for change to the design of the system under test based on analysis of 
test results. 
10. New domain knowledge to be captured based on analysis of test results. 
 
The intent is that this framework be used by system designers throughout the design & 
development of the system [REQ1] starting from that early concept phase of the project 
identifying robustness factors and design requirements. Then system developers progressively 
iterate through a design, implement, test, analyse and improve cycle, initially using models, 
then components and finally vehicles as development progresses [REQ4]. Throughout 
development domain knowledge should be captured and used to improve design guidelines. 
The individual elements are further described in the following section. 
  
4.4 Design for Robustness Framework Elements 
In this section the findings from the case studies are used to identify individual 
elements of the design for robustness framework. The techniques identified in the literature 
review are then used to develop methods within these elements with new techniques 
proposed to address any gaps. References are given throughout to indicate sources of further 
information on a particular method. 
 
4.4.1 Design Guidelines 
Design guidelines are required to systematically capture domain knowledge [REQ14]. 
In a number of cases additional robustness was added into the system after the occurrence of 
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failures by design changes, e.g. defensive programming. There is a need to capture and 
classify robust design measures at a generic level such that they could be used as guidance in 
techniques at a software, hardware and system level to improve robustness. As well as 
lessons learned from automotive experience, for which the DFR Framework creates a 
feedback mechanism from testing, design guidelines should incorporate best practice design 
guidelines the literature review highlighted some best practice from other fields such as the 
concepts of survivability (Knight et al, 2001), Self Stabilization  (Arora and Gouda, 1994), 
and elementary interface design concepts (Kopetz, 1999) [REQ13].  
There could be a number of complementary mechanisms for deploying such design 
guidelines. Specific requirements can be embodied as company design standards, which will 
ensure compliance in any system they are cascaded to. However a more effective mechanism 
may be via training whereby the wider principles of design for robustness can be taught as 
well as specific practices. A robust design principles and techniques course would fit well 
with modular technical training schemes. Another mechanism would be Design Guidelines 
documents that capture good and bad practice, though less formal than standards they can be 
more flexibly applied. Robustness cases are also a mechanism to capture knowledge which 
will be subsequently discussed. These mechanisms should be backed up by design reviews by 
peers and robustness specialists. 
The guidelines should provide guidance on: the specification of acceptable service 
levels for degraded modes when faults are present [REQ2], fault tolerant design methods 
particularly against communication faults [REQ9] and measures to improve design 
robustness to parameters of low supply voltage transients, ECU shut down and initialisation, 
powermodes, and user operations [REQ10]. 
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4.4.2 Identification of Critical Robustness Parameters 
The case studies highlighted that there were certain parameters and operating modes 
which were more prone to cause robustness related failures. Examples of these were supply 
voltage variability, processor availability and system initialisation and shut down operating 
modes. While the case studies highlighted the difficulty in relying on desktop methods for 
identification of specific failure modes, a breakdown and analysis of robustness parameters 
to identify areas which are more susceptible to robustness failures would allow more design 
focus on these [REQ5] and specific levels of acceptable service to be specified against these 
[REQ2]. 
This variability analysis could be achieved through techniques such as review of 
previous design issues (the case studies serve as a basis for this) and variability focused 
design FMEAs. One practice of particular use is Parameter diagrams (P Diagrams) (Fritzsche, 
2006). These break down noise sources in a system against those caused by; piece to piece 
variation, change over time, customer, external environment and system interaction 
[REQ10]. Those parameters deemed critical for robustness either due to experience failures 
or criticality of impact could then be the focus of particular design measures or scrutiny in 
validation [REQ12]. 
 
4.4.3 Robustness Cases 
While design guidelines would help at a bottom-up level there is a need for methods 
that would enable the system designer to argue at a top-down level whether their system is 
robust taking into account potential impacts from other systems. A top-down method used in 
safety assessment is Safety Cases which are structured arguments concerning why a system 
meets its safety goals. It may be possible to use this approach in an analogous manner to 
argue why a system is robust.   
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Hence a Robustness Case would be a structured argument on why a system (of systems) 
is robust and is analogous to a safety case which “should communicate a clear, 
comprehensive and defensible argument that a particular system is acceptably safe to operate 
in a particular context” (Kelly and Weaver, 2004). The safety case should clearly argue how 
the evidence provided, e.g. design specifications, development methods and test results, 
demonstrates that the safety requirements of the system have been fulfilled. In a similar 
manner the Robustness Case gives a structured argument for how robustness requirements 
are met. This serves as a structured thought experiment for the system designers making them 
consider and explicitly express robustness objectives at an early stage of the design 
[REQ2/5]. It also gives confidence to decision makers that there has been adequate 
consideration of robustness in the system design and there is traceable evidence of how 
robustness objectives have been met [REQ3]. The literature review identified that safety 
cases often use a notation called Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) proposed by Kelly and 
Weaver (2004) and this could be adopted for Robustness Cases as it offers a visual 
representation of the argument structure which can be more readily understood. Benefits 
using safety arguments for modular systems (Bate, Hawkins and McDermid 2003), in that if 
modularity could be argued the safety case would hold for a variety of configurations, may 
also apply to certain automotive systems where there are standard elements e.g. network 
interfaces allowing degrees of modularity.  
The argument structures can document best practice approaches to achieving particular 
robustness objectives [REQ14] to make design resilient to typical types of robustness failure 
[REQ9/10]. 
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4.4.4 Design and Construction of Test Artefacts 
The next step is to design and construct test artifacts system at various levels of 
abstraction, which initially will be models of the operating strategy at a high level [REQ7], 
before moving to more detailed models of the control and physical interactions and 
ultimately physical parts. In designing these test artifacts an input should be the design 
requirements identified in the robustness case and from robust design. 
The case studies identified that an important factor for the robust operation of systems 
is the availability of the processing platform and the data to implement functions and the 
ability of the system to cope with spurious disruptions to these [REQ8]. Robustness 
modelling methods will be developed in the next chapters focusing on non-functional 
properties, e.g. voltage, initialization, and power-modes, relating to the ability of the system 
to function as opposed to the function itself [REQ9/10]. These models could be used for 
robustness analysis, formal model checking [REQ6] and as a platform model within a SIL or 
HIL test rather than assuming the control strategy can run at any time. 
As well as more robustness orientated models encompassing the failure modes of 
processing and communication systems more robustness orientated models are required of 
physical systems to encompass the complete scope of variation within them rather than 
modelling them at a nominal state. Such advanced physical modelling methods and their 
application to HIL based robustness testing of control systems is described by 
Thanagasundram (Thanagasundram et al., 2008).  
There is also a requirement for techniques to explore use cases, particularly for new 
systems. Modelling and simulation can be used to support earlier and wider user trials of new 
functions. An alternative approach may be to use formal analysis of models to determine 
potential situations whereby undesirable events can occur, i.e. reverse engineer use cases 
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[REQ6]. These would have to be plausibility checked to determine whether they could 
potentially occur. 
 
4.4.5 Design Of Experiment (DOE) 
The most suitable techniques identified in the literature review for the design of 
experiments for robustness testing were; structured pseudo random testing, Classification 
Tree Method and covering arrays [REQ15]. 
Monte Carlo or Pseudo random testing can quickly achieve wide coverage of the 
overall test space then fill it in at an increasing density. This approach has already been 
proved to be effective for dealing with robustness issues related to low voltages (Huang, 
McMurran, Dhadyalla and Jones, 2009). This work was based around a relatively limited 
number of parameters and used weighting of the pseudo random distributions to increase 
coverage in critical areas. 
For more parameters the design of the experiment will have to be further optimized and 
should also utilize expert knowledge in order to do this. An approach may be to view the 
experimental design as an optimization problem to give a more dynamic or agile design of 
experiments whereby the experiment evolves based on previous results of random sampling. 
A structured approach to design of experiment for robustness testing using classification tree 
method and covering arrays is described by Dhadyalla (Dhadyalla et al., 2013) [REQ11]. 
 
4.4.6 Robustness Testing 
Robustness testing should take place on the test artifacts at various levels of 
abstraction. Initially this will be on models using off-line test platforms, moving through 
hardware in loop testing at component and system level, before testing of vehicle level. Such 
a multi-level systematic approach to model-based testing is advocated in model based 
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systems engineering approaches (Forder, 2012). Test Automation is a key enabling 
technology to be able to conduct a large number of tests, allowing increased coverage and an 
ability to repeat testing at all change points [REQ11]. This can become more difficult as test 
artifacts become physical parts in terms of observability and may require development of 
bespoke test solutions such as video capture and image processing (Huang et al, 2009). 
An alternative approach to verifying models in terms of robustness is to use formal 
methods [REQ6]. This approach would use model checkers based on formal methods to 
confirm that the important properties related to robustness hold. These properties could be 
based on the robustness goals identified within the robustness cases. There is collaborative 
work in projects such as the PICASSOS project (Ricardo, 2013) to mature formal methods in 
the context of verifying the functional safety of automotive systems which if successful will 
allow them to be applied in a robustness context. 
 
4.4.7 Data Analysis 
For such complex and large scale experiments into robustness it becomes important not 
only to be able to automate the testing but also to automate the analysis of data. Inevitably 
such experiments will create the requirement to analyze very large data sets and, as some 
robustness issues will not be discovered until the vehicle is in the field, this will also include 
field data.  
 Data analysis of the results of robustness testing can also be challenging not just due to 
the volume of data but also because the test is not looking for the expected response to a 
stimulus as in functional testing but rather whether an unexpected response has occurred, 
which by definition is more difficult to find [REQ16]. Therefore the use of data-mining tools 
is essential (Taylor et al, 2012). Ideally continuous measures of the health of a system and its 
components should be used as these can expose areas of the test space where levels of 
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variation or interactions cause risk without manifesting in customer level failures which then 
can be the subject of more focused investigation. 
 
4.5 Conclusions and Next Steps 
This framework identified represents a structured approach to design for robustness of 
automotive electronics. Many parts of the framework are based on state of the art practices 
identified within the literature review. Figure 4.2 summarises how the requirements for the 
framework set out at the beginning of the chapter are addressed by the various elements.   
As well as integrating existing methods there are two new methods of robustness cases 
and robustness models identified in the framework which require further development. In the 
next chapter these methods will be developed through application to a fiber-optic based 
infotainment system to create guidelines for their generic application in terms of inputs, 
contents and structuring of the robustness case and models. Subsequently they are evaluated 
through trialing them by applying them to a hybrid electric propulsion system. 
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[REQ1] support the system designers of individual systems and system 
of systems (architectural level) during the design and 
development phases of a project.
X
[REQ2] support the specification of what service failures are 
acceptable as a result of external failures and how often they 
can occur in order to have a measure of what is acceptably 
robust.
X X X
[REQ3] provide a method to give assurance that the system can be 
trusted to be robust.
X
[REQ4] support an iterative and increment development approach. X
[REQ5] provide a means for upfront risk analysis to determine where 
design effort to address systematic risks needs to be.
X X
[REQ6] recognise the potential to apply formal methods to robustness 
issues.
X X
[REQ7] provide a means of modelling robustness relevant properties 
at a useful level of abstraction.
X
[REQ8] provide the ability model interactions between systems 
including fault insertion.
X
[REQ9] address transient faults originating outside the system 
affecting software which are typically types of communication 
faults includes race conditions, early and late interactions , 
erroneous or missing input signals, spurious communications or 
corrupted messages.
X X X X
[REQ10] incorporate robustness related parameters of low supply 
voltage transients, ECUs shut down and initialisation, 
powermodes, user operations.
X X X X
[REQ11] cater for a variety of activation patterns including at least 3 
factors.
X X
[REQ12] provide a methodology for identifying and prioritising 
robustness related parameters as part of the system design.
X
[REQ13] provide a means of incorporating best practice design 
guidelines.
X
[REQ14] incorporate a means of systematic knowledge capture.
X X
[REQ15] incorporate best practice test methods, including scalability 
such that the level of confidence increases throughout the 
testing.
X
[REQ16] be capable of detecting undesired results from verification 
tests not just expected response.
X
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Figure 4.2. Design for Robustness Framework elements vs. requirements 
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Chapter 5 – Development of New Robustness Techniques 
through Application to an Infotainment System 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the two novel techniques, specifically robustness cases and robustness 
modelling, are developed through application to a fiber-optic network based infotainment 
system. Firstly an overview of the MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) fiber-optic 
infotainment network is given as background to give an understanding of the technology and 
associated issues. Following this a robustness case for a MOST infotainment system is 
developed based on safety case practices identified in the literature review. The next section 
describes the development of robustness models, initially as a generic approach before 
describing application to the Control Channel of a MOST infotainment system. Initial 
conclusions are made on the usefulness of these two new techniques. Finally the generic 
content of the core methods is abstracted and documented.  
 
5.2 MOST Infotainment Systems 
MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) is a communication system with a flexible 
architecture designed specifically for automotive infotainment systems. This section gives an 
overview of MOST, a more in-depth description is given in “MOST - The Automotive 
Multimedia Network” (Grzemba 2008). The detailed specifications for the network and 
network interface controller used in this work are contained in MOST Specification Rev 2.4 
(MOST Cooperation, 2005) and OS8104 MOST Network Transceiver Final Product Data 
Sheet (Oasis, 2003).  
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Growing infotainment system complexity, particularly multiple audio and video 
channels causing excessive amounts of wiring, lead to the need for a high bandwidth 
network. The key requirements for this network are that it should be capable of the 
distribution of multiple digital audio channels, have a high immunity to noise and be highly 
flexible and reconfigurable. As a result vehicle manufacturers and suppliers formed the 
MOST Cooperation to develop common standards for such a network. MOST was first 
applied to the BMW 7 Series in 2001 and is now used by BMW, Mercedes, VW/Audi, 
Toyota, Volvo, Porsche, Jaguar Land Rover and Hyundai in over 100 vehicle models.  MOST 
is now available in three bandwidth variants, 25Mbits/sec (MOST25), 50Mbits/sec 
(MOST50) and 150Mbits/sec (MOST150), with the increase in bandwidth supporting video 
networking and high definition audio. 
MOST is effectively a composite bus able to transmit three types of information with 
different requirements. The first is control data necessary for command signals, status signals 
and small packet data. This needs comparatively limited bandwidth, message arbitration and 
low latency. The second data type is synchronous data for continuous real-time transmission 
of streaming audio and video files. This needs large amounts of guaranteed bandwidth with 
minimal buffering. The third data type is asynchronous data for transmission of sporadic 
bursts of ‘large’ packet data e.g. contacts lists, navigation data or web pages. This needs 
intermittent access to a variable bandwidth channel. 
To achieve a sufficiently high bandwidth, noise immune communication MOST 
typically uses an optical medium to transfer data with an eye-safe LED light-source linked by 
Plastic Optical Fiber (POF) in a ring topology. To accommodate different types of data the 
MOST data frame is split into three sections with an ability to dynamically re-apportion 
bandwidth between synchronous and asynchronous data. The MOST topology and frame 
structure is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. 
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Figure 5.1 MOST topology and frame structure 
 
The operation of the bus is controlled by the bus master which generates a frame that 
travels from node to node around the ring. Each node receives information and updates any 
of its own information with a 2 bit delay per node in transmission. Each frame is 512 bits so 
the bus master receives back the start of the frame while still sending the frame.  
Each MOST node has a “Network Interface Controller” (NIC) which provides the low 
level interface to the bus via a Fiber Optic Transceiver (FOT). Each node must also 
implement a standard set of communication software called MOST NetServices which 
control communication from the application software to the network interface controller. 
This abstracts control to application level peer to peer communications via standard interface 
definitions known as Fblocks (short for function blocks). It is vital that the network interface 
controllers and NetServices implemented on all nodes are compatible. 
For the robustness of MOST-based infotainment systems the initialisation is a key 
phase which is influenced by the status of the individual MOST nodes and the interactions 
between them on the control channel. MOST allows features to be dynamically registered, 
typically at start-up, through a process of each node registering its function blocks and then 
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compiling and distributing a registry of which functions each node contains. Following this 
the nodes can set up peer-to-peer interfaces. If new functions are registered or de-registered 
during or after the initialisation nodes are notified of this configuration change but this can be 
disruptive during initialisation. 
Hence initialisation is the busiest period of MOST control channel communication, and 
becoming increasingly challenging to optimise as the number of customer features, and 
therefore number of MOST function blocks, increases. There are key customer requirements 
to satisfy, not only that the system starts up in a robust manner with continuity of correct 
service (i.e. reliability), but that certain infotainment and comfort features are available as 
soon as the vehicle is started (i.e. availability). 
Types of service failures which could occur and must be mitigated in the system design 
include; excessive delay before audio sources are available, missing customer features, and 
delayed system startup. Traditionally, these types of failures are driven out during system 
practical testing and signoff. This can be a long resource consuming process, even with 
recent advancements in automated testing, and will only become more complex as feature 
numbers increase. 
Infotainment systems must be designed to be highly modular and reconfigurable to 
allow varying levels of features to be offered and cater for variations between markets e.g. 
navigation systems and tuners. This presents an additional challenge in ensuring the system is 
robust in all configurations. 
 
5.3 Infotainment Robustness Case Development 
In this section a robustness case is developed for an infotainment system analogous to a 
safety case based on methods for safety case construction identified in the literature review. 
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The development of the infotainment system used for the study was already underway and so 
the objective was to ensure the set of specifications and requirements were sufficient to meet 
robustness objectives. At the end of the chapter the generic principles behind the approach 
and development steps are captured. 
 
5.3.1 Goal Structuring Notation  
The diagrammatic technique Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was selected to 
construct the robustness case for infotainment as the approach offers benefits in terms of 
clarity and structure (Kelly and Weaver 2004). Of particular importance in the context of 
complex systems is that GSN can be used to hierarchically decompose robustness objectives 
into a number of sub-arguments which have the potential to be reused as design “patterns” 
(Kelly and McDermid 1997).  
Goal Structuring Notation has symbols representing Goals, Solutions, Strategies, 
Contexts, Assumptions and Justifications with arrows representing relationships between 
them. Arguments are constructed in a hierarchical form and strategies can be used to describe 
the approach for decomposing a high level goal into sub-goals. The GSN Community 
Standard (GSN Community 2011) gives a comprehensive and authoritative definition of the 
Goal Structuring Notation and best practice guidelines on its use. A short overview of the key 
constructs is given below through description of an example. 
Figure 5.2 shows an example of part of a GSN safety argument. At the top is a safety 
goal that hazard occurrences occur less than defined targets, in this case it is actually a sub-
goal within the overall safety case. This goal is shown by the sideways linking arrow with the 
hollow arrowhead to be in the particular context of risk targets for hazard occurrence. The 
arrow downwards with the solid arrowhead shows how the goal is supported by a strategy of 
using industry standard controllability targets which is in the context of these industry 
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standards. The strategy is supported by a single goal in the example though it is typical that a 
strategy decomposes a goal into a number of sub-goals. The goal in this case, is that the 
Markov chain failure probability modelling of the items on the fault tree analysis meets these 
targets. In this case an assumption is highlighted that the fault tree analysis is comprehensive 
which notes an unsubstantiated statement. This assumption must be followed up to ensure the 
safety case is robust. It is also possible to add justifications to the diagram to give evidence 
for assertions. Finally the goal is shown to have a solution, marked as a circle, of the fault 
tree and Markov probability analysis that would be the evidence provided to show the goal 
has been met. In this case it is a single solution but it can be multiple solutions which must 
all be done to meet a goal or alternative solutions which are individually sufficient. 
 
Figure 5.2 Example of Goal Structuring Notation (based on Barker, Kendall and Darlinson 
1997) 
 
Goal 
Strategy 
Solution 
Context 
Assumption 
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The safety case for complex systems can be decomposed into a hierarchical argument 
consisting of a number of modules which can be re-used in similar contexts (Kelly 2001, 
Bates, Bate, Hawkins, Kelly, and McDermid, 2003). This allows for separation of concerns 
while maintaining a coherent overall argument and enables the identification of goals in 
discrete argument modules which are applicable at system of system, system and component 
levels. To compose different arguments modules together, the goals required and fulfilled by 
other modules must be consistent. For example the contexts assumed by different modules 
must be shared. When a successful composition has been achieved an output is a contract 
which records the agreed relationships between modules. Changes to a module argument 
thereafter then must adhere to the conditions of the contract. 
Kelly goes on to list the key principles behind the architecture of a modular safety case 
as: 
 High Cohesion and Low Coupling  
 Supporting Work Division and Contractual Boundaries 
 Supporting future expansion 
 Isolating change 
Some of the inferences from this are a separation of software and hardware arguments, 
separate arguments for highly dynamic parts of systems, avoiding unnecessary restrictions of 
context and care in-cross referencing and definition of goals which should be as solution 
independent as possible. Figure 5.3 shows an illustration of the partitioning of a Modular 
Safety Argument Structure for Integrated Modular Avionics given in Kelly, 2001. 
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Figure 2.3. Example – Modular Safety Argument Structure for Integrated Modular Avionics  
Figure 5.3 Modular safety argument structure for integrated modular avionics illustration of 
safety case partitioning (Kelly, 2001) 
 
Palin and Habli (2010) set out to define an approach to create a “safety case catalogue” 
using GSN patterns and modular extensions capable of constructing a full vehicle safety case. 
The high level argument for vehicle safety is split into strategies for assuring acceptable 
safety during and after product development. The strategy for assuring safety during product 
development is supported by two types of sub modules (“away goals”): one for meeting pre-
defined system safety requirements e.g. crash performance regulations, and a second type for 
system safety which has instances for each vehicle system. The strategy for assuring post 
product development safety is supported by two sub-modules one relating to production and 
the other relating to servicing, in-use monitoring and maintenance. 
 For the product development away goals top level argument patterns were developed. 
The System Safety argument was expressed as a "Risk Management Argument Pattern" 
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which had three Away Goals, i.e. sub modules, justifying the processes used for Hazard 
identification, the specification of safety goals and for the creation of the FMEA. The case 
study was conducted on a stop/start system and the instantiation of the 'Risk Management 
Argument Pattern ' and ‘Risk Mitigation Argument Pattern’ were illustrated. 
The authors observed this approach led to better argued and more traceable safety cases 
and noted the modular structure was a good method of linking design artifacts e.g. state, 
sequence and logic diagrams to the safety case. The authors also stated there were a number 
of limitations but did not expand on these other than to state it was necessary for those 
constructing the safety case to be familiar with the domain. 
 
5.3.2 Application of Goal Structuring Notation to Robustness Cases 
The first concern in the development of the Infotainment GSN robustness case was the 
selection of a suitable tool. There are a number of tools available; the GSN Working Group 
(2012) lists the following: 
ASCE (Adelard Safety Case Editor) Adelard www.adelard.co.uk 
E-Safety CasePraxis HI S www.esafetycase.com 
GSN CaseMaker ERA Technology  www.era.co.uk 
ISCADE (Integrated Safety Case Development Environment)RCM2 www.iscade.co.uk 
ISISHigh Integrity Solutions www.highintegritysolutions.com 
University of York Freeware Visio Add-on - University of York 
 
After comparing with a bespoke GSN modelling tool (ASCE) it was decided to use 
Microsoft Visio with the University of York Freeware Visio Add-on as this offered the 
required functionality in a readily available and easy to use tool. In particular the University 
of York plug-in offers good support for modular arguments. For an industry roll-out of this 
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technique it would be necessary to revisit tool selection based on: the tools already used in a 
particular organisation, the ability to link to other tools such as requirements management 
tools and the ability to export GSN as a hyperlinked HTML file offered by some commercial 
tools. 
The first step in developing a GSN safety case is to define: the high level safety goal, 
the system and the related context to which it applies, so a similar approach was taken for the 
robustness case. For the infotainment system robustness case the top level goal was defined 
as “Infotainment system is acceptably robust in normal operation”. To provide clarification 
on the particular system a contextual statement was linked to defined the system context as 
“Individual Systems within GEN2.1 Phase 3 MOST Infotainment System”. While the 
definition of the system is suitably precise it was recognised further steps would be required 
to define the context of normal operation and to justify what was acceptable robustness. 
However for this case study the emphasis was on developing the argument structure so it was 
decided to focus on this rather than further resolving these application specific definitions. 
Hence there was a need to state two assumptions regarding this goal that would need to be 
followed up and clarified. The first was that normal operating conditions are defined in the 
system specification. The second was that acceptable robustness is defined in the system 
specifications, i.e. the acceptable levels of service during external failures. This top level 
argument is shown in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3. Infotainment system robustness case top level goal 
 
Having identified the top level goal the next step was to develop a strategy to 
decompose this into a number of sub-goals which would form the basis of argument modules. 
Using the previously noted principles of high cohesion and low coupling, supporting work 
division and contractual boundaries, supporting future expansion and isolating change a 
proposal for the decomposition of the infotainment robustness case was developed and is 
shown in Table 5.1. 
OEM Supplier
Software 
Operating system  Argument for robustness of operating system Derivatives for operating systems
Functions  Argument for robustness of implementation of specific functions Specific for function
Function Interaction  Argument for robustness of interaction of function with others Specific or overall argument?
Hardware 
Application Hardware  Argument for robustness of node hardware Specific for node
Communications channels 
MOST Physical layer  Argument for robustness of MOST Physical Layer Generic
NIC / INIC  Argument for robustness of Network Interface Component Specific
Netservices  Argument for robustness of Netservices Generic
Application layer  Argument for robustness of application layer interface to netservices Specific for node
Transient Behavious
Initialisation   Argument for robustness of initialisation behaviour Generic
Shut down   Argument for robustness of shutdown behaviour Generic
Error Recovery
MOST  Argument for robustness of MOST error recovery Generic
Component  Argument for robustness of component error recovery e.g. watchdogs Specific
Unintenional Interaction
Unintenional Interaction   Argument for robustness against unintended interactions Generic?
Configuration Argument
Configuration Argument  Argument for robustness of configurability of system Generic
Responsibility Generic/ Specific
(Instantiation Required)DescriptionArgument
 
Table 5.1 - Decomposition of the infotainment robustness case into argument modules 
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The intent of this approach was to recognise work division and contractual boundaries 
particularly between the OEM and the supplier and where different parts of the organisation 
specify aspects of the system behaviour at hardware, software and communications levels. In 
addition, noting areas of high risk identified by the case studies, specific argument modules 
were added for transient behaviours (initialisation and shut down), for error recovery and for 
unintentional interactions. Finally, recognising this was a modular system, an argument was 
added concerning the configurability of the system, i.e. justification that the system would be 
robust in any potential configuration. This was used to define the top level argument structure 
breaking down the top level goals into sub-goals with associated argument modules shown in 
figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Infotainment system robustness case top level argument structure 
 
Each of the argument modules identified in the top level argument was developed by 
breaking down each argument specific top-level goal into strategies, sub-goals and solutions 
which would form the evidence for achieving each sub-goal. These required domain 
knowledge to create and in this case were developed largely bottom up using information 
provided by relevant technical experts. However this did show that the person constructing 
the robustness argument did not have to be a domain expert providing they had adequate 
knowledge of automotive electronics and access to domain experts.  
An example of one of these argument modules for the network interface controller is 
shown in Figure 5.5 with the full argument being contained in Appendix 1. The argument 
module shown illustrates the decomposition strategy for the robustness of the network 
interface into; selection of approved components, using correct version of firmware, 3
rd
 party 
review, device level and system level verification testing. The solutions for these are the 
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evidence of supplier certificates of compliance, results of 3
rd
 party review and results of 
supplier component tests and in-house system tests.  In some cases a part of the strategy to 
meet a goal would refer to an existing solution in another argument module.  
In constructing these arguments it helped identify where there were adequate measures 
in place and where there were gaps. This was possible through review of the argument to 
determine completeness and whether the solutions proposed were adequate in meeting the 
goals. One example was in the case of the network interface controller argument, where on 
the basis of the proposed solutions it was questioned whether the system Design Verification 
Method (DVM) had adequate robustness testing. In future application the argument should be 
the initial basis for robustness design reviews at an early stage in development to highlight 
and address such risks. 
The robustness argument also highlights the need to follow up gathering evidence of 
compliance, both internally and externally, with each sub-goal rather than trusting that this 
had been done. 
 
Figure 5.5 - GSN robustness argument module for the Network Interface Controller 
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5.4 Robustness Modelling 
This section describes the approach taken to develop robustness models for distributed 
automotive electronics systems. These models were initially developed at a generic level in 
MATLAB Simulink and Stateflow to be able to capture both continuous and state based 
behaviour. Subsequently these models have been targeted at a specific application of the 
initialisation of a MOST infotainment system. The objective of this modelling was to be able 
to simulate the initialisation process to understand the critical parameters to the robustness 
and consistency of the process and to be able to investigate alternative strategies. At the end 
of the chapter the generic principles behind the approach and guidelines for model 
development are captured. 
 
5.4.1 Approach To Modelling 
The first concern with the development of any model is the level of fidelity to the real 
system to make it realisable and useable while allowing behaviour in the areas of concern to 
be sufficiently representative to make valid conclusions. In particular it is necessary to decide 
which attributes should be embodied in the model, the level of detail to which they must be 
modelled and which attributes can be left out in the abstraction of the model.  
From the study of robustness related failures of automotive electronics it was seen that 
important factors are those related to the availability of the processing platform and the 
timely availability of data to implement functions from other systems. Hence it is necessary 
to model non-functional (to the customer) properties, e.g. voltage, initialization, and power-
modes, relating to the ability of the system to function. 
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This focus on the ability of the system to function as opposed to the function itself then 
allows the effort to construct the model to be considerably reduced if the functional 
behaviour can be abstracted.  The initial approach for doing this was to consider functions as 
operational if the processing platforms to implement it were available and the other functions 
providing input signals were available.   
At a Systems of Systems level for automotive electronics it is necessary to capture 
continuous behaviour, such as the response to a varying cranking voltage, as well as state 
behaviour as robustness failures can be a combination of both. It was therefore determined to 
model the continuous behaviour in MATLAB Simulink and the state behaviour of an 
individual ECU (Electronic Control Unit) in Stateflow. These models were initially 
developed at a generic level based on five ECUs with a variety of initialisation characteristics 
connected via a CAN bus to explore the modelling approach.  
 
5.4.2 Development Of Generic Model  
A generic model was iteratively developed; the resulting top level structure is 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. The model consists of a number of individual blocks representing 
the ECUs, an operation mode block controlled by an engine start-stop switch which in turn 
controls supply voltage generation blocks and the powermode of the ECUs. Powermodes are 
used on vehicles where the key controlled states are replaced by electronically generated ones 
for power-off, accessory, ignition on, and cranking. The ECU blocks state machine has a 
timing input which can be phased between ECUs to represent the differences in timing that 
will naturally exist between ECUs. The supply voltage generation blocks can generate 
permanent supplies, ignition fed supplies and configurable cranking voltages. A final block 
determines whether distributed functions are operational. 
 
126 
 
Figure 5.6 Top level structure of generic model 
 
A variety of ECU blocks were constructed to represent different scenarios by which 
ECUs may be activated including supply voltage activated, powermode wake-up, CAN wake-
up and hardwired signal wake-up. A more detailed view of the inputs and outputs to one of 
these blocks is shown in Figure 5.7. The inputs are supply voltage, a powermode signal 
which determines its operational state, and an external wake-up signal which could be a CAN 
signal, a hardwired signal or none in case of an ECU which is always active when powered. 
The minimum operating voltage at which it will go into an unpowered state if the supply 
voltage drops is configurable for each ECU. There is also an input which allows the block to 
be externally re-set to mimic a sporadic failure in individual ECUs to allow the effects on the 
overall system to be observed. 
ECU Blocks 
 
Operation  
Mode Block 
Engine  
Start-stop  
Switch  
Supply Voltage 
Generation Blocks 
Distributed 
Function Operation 
 
 
 
 
 
Timer Blocks 
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The outputs from the ECU blocks are Status, Imax and CAN_Out. Status is an integer 
value which relates to the current operational state of the ECU as determined by its internal 
state-machine, Imax is the potential current drain of the ECU in its current mode and 
CAN_Out is a binary value indicating whether the ECU is maintaining network 
communications.  
 
Figure 5.7: ECU Block from Generic Model   
 
Within each ECU block is a state machine with the key operational states, the structure 
of this is illustrated in Figure 5.8. The main states are Unpowered, Sleep, Initialisation, On, 
and Shutdown. The state transitions are determined by the external wake-up inputs, the 
power supply level in relation to the minimum operating voltage, the external reset signal, 
and the Initialisation and Shut-down times which are configurable for individual ECUs. 
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Figure 5.8: State Machine within ECU Block   
 
An objective of the model is to show when distributed functions are operational. A 
block to determine this was added, a section of which is shown in Figure 5.9. Whether a 
particular function is active is based not only on the availability of the relevant ECUs, 
determined by status outputs from the ECU blocks, but also the availability of signals 
provided by other functions. When a function becomes active it sets flags to indicate that the 
signals it outputs are available to other functions. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Part of the state machine for distributed function availability from generic model   
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5.4.3 Results From Generic Model 
A key source of issues for the robustness of distributed automotive systems is from low 
voltage transients such as when cranking the engine with a battery in a low state of charge. In 
such situations at critical voltages the operational states of different parts of a distributed 
system may change highly dynamically and in a non-uniform fashion across the system 
giving the potential for operational issues. Novel approaches to developing practical tests on 
physical systems have been developed (Huang et al, 2010) but it would be desirable to use 
simulation to test such conditions, leading to early detection and resolution of issues. Hence a 
simulation of a low voltage crank was used to test the modelled system, examples of the 
results are shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Simulation of low voltage cranking on generic model  
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In the test scenario shown in Figure 5.10 the engine start switch was pressed and held 
triggering a 3 second engine crank and then pressed again after 10 seconds to shut off engine, 
entering accessory mode for 4 seconds before going into power-off mode shutting down all 
ECUs as shown on the powermode graph. The supply voltage graph in Figure 5.10 shows a 
typical sinusoidal voltage dip when the engine is cranking, which recovers after the engine 
fires. It is possible to vary this signal pseudo-randomly to test a variety of scenarios.  
The ECU status graph shows the resultant operational state of the ECUs illustrated by 
an integer value (0 = unpowered, 1= Sleep, 2 = Shutdown, 3 = Initialising, 4 = Running). A 
value of -1 is used where an ECU has gone unpowered without going through full shutdown 
which can cause anomalous behaviour. In the test scenario the crank signal has provoked this 
state in one of the ECUs. The ECUs can be seen to have varying times for initialization and 
shutdown. One ECU does not initialize until around 8 seconds the effect of this in delaying 
operation of functions can be seen in the functional status graph. 
The graph marked I Max in Figure 5.10 shows the combined maximum current draw of 
the ECUs. This figure is of interest in maintaining voltage stability and in the detection of 
quiescent current issues, caused for example by nodes not going to sleep and keeping other 
nodes on the network awake. 
While the results for this scenario with a limited number of interacting nodes and 
functions are readily understandable, as the complexity increases to that of real systems, they 
become less intuitive. The next step has been to apply the modelling principles shown to a 
specific application. 
 
5.4.4 MOST Control Channel Model – Initialisation Robustness Issues 
The specific application targeted was the initialisation of an infotainment system based 
on a MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) fibre optic network. The objective of this 
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modelling was to be able to simulate the initialisation process to be able to understand the 
critical parameters to the robustness and consistency of the process and to be able to 
investigate enhanced  alternative strategies.  
Analysis of MOST initialisations has shown a number of interesting behaviours. During 
high initialisation bus loading, cases have been observed where multiple slave modules are 
sending control messages to the master module simultaneously, leading to a high number of 
Non-Acknowledged messages (NAKS) which must be re-sent. During this period of intense 
retries it was possible for one slave module to monopolise the master module where only its 
messages were being received and acknowledged. This prompted the following questions to 
be investigated through the modelling. Why is the network services cycle time, the rate at 
which the network services software task is called by the module's operating system, the 
same in all nodes and could varying them improve initialisation timing? Why is the low level 
retry number, the number of times the Network Interface Controller will attempt to re-send a 
message, set to the same value in all nodes and could varying them improve initialisation 
timing? Why is the low level retry timing identical in all nodes and could varying them 
improve initialisation timing? During the notification setting phase, all modules are trying to 
set notifications simultaneously. This causes high MOST control channel bus loading, 
therefore high numbers of not-acknowledged messages, leading to initialisation delays. 
Measures of network performance during start-up include: the time from light on until 
the system is fully initialised with all notifications set and audio sources set up, the time from 
light on until a particular customer feature is available and the number of MOST message 
low level and high level retries used.  
Adjustable parameters which affect initialisation performance include: the Network 
Services cycle time, the number of low level retries and their timing, the use of application 
high level retries, and associated timing parameters, the receive and transmit message 
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buffering strategy, the MOST ring order, the scheduling of notification setting, and therefore 
order of feature availability. These parameters are not fixed in the MOST specifications and 
are therefore need to be specified by the vehicle manufacturer or module suppliers. Some of 
these parameters such as number and timing of low level retries have remained constant 
since the very first MOST system designs, and have been re-used on subsequent systems. For 
parameters such as the network services cycle time, only simple guidance might be given to 
the module suppliers, such as the master node should be faster than the slave nodes. 
Optimising these parameters could be achieved by practical experimentation. Clearly this 
could become a long and expensive process, as it would require support from several module 
suppliers to produce special prototype software and hardware. 
The application of the model is to examine the network initialisation strategy and 
predict the effects of changing parameters, e.g. retry wait times, over a wide variety of 
initialisation scenarios. A specific question of interest to the technical specialist was; 
although forbidden by the MOST standard, could varying the low level retry spacing across 
the network improve performance in a system where only the master node is able to send 
broadcast messages, and group cast messages are not used? 
The objectives are to determine and specify requirements for the MOST system to 
guarantee predictable initialisation behaviour, and understand the effects of increasing 
customer feature on the MOST system in advance of building prototypes. 
 
5.4.5 MOST Control Channel Model Implementation 
The requirement for the model was to have representative levels of MOST control 
channel traffic in terms of source, destination and relative timing of messages during the 
initialisation phase and representative behaviour of the channel for factors such as timing, 
bandwidth and arbitration.  
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Based on the generic model previously described, the MOST system was modelled as a 
series of interlinked state machines. The model was constructed using Matlab Simulink and 
Stateflow, a top level view is shown in Figure 5.11. The model of a 9 node system was 
constructed using an existing system as a reference for the communication patterns and 
MOST specifications to determine underlying behaviours.  
 
 
Figure 5.11- Top level view of MOST initialisation model 
 
Figure 5.12 illustrates the top level inputs and outputs of a node. These are similar to 
the generic models with the following MOST specific additions. The node position and 
number of nodes allows the ring configuration to be changed. The MOST Bus input is a 
signal bus from the arbitration node providing: which node has won arbitration transmitted 
message, the content of the transmitted message, whether messages have been 
acknowledged, and whether the ring is complete. The MOST Bus output is a signal bus to the 
arbitration node containing: message transmit requests, content and priority, received 
message acknowledgement and a binary signal to indicate when the node’s transmitting light 
output is on. The node status output gives an enumerated value corresponding to its stage of 
initialisation. The node also outputs its current number of low level retries and the number of 
messages in its send buffer. 
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Figure 5.12- Enlarged view of node 
 
Further inputs which were previously identified as impacting initialisation timing and 
set as user definable parameters within each node are; the minimum operating voltage, the 
ECU initialisation time, the network interface wakeup time from detecting light at its input, 
low-level retry interval, the number of low-level retries, the high level retry interval and 
number, the netservices cycle time, the number of vehicle status requests the node makes 
during initialisation and the buffer size of the application message handler.  
Figure 5.13 shows the high level structure of a node which has similar structure to the 
generic model with states for unpowered, sleep, initialising and running. States have been 
added for ring restart to capture behaviour during loss of light around the fibre optic ring, 
either during shut-down or a fault, and the initialisation has been split into the initialisation of 
the micro-processor and of the network interface. The major change is in the running state 
where the key part of the modelling was to determine which aspects of the control channel 
communications to abstract and how to model them. An approach of only modelling at 
particular layers in the OSI Reference Model was not possible as the behaviour is a factor of 
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all layers, so the model included layers used in MOST. These are known as the application 
layer, application message handler layer, netservices layer and network interface controller 
and were modelled with appropriate abstractions at each layer which will subsequently be 
described.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 - Overall structure of a node in the model 
 
Application Layer 
The application layer controls the high level behaviours and implements the 
initialisation strategy. The top layer of the application layer block is shown in Figure 5.14 
illustrating the key stages of the initialisation process which reflects the specified 
initialisation strategy for the target system. On completion of hardware initialisation the node 
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waits for the network to become active and then the master sets a timer to allow all 
participants to join before checking which functions are present on the individual nodes. On 
receiving a valid configuration the master broadcasts a configuration status OK message 
which triggers the individual nodes to request via a “Central Registry Get” message either for 
for the full central registry of functions and their location or a portion relating to functions of 
interest. At this point the slave nodes also request the vehicle configuration from the master 
and on completion of this the master broadcasts a message to the nodes to commence set-up. 
This consists of the nodes requesting notification of the status of other functions and is 
complete on receipt of responses at which time normal running can take place. 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Application layer initialisation states in master node 
 
The major abstractions in the application layer were in abstracting the messages into 
generic classes and simplifying the interaction at application level to generic types or patterns 
137 
where the message sent dictated particular response behaviour by the receiver. The actual 
data was not required merely just enough information to trigger representative message 
traffic in terms of timing, number, priority, source and destination of messages. Table 5.2 
shows part of the message abstraction table which gives the enumerated value of the message 
types. 
Value of 
Message_Contents 
Variable Corresponding MOST Message Comments
0 No message Default value when no message is transmitted
1 - 14 Reserved Allows plotting on same graph as Tx/Rx Nodes
15 FBlockIDs.Get
16 FBlockIDs.Status
17 FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message not last message
18 FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message last message
19
20
21 Configuration.Status.ConfigurationControl Ok Sent when valid central registry built
22 Configuration.Status.ConfigurationControl Changed
23 Configuration.Status.ConfigurationControl Not Ok
24 CentralRegistry.Get
25 CentralRegistry.Get All
26 CentralRegistry.Status
27 CentralRegistry.Status Segmented message not last 
message
28 CentralRegistry.Status Segmented message last message
29
30 Vehicle Status Request (Fblock 0xF5 ) not last request ECU Confirmation stage - Each ECU requests 
vehicle config status from Master & checks 
(some nodes may have mutiple requests)
31 Vehicle Status Request (Fblock 0xF5 ) last request ECU Confirmation stage - Each ECU requests 
vehicle config status from Master & checks 
(some nodes may have mutiple requests)
32 Vehicle Status Response (Fblock 0xF5 ) ECU Confirmation stage - Response from Master 
for Vehicle status  
Table 5.2 MOST modelling message abstraction table 
 
Generic patterns of interactions during initialisation were observed from specifications 
and analysis of traces. Two examples of such patterns are shown. Figure 5.15 shows the state 
machine for behaviours in a slave node during check system configuration phase of 
initialisation. The node waits for an incoming message type corresponding to an “Fblock 
request” from the master for it to declare its functions. In response the node creates a new 
“Fblock Status” request and calls the message handler layer to transmit it. The System check 
is complete when message handler confirms the message has been successfully transmitted. 
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Figure 5.15 Slave node application layer behaviour during check system configuration  
 
Figure 5.16 shows the state machine for behaviour in a slave node during notification 
set-up phase of initialisation. The node sends a series of notification requests to appropriate 
nodes using the message handler. The set of notification requests and appropriate responses 
for each node was derived through analysis of actual system behaviour. These were 
categorised into different types based on the response from the receiving node. One 
simplification used in the model was to create globally accessible variables for the location 
of the nodes in the ring to determine the location nodes should set notification on. This 
facilitated the abstraction of data from the messaging while maintaining fidelity of message 
traffic. Notification setting has a high level retry strategy triggered by a message send failure 
at lower level whereby it will attempt to resend after an interval, typically 500ms. 
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Figure 5.16 Slave node application layer behaviour during notification phase of 
initialisation  
 
Message Handler Layer  
The message handler layer interfaces between application and netservices layers. 
Figure 5.17 shows the top level structure of this model block illustrating the main functions, 
which are performed in parallel. The outgoing message handler takes send requests from the 
application level and queues them in priority for the netservices layer. Similarly the incoming 
message handler takes incoming messages from the netservices and queues them to be 
responded to. The other functions deal with routine responses and consumption of messages 
which are not part of the node’s own initialisation. Receive FBlock status consumes the 
FBlock status messages from nodes where notification has been set. The notification handler 
deals with notification requests from other nodes and generates appropriate status messages 
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based on the type of notification request. The Receive vehicle status function consumes 
vehicle status messages, other than being received they have no other impact on the 
initialisation behaviour.    Receive new message processing acknowledgement is a response 
to particular types of notification requests where the status information requested is not 
immediately available and the response is to generate a periodic message confirming the 
response is still being processed. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Message handler layer functions 
 
Netservices Layer 
The Netservices layer is shown in Figure 5.18. The Call Netservices block periodically 
executes the netservices register interface according at an interval defined by a user settable 
parameter. The netservices register interface receives the next message in the network 
interface controller’s incoming message register and loads the next outgoing message to its 
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outgoing message register and reads the message send result register, reporting back if the 
previous message has been successfully sent or failed to send. 
 
 
Figure 5.18 NetServices layer functions 
 
Network Interface Controller Layer 
The top level functions in the network interface controller layer are shown in Figure 
5.19. The message transmission function takes an outgoing message, assigns a priority to it 
according to the message type and the number of times it has failed to win in the arbitration 
process and sends this to the central arbitration block which is discussed subsequently, via 
the outgoing message signal bus. If the message is sent but failed to be received it 
implements the low-level retry strategy according to the set parameters. If still the message 
fails it records message send failure. The message reception function detects if the node is 
the destination for a transmitted message on the incoming message signal bus. If the received 
message register is clear it loads the message and sets an acknowledge (ACK) flag, else if the 
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register still has a message then it set a message not acknowledged (NAK) flag. The values of 
these flags are sent to the arbitration block via the output signal bus. The final functions 
relate to the light input and output of the optical physical layer which is abstracted to a 
Boolean value on the message input and output busses. When the Set_Node_No_Light_On 
function detects the value of the output from the previous node changing from Off to On it 
sets the value of the lightoutput for its node to On.  When the Monitor_Light_ In function 
detects the ring on value from the arbitration node it enables message receipt, if the value 
changes to ring_off it causes a state change from running to ring-restart.  
 
 
Figure 5.19 Network interface controller block in nodes  
 
A major simplification for the model which reduced the implementation effort while 
retaining the same communication behaviour, was to model the message arbitration as a 
centralised process whereas in practise it is a distributed process. Figure 5.20 shows the top 
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level of the arbitration block which takes the bus access requests from all nodes, determines 
which has the highest priority, makes the associated message content the content of the 
transmitted message on the block’s output and sets a flag to indicate to the nodes that there is 
a new message. The arbitration block also sends a message to indicate the arbitration winning 
block and the result of whether the message is acknowledged or not acknowledged by 
recipient nodes. A further function is to confirm whether full ring is running by monitoring 
the light-output of all nodes and output this to the nodes to confirm communication is 
possible. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 MOST Control Channel arbitration block 
 
Finally the model was instrumented with the primary output measurements being: the 
source, destination and contents of the transmitted messages, the initialisation status of each 
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node against enumerated stages, the number of low level and high-level retries, the number 
of not acknowledged messages (NAKs) and the utilization of the internal buffer in the nodes.  
 
5.4.6 Results from Infotainment Robustness Model 
Correlation Testing 
After debugging, the model was tested for correlation against results recorded from an 
actual system. Figure 5.21 illustrates part of the message traces obtained from the model 
against the physical system. Analysis of this and the message traces showed very similar 
patterns in the communications including known bottlenecks at critical times in the 
initialisation e.g. when all slave nodes are simultaneously requesting the central registry from 
the master node. 
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Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node Node
Disassembly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Disassembly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FBlockIDs.Get Source R        00.NetBlock.01.FBlockIDs.Get Source R        
FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message not last messageR Source        00.NetBlock.01.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(00:0C) 068A110152016001F314F2R Source        
FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message last messageR Source        00.NetBlock.01.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(01:04) 8AF901R Source        
FBlockIDs.Get Source  R       00.NetBlock.01.FBlockIDs.Status.06.8A.110152016001F314F28AF901R Source        
FBlockIDs.Status R  Source       00.NetBlock.02.FBlockIDs.Get Source  R       
FBlockIDs.Get Source   R      00.NetBlock.02.FBlockIDs.Status.31.01.0682F305F282R  Source       
FBlockIDs.Status R   Source      00.NetBlock.03.FBlockIDs.Get Source   R      
FBlockIDs.Get Source    R     00.NetBlock.03.FBlockIDs.Status.91.01.0689F316F289R   Source      
FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message not last messageR   Source     00.NetBlock.04.FBlockIDs.Get Source    R     
FBlockIDs.Status Segmented message last messageR    Source     00.NetBlock.04.FBlockIDs.Status.40.02.068DF28DF317R    Source     
FBlockIDs.Get Source     R    00.NetBlock.05.FBlockIDs.Get Source     R    
FBlockIDs.Status R     Source    00.NetBlock.06.FBlockIDs.Get Source      R   
FBlockIDs.Get Source      R   00.NetBlock.06.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(00:0C) 5001540151010690F309F2R      Source   
FBlockIDs.Status R      Source   00.NetBlock.06.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(01:04) 901102R      Source   
FBlockIDs.Get Source       R  00.NetBlock.06.FBlockIDs.Status.50.01.540151010690F309F2901102R      Source   
FBlockIDs.Status R       Source  00.NetBlock.06.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(01:04) 901102R      Source   
FBlockIDs.Get Source        R 00.NetBlock.07.FBlockIDs.Get Source       R  
FBlockIDs.Status R        Source 00.NetBlock.07.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(00:0C) 2302068B3201F28BF312FBR       Source  
Configuration.Status.ConfigurationControl OkSource B B B B B B B B 00.NetBlock.07.FBlockIDs.Status SEG(01:06) 01FC02FC03R       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get All Nak Source        00.NetBlock.07.FBlockIDs.Status.23.02.068B3201F28BF312FB01FC02FC03R       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get Nak   Source      00.NetBlock.08.FBlockIDs.Get Source        R
CentralRegistry.Get Nak     Source    00.NetBlock.08.FBlockIDs.Status.22.01.0686F3022301F286R        Source
CentralRegistry.Get Nak       Source  00.NetworkMaster.01.Configuration.Status.ConfigurationControl OkSource B B B B B B B B
CentralRegistry.Get Nak  Source       00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 R Source        
CentralRegistry.Get Nak    Source     00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Get Nak      Source   00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak      Source   
CentralRegistry.Get R        Source 00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 Nak       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get All Nak Source        00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Get Nak   Source      00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501R      Source   
CentralRegistry.Get Nak     Source    00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.10201Nak        Source
CentralRegistry.Get Nak       Source  00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.10201Nak  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak        Source 00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(00:0C) 01800100018002010180EESource R        
CentralRegistry.Get Nak  Source       00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 Nak       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get Nak    Source     00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Get R      Source   00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.10201R        Source
CentralRegistry.Status Source        R 00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.10201Nak  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak      Source   00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(01:0C) 010180F501018040010180Source R        
CentralRegistry.Get All Nak Source        00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 Nak       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get Nak   Source      00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Get Nak     Source    00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak       Source  00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.10201R  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak        Source 00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(02:0C) 03010180FD010180EC0101Source R        
CentralRegistry.Get Nak  Source       00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 Nak       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get R    Source     00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Status Source      R   00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak    Source     00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak      Source   00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(03:0C) 8026010180FC0101802401Source R        
CentralRegistry.Get All Nak Source        00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1 R       Source  
CentralRegistry.Get Nak   Source      00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak   Source      
CentralRegistry.Get Nak     Source    00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak       Source  00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak        Source 00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(04:0C) 0180EF01018061010180C1Source R        
CentralRegistry.Get R  Source       00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.1F501R   Source      
CentralRegistry.Status Source    R     00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get Nak  Source       00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak    Source     00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(05:0C) 010180C3010180C401018ASource R        
CentralRegistry.Get Nak      Source   00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501R  Source       
CentralRegistry.Get All Nak Source        00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak   Source      00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(06:0C) 068A018A1101018A520101Source R        
CentralRegistry.Get Nak     Source    00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
CentralRegistry.Get Nak       Source  00.NetworkMaster.01.CentralRegistry.Status SEG(07:0C) 8A6001018AF314018AF28ASource R        
CentralRegistry.Get R        Source 00.NetworkMaster.00.CentralRegistry.1F501Nak    Source     
Model Physical System
 
Figure 5.21 Comparison of message traces obtained from the model and from the physical 
system 
 
Figure 5.22 illustrates the output from the model of the initialisation status of the nodes 
against the enumerated stages. Overall the model initialisation time was faster than the actual 
system; the cause of this is mainly due to there being behaviours in some nodes of the actual 
system not being to specification (the system was still in development at this stage), causing 
parts of the initialisation to be repeated and also due to application level delays in the model 
where actual nodes may have other concurrent application level tasks. This resulted in a 
greater intensity of communications leading to a higher level of low-level and high-level 
retries in the model. For the initial work in investigating methods of configuring the system 
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to reduce initialisation delays, this greater intensity of communication was desirable to 
enable testing  with a degree of stress.  
MOST Node Initialistion Status - 9 Node Model 0_9 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
7
0
1
4
0
2
1
0
2
8
0
3
5
0
4
2
0
4
9
0
5
6
0
6
3
0
7
0
0
7
7
0
8
4
0
9
1
0
9
8
0
1
0
5
0
1
1
2
0
1
1
9
0
1
2
6
0
1
3
3
0
1
4
0
0
1
4
7
0
1
5
4
0
1
6
1
0
1
6
8
0
mSec
Node A
Node B
Node C
Node D
Node E
Node F
Node G
Node H
Node I
1 = Sleep
2 = Initialising
3 = Running
4 = Wait_Net_On
8 = Check_System_Configuration
5 = T2 Timer
10 = Central Registry Get
11 = Vehicle Status Get
12 = Notification Setting
14 = Notifications Set
15 = Notification Status Received
 
Figure 5.22 Initialization status trace from MOST Control Channel model     
 
The model size grew substantially relative to the generic model with the increase in 
complexity of the nodes and the number of nodes on the target system. As a result the run 
time of the simulations increased to becoming around 1000 times slower than real-time on a 
standard lap-top. However as the period of interest is comparatively short (typically under 10 
seconds) this was found to be acceptable. 
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Initialisation Parameter Robustness Testing 
The objective of this testing was to understand the critical parameters to the robustness 
and consistency of the initialisation process and to be able to investigate alternative 
strategies. The key parameters to be investigated were NetServices timing (Test 1), Low 
Level re-try timing (Test 2), Low Level retry number (Test 3) and Ring order (Test 4). 
 
Base Case 
For the base case testing of the model the parameter values, shown in Table 5.3, were 
set to that of the actual specified system. Exceptions to this were factors which added a time 
delay without interacting with any other factors but were constant in all tests (T2 timer, ECU 
and network interface initialisation times).  These were reduced to minimal values, which 
significantly reduced the time for each individual simulation run. 
 
Node A Node B Node C Node D Node E Node F Node G Node H Node I
Parameter Master Slave IHU HLDF AUD CDC BPM AUU RSE SDARS IBOC
Net Services Cycle Time <4mS Max 4mS 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 8
Low Level Retry Time 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Low Level Retry Time No.Blocks (3min) 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Number Low Level Retries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Central Registry Get High Level Retry Time (mS) 200/500 500 200 200 200 200 500 200 200
Transit mode send High Level Retry Time (mS) 1000 1000
Vehicle Status High Level Retry Time (mS) 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8 500 x 8
Notification Set High Level Retry Time (mS) 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4 500 x 4
Ring Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T2 Timer (delay in mS for application initialisation) 10
Tmax Config OK (mS) 10000
ECU Init Time (mS) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
NIC Wakeup (mS) 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
EHC Receive Buffer Size 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Specification
 
Table 5.3 Base Case parameter values 
 
The results for the base case are shown in Figure 5.23. The initialisation time is less 
than would be expected for an actual system due to the reduction in constant parameters to 
reduce simulation time; however the important factor is the relative initialisation times which 
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this does not affect. The number of not acknowledged messages (NAKs) and re-tries are also 
deliberately higher than actual due to the lack of delays at application level previously noted. 
 
 
Figure 5.23 Base case results 
 
Effect of NetServices Timing (Test 1) 
The first area of investigation was to assess the impact of changing the frequency at 
which MOST netservices, which takes messages from and to the message buffers of the 
network interface, is run by the nodes. The test hypothesis was that increasing the frequency 
of netservices should reduce initialisation time. However to run faster may result in 
additional hardware costs so it is important to understand where the best gains can be made. 
In Test 1a the netservices timing for all nodes was set to 4ms which was a reduction 
from 5ms in Nodes D and F, and from 8ms in Node I. As shown in Figure 5.24 this did result 
in a significant decrease in initialisation time to 2143ms.  The major gain of over 500ms was 
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during initialisation stage 11, where vehicle status is requested by all nodes from the master 
with smaller gains at other stages. A high level retry during stage 11 as a result of a failed 
message send to the master node by the HLDF (High Line Display Front) which is present in 
the base case was avoided. Further analysis of the message traces from the model showed 
that the message sent failure is only narrowly avoided in Test 1a highlighting an emergent 
property whereby a slight improvement overall communication can make step change 
improvements in performance. 
 
 
Figure 5.24 Test 1a Net Services for all nodes at 4ms 
 
The next test (1b) was to investigate if increasing the frequency of running netservices 
on the master node, which has the highest overall number of messages sent and received 
during initialisation, to 2ms would further decrease initialisation time. The results, shown in 
Figure 5.25, show that in practise this did not happen. While still being an improvement on 
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the base case initialisation timing of 478ms it was slower than Test 1a with all nodes at 4 ms 
Netservices cycle time.  
 
 
Figure 5.25 Test 1b Master cycle time reduced to 2ms 
 
The key difference was in stage 12 of the initialisation, which is for notification setting, 
with this taking 950ms for Test 1b against only 615ms in Test 1a. Further analysis of the 
communication traces revealed that in this stage the node on the critical path was in fact one 
of the slave nodes, the HLDF (High Line Display Front) which sets the highest number of 
notifications to be able to display system status to the driver. When set to the same 
netservices time the HLDF and the master node set notifications in parallel, but when the 
master set the higher net services cycle time it dominates and causes the HLDF to do a high-
level retry. This results in the notifications being set in series with HLDF notifications being 
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delayed until after the master node has completed resulting in overall longer time for this 
phase.  
The next test (1c) was to see the effect of also reducing the netservices cycle time down 
to 2ms for the next two nodes with high communication intensity during initialisation. The 
results, shown in Figure 5.26, show that, while there was an improvement over previous Test 
with just the master node at 2 ms, it was still not as good as Test 1a with all nodes set to 4ms. 
 
 
Figure 5.26 Test 1c Key nodes (IHU,HLDF,RSE) cycle time reduced to 2ms 
 
On examination of the communication traces it could be seen that the critical stage was 
again notification set up with this taking 855ms as opposed to 615ms Test 1a. The cause was 
that the HLDF made a high level retry due to now competing unsuccessfully with RSE (Rear 
Seat Entertainment) node and other nodes to get message received by master. Further 
analysis suggested that in times where many nodes are competing to get message response 
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from the master node it may be undesirable for them to be synchronised by using the same 
net services frequency or an exact multiple of this. 
For the next test (1d) the net services frequency of remaining nodes was reduced to 3 
ms to desynchronise them from the nodes at 2ms. The results of this are shown in Figure 
5.27. They show that this de-synchronisation did indeed result in in substantial decrease in 
initialisation time to 1309ms as a result of the HLDF not requiring a high-level retry during 
the notification setting stage. 
 
 
Figure 5.27 Test 1d Key nodes (IHU,HLDF,RSE) cycle time reduced to 2ms, other nodes 
reduced to 3ms 
 
The next test was to take the de-synchronisation concept further and repeat Test 1d but 
slightly skewing netservices cycle time for each node such that no two nodes were running on 
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same cycle time. The results shown in Figure 5.28 indicate a slight but not significant benefit 
over Test 1d for doing this. 
 
 
Figure 5.28 Test 1e Key nodes (IHU,HLDF,RSE) cycle time reduced to c.2ms, other nodes 
c.3ms but not multiples 
 
Low Level Re-try Timing (Test 2) 
The next test was to determine if there were benefits in deviating from MOST 
specification by deliberately introducing a variation in Low Level retry times between nodes 
to desynchronise retries. This would only be possible if no other node than the master was 
allowed to send broadcast messages but this is the case in the system under consideration. 
The first test (2a) reduced the low level message retry from 4ms to 2ms on the master 
node, this being the sender of more messages during initialisation than any other node. The 
expected result was a reduction in initialisation time through the master node winning 
1295 47% 68 13% 1
Initialiation 
Time (mS) % NAKs
>3 
Retries
% 
Messages 
>3 Retries
HL 
Retries
154 
message arbitration more often. However the actual result shown in Figure 5.29 was a slight 
increase of 201ms in initialisation time, this being all in stage 12 of notification setting due to 
an additional high level retry as a result of slight change in phasing due to master being able 
to set notifications quicker, with timing of other initialisation stages being unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 5.29 Test 2a BASE with master on 2ms Low Level retry 
 
The reason most stages are unaffected is that generally messages from the master were 
being received without retries and the pace of reception was being set by the receiver in 
phases where there was little other bus contention. 
For the next test (2b) a larger variation was tried across all nodes as shown in Table 5.4, 
the values being allocated according to number of messages sent during initialisation. 
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Node A Node B Node C Node D Node E Node F Node G Node H Node I
Parameter IHU HLDF AUD CDC BPM AUU RSE SDARS IBOC
Low Level Retry Time 4 4.5 6 7 8 9 5 10 11  
Table 5.4 Test 2b variations in low level retry timing 
 
The results of test (2b) are shown in Figure 5.30. This shows a 650ms reduction in 
initialisation time relative to the base case which has been achieved through avoiding a high 
level retry during stage 11 of the initialisation. Time for other phases has not been adversely 
affected showing potential benefits for the strategy. 
 
 
Figure 5.30 Test 2b BASE with all different retry timing - large variation 
 
A subsequent test (2c) was carried out with a much smaller variation in retry timing 
shown in Table 5.5. The objective of this was to desynchronise the retry timing of the nodes 
while adding the minimum extra timing.  Again these were allocated on the basis of a 
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number of messages sent during initialisation. Note the variation has to be in discrete steps 
the numbers allocated increased incrementally by a single step. 
 
Node A Node B Node C Node D Node E Node F Node G Node H Node I
Parameter IHU HLDF AUD CDC BPM AUU RSE SDARS IBOC
Low Level Retry Time 2 2.541 5.082 4.719 4.356 2.904 3.63 3.267 3.993  
Table 5.5 Test 2c variations in low level retry timing 
 
The results of Test 2c are shown in Figure 5.31. Again the desynchronisation of retry 
timing gave a benefit in reducing initialisation time by 448ms, however this time the benefit 
was achieved in steps 12 and 14 of the initialisation. 
 
 
Figure 5.31 Test 2c BASE with all different retry - small variation 
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Low Level Retry Number (Test 3) 
The next set of tests looked at the impact of increasing the number of low level retries 
with a view to avoiding delays due to high-level retries during initialisation. In the first test 
(3a) the low level retry number was increased from 11 to 15 on all nodes. Figure 5.32 shows 
the results which give an initialisation time reduction of 828ms. This was mainly as a result 
of avoiding a high level retry during stage 11 of the initialisation on the base case but there 
was also a slight benefit in avoiding a high level retry in stage 12.  
 
 
Figure 5.32 Test 3a Base but with low level retry increase to 15 for all nodes 
 
For the next test (3b) a strategy was investigated of only increasing the low level retry 
to 15 on the nodes which exhibited a high level retry, i.e. had exceeded the maximum 
number of low level retries, on the base case. The results, shown in Figure 5.33, show a 
similar level of benefit stage in 11 in avoiding a high level retry but not in stage 12. 
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Figure 5.33 Test 3b Differentially increase nodes with 2 HL retries in Base 
(IHU,HLDF,AUD,AUU,SDARS) to 15  
 
Ring Order (Test 4) 
According to MOST specifications ring order is not a factor in message arbitration. 
However it was hypothesised that if all other factors are equal in the control channel message 
arbitration then ring order does become the deciding criteria. In Test 4 a node with a heavy 
utilisation of the control channel particularly in terms of received messages was moved from 
directly after the master to last in ring order. The results shown in Figure 5.34, show that this 
slight change was enough to prevent a high level retry which resulted in a reduction in 
initialisation time. While the high level retry distorted the impact of the effect it shows that 
ring order can have an effect. 
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Figure 5.34 Test 4 HLDF moved from 2nd to last in ring order 
 
Overall Comparison 
An overall comparison of results from the investigation into changing initialisation 
parameters is shown in Figure 5.35. This highlights the potential benefits which could be 
derived from exploring different strategies including some which can be done at no cost such 
as increasing the number of retries (Testt 3) or changing ring order (Testt 4). The greatest 
benefits are derived through increasing the frequency of net services (Testt 1) but care needs 
to be taken to ensure the benefit is on nodes on the critical path and that no adverse effects in 
other ECUs. Clearly there is scope for further experimentation looking at the effects of 
combining strategies. An initial test was carried out on two potential hybrid strategies but in 
these cases the benefits were not additive and the improvement was not better than the lower 
of the individual strategies they were based on. However what this does show is that the 
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model can facilitate more complex designs of experiments to look at the effects of 
interactions of multiple variation parameters.  
 
 
Figure 5.35 Overall test results from 9 node MOST system 
 
A key finding is that due to the non-inherent non-linear properties of the system a small 
improvement could provide a significant benefit. 
 
5.5 Initial Conclusions on Application of Methods 
5.5.1 Infotainment Robustness Case Initial Conclusions 
Based on the application of robustness cases to infotainment systems it appears to be a 
promising approach. In terms of effort to construct, the technique proved to be tractable. The 
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author was able to construct the robustness case in approximately 100 hours with input from 
relevant technical specialists.  
The use of Goal Structuring Notation as a diagrammatic technique meant that the 
outputs were easily understood even by those not familiar with safety cases. The technique 
appeared to add value not just in providing structure to existing measures e.g. specifications, 
statements of work, but also highlighted areas where additional measures needed to be taken. 
A further benefit was that it provided a mechanism to ensure that evidence e.g. results of 
previous testing, is systematically gathered and reviewed. In complex systems, especially 
those with legacy components, it can be easily but wrongly assumed that previous testing has 
been successfully completed. It may be the case that a legacy part of a system may not have 
achieved its specified behaviour in a manner which becomes critical in the new system 
context resulting in system failures. 
However it is important to evaluate the method with another application to prove it is 
more widely applicable, as for example the inherent modularity of MOST infotainment 
systems may favour the approach and make the breakdown into argument modules easier to 
achieve than on a more heterogeneous system. This will be investigated in the next chapter. 
As part of this work definitions of relevant parameters such as “acceptably robust” and 
“normal operation” will be developed. 
 
5.5.2 Infotainment Robustness Modelling Initial Conclusions 
An approach has been shown for robustness modelling of automotive electrical systems 
of systems based upon focusing on the ability to function rather than the functions 
themselves. This abstraction is necessary to make the development and use of the models of 
large scale systems tractable. While the customer functions themselves were not modeled the 
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timing of their availability to the customer could be derived from the model which is critical 
to customer satisfaction. 
The robustness model gave useful results and an ability to explore design alternatives 
which would not be economically feasible with the physical system which would require 
large amounts of hardware and software changes across several ECUs for uncertain benefit. 
The work has shown it is possible to model the behaviour of MOST control channel to 
investigate the performance effect of key parameters with a view to their optimisation. In 
doing this it has highlighted the non-linear and emergent behaviour of the system deriving 
results which would not be possible to do through a manual analysis. The results gave a 
number of options for improvements which could be further explored and evaluated on a cost 
benefit basis before being physically manifested.  It was also possible with the model to do 
grey box testing and observe states of the model such as utilization of buffers and 
initialisation states prior to communicating which was not possible with physical parts. 
Application of the modelling principles to a real system has shown that a high degree of 
effort can be required to get models which embody critical features for robustness analysis. 
The infotainment robustness model took approximately 6 man months to develop, however it 
is envisaged that with less learning required subsequent models could be developed in a 
shorter timeframe, even on a different type of system. This will be confirmed in the 
evaluation study described in the next chapter.  
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5.6 Generic Methodology Description for New Methods 
In this section the core generic content of the methods is abstracted from the 
Infotainment case study and described to enable the use of the methods in other applications. 
 
5.6.1 Generic Methodology for Robustness Cases 
Robustness cases are structured arguments for why a system will not exhibit service 
failures in the presence of errors caused by external faults. Robustness Cases make use of 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and no changes are made in the use of the notation from 
that described in the GSN Community Standard (GSN Community 2011). The selection of 
tools is not prescriptive but they must support modular arguments. The robustness case 
should be initiated at the concept phase of the system design to identify design requirements 
and potentially existing design solutions which can be reused. The author of the robustness 
case should have knowledge of automotive electronics but does not have to be a domain 
expert providing access to domain expertise is available. A six step process for the 
development of robustness cases is illustrated in Figure 5.36 and described in the subsequent 
section. 
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Figure 5.36 Process steps in developing Modular Robustness Case 
 
Step 1. Define High Level Robustness Goal 
The first step is to define the high level robustness goal, robustness being defined as 
freedom from service failures in the presence of errors due to external faults. Crucially these 
service failures should consider the wider set of dependability attributes not being restricted 
to safety (the system under consideration may have not safety critical functions) but including 
availability and reliability as the most significant. To do this requires an acceptable level of 
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service in the presence errors due to external failures to be defined. This may not be possible 
to define at an early stage and so an assumption may have to be made and subsequently 
followed up. As robustness is with respect to external failures it is necessary to be clear on 
what is the boundary of the system. The boundary of the system, or an individual part of a 
system of systems, can be considered to be the programmable device with responsibility for 
controlling delivery of a particular service and any dedicated sensors and actuators.  
 
Step 2. Define Argument Module Decomposition 
The next step is to use a top level argument to decompose the high level robustness 
goal into a number of argument modules. This should use the principles used in modular 
safety cases of: high cohesion and low coupling, supporting work division and contractual 
boundaries, supporting future expansion and isolating change. For automotive use a 
particular concern is responsibilities split between the OEM and the supplier. Argument 
modules should address specific areas known to be problematic on the basis of domain 
knowledge, e.g. analysis of previous failures such as the case studies in Chapter 3.  
 
Step 3. Develop Argument Modules 
Each of the argument modules identified in the top level argument should be developed 
by breaking down each argument specific top-level goal into strategies, sub-goals and 
solutions which would form the evidence for achieving each sub-goal. These require domain 
knowledge to create and so domain experts in the specific area covered by the argument 
module should be engaged. In most cases existing solutions will exist so part of the argument 
may be developed through a bottom up approach inferring sub-goals from the solutions. As 
the application of the method matures then there will be existing argument modules which 
can be referred to and re-used if they have been proven to be successful. 
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Step 4. Review Argument Modules 
When an argument module has been created it should be reviewed through a suitable 
peer-review process in a similar manner to other design artefacts. If weaknesses in the 
argument are found then the argument should be further developed. 
 
Step 5. Review Overall Argument 
The overall argument should also be peer reviewed to ensure there are no gaps in the 
top level argument. Once again if weaknesses are found then the argument should be further 
developed either through adding new argument modules or augmenting existing ones. 
 
Step 6. Correlate to Design Requirements 
Once the argument structure has passed through review then it is necessary to ensure 
that the requirements within the arguments are reflected in the design requirements. 
Typically design requirements and related verification methods are held in a database within 
a requirements management tool such as DOORS. This can be used to ensure design 
requirements are fulfilled and solution evidence is gathered as part of the normal design and 
development process. A field can be added to show which requirements are related to the 
robustness case so that monitoring can be done in case of requirements changes which may 
impact the robustness case. Due to this need to monitor the impact of changes the robustness 
case remains a live document until the end of the design phase when requirements are frozen. 
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5.6.2 Generic Methodology for Robustness Modelling 
In this section the approach to robustness modelling developed within this chapter is 
explained as a generic methodology with wider applicability. The approach focuses on 
modelling the availability of resources required for service delivery, in particular processing 
and communication, rather than modelling the specific functionality of the service. This 
model should be ideally created as soon as the initial deployment architecture for the service 
under consideration is available. This deployment architecture should define the Electronic 
Control Units (ECUs) involved in the service delivery, the interaction between them and the 
communication networks. For robustness considerations it is essential to understand which 
ECUs are providers of inputs to the ECU controlling the service delivery.  
Figure 5.37 illustrates the generic structure of the robustness model. The ECU 
controlling the service delivery and ECUs which are providers of inputs are modelled as 
interlinked state machines. The ECUs have inputs associated with timing, user inputs, system 
operating mode and power supply which the case studies showed were all critical parameters 
in robustness related issues. There is also a block within the model concerned with 
distributed functions based on availability of processing and communication resources. Each 
block is described in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
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Figure 5.37 Generic structure of Robustness Model 
 
The timing block provides a common clock signal to the ECU blocks and should be set 
to a higher level of resolution than expected response times within the system. For the initial 
development this was set to 1 ms and for the infotainment study reduced to 1 µs. This is then 
used by each individual ECU block as a shared definition of time and to ensure their state 
machines can respond sufficiently quickly noting there will be need to model the response of 
events within a statemachine to occur more slowly to reflect actual system responses.  
User inputs which affect both the specific service under consideration and also the 
wider system operating mode should be modelled. Typically these are modelled as switches 
between binary values or constant blocks giving parametric values. For a vehicle system the 
operating mode (powermode) is typically influenced by wake up events such as door unlocks, 
door opening and pressing of start button.  
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Using these inputs the System Operating Mode determines the current operating mode 
of the vehicle (Powermode) and then sends this to the ECUs which will each take appropriate 
initialisation or shut-down responses.   
The power supply voltage level was found to be a critical parameter in the case studies 
particularly with respect to short low voltage fluctuations during starting of the engine. The 
power supply block provides a parameter-based, continuous analogue signal of the voltage 
level to the ECUs and can simulate voltage fluctuations when the powermode indicates an 
engine starting state. 
Figure 5.38 illustrates the inputs and outputs to a generic ECU Block. The timing input 
is used to trigger the state machine and to determine the duration of events. The supply 
voltage input is used to determine whether the ECU is powered or unpowered depending on 
its minimum operating voltage parameter. The System Operating Mode input is used to 
determine whether the ECU should power up or shut down. Significant parameters of the 
ECU which can impact availability and are subject to variation should be set by constant 
blocks which user can configure. Typically this should include: minimum operating voltage, 
initialisation time, shutdown time, cycle times for performing specific tasks e.g. servicing 
communication interfaces and any built in delays within the system to wait for external 
events to occur. The external reset causes the ECU to re-initialise to be able to fault inject to 
simulate the effect of internal ECU faults such as watchdog resets. The external wake-up 
causes the ECU to initialise to facilitate fault injection of spurious ECU wake-ups. Comms In 
is used for other input signals needed for the ECU platform to initialise and shut-down. The 
Comms Out is the data which the ECU provides to other ECUs required for the delivery of 
the required service. Where possible the actual messages should be abstracted into generic 
classes represented by an enumerated value of the message types. The node status is used to 
communicate and externally observe the internal state of the ECU, in particular its 
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availability in terms of ability to function and communicate. In a model it is also possible to 
make observable parameters which in an actual system would not be, such as ECU 
initialisation states or buffer utilisation in the case of the MOST infotainment model.  
The Comms Out and the Node Status information are used by the distributed system 
block to determine the availability of the particular service under consideration. The block 
can also be used to implement distributed functions for arbitrating communications to 
determine which of the messages that the ECUs attempt to send will be successful. 
 
 
Figure 5.38 Generic ECU block inputs and outputs 
 
Figure 5.39 shows the internal structure of a generic ECU block illustrating the generic 
states and transitions between them. If the voltage is below the minimum operating voltage 
the ECU will be in the Unpowered state. When voltage is above minimum operating voltage 
then the ECU will go into either asleep or initialisation state depending on inputs such as 
system operating mode. In the sleep state the ECU uses minimum power until it receives a 
wake-up trigger to initialise. The initialisation state represents the time delay for boot-up of 
microprocessors and communication devices which is an externally configurable parameter.  
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After this is complete an ECU is considered to be in its running state and able to execute 
communication functions and application layer interactions which may be necessary before 
the service can be provided. Some ECUs have shutdown routines, e.g. data-storage, that they 
must perform before going to sleep mode. Power interruption during shut-down can cause 
issues e.g. failure to write-back to non-dynamic memory, which should be captured in the 
model by a different Node Status value. 
 
 
Figure 5.39 Generic ECU block internal structure 
 
The level of detail of the modelling of the application layer interface interactions and 
communications layer will vary depending on the characteristics of the specific system as 
was seen in the generic model and the MOST initialisation models. 
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The testing of the model should be determined by the requirements coming from the 
Robustness Case. This will be explored further through application of the methods in 
combination in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Development of New Robustness Techniques 
through Application to a Hybrid Propulsion Control System 
  
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the new proposed techniques of robustness cases and robustness 
modelling were developed through application to an infotainment system. In this chapter the 
techniques will be evaluated and confirmed to be more widely applicable through applying 
them to the system initialisation of a hybrid propulsion control system. Firstly the hybrid 
system initialisation process is discussed in terms of the key objectives and its technical 
implementation, illustrating the level of complexity underlying a simple high level 
requirement. Then the development of the robustness case is described for the hybrid system 
initialisation including the identification of robustness parameters, the identification of 
robustness requirements and requirements for model-based testing. Following this the 
development of the robustness model for hybrid system initialisation is described including 
the testing process and results.  Conclusions are given on the differences from the previous 
application and hence the transferability of the methods and also on utility of the individual 
techniques. Finally extensions to the generic methods arising from the evaluation are 
described including how the techniques can be used in a complementary manner as part of 
the overall design for robustness framework. 
 
6.2 Hybrid Propulsion System Initialisation  
6.2.1 Hybrid propulsion system and robustness parameter analysis 
The case study selected for evaluating the proposed new methods for robust design was 
that of a parallel hybrid electric propulsion system. This was selected on the basis of being an 
174 
example of complex system with many interacting parts that the author had access to the 
underlying design information but is different to the infotainment application used to develop 
the methods. A significant difference is that unlike the infotainment system the constituent 
parts are non-homogeneous, this is important in showing the methods are more generically 
applicable. While the hybrid system has safety-related requirements the case study focused 
on robustness requirements relating to system availability. 
A simplified driveline architecture for a parallel hybrid electric vehicle is shown in 
Figure 6.1. In the case study example an electric motor is incorporated within the 
transmission between two clutches such that the drive propelling the vehicle can be delivered 
by the internal combustion engine (ICE) or the electric motor (EM) or a combination of both 
in parallel. The electric motor is powered from a high-voltage battery via a power inverter. 
The battery is charged from the electric motor as a result of either regenerative braking or by 
using energy from the internal combustion engine. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Parallel Hybrid Electric Vehicle driveline architecture 
 
An analysis of robustness factors impacting the HEV system was conducted using a 
Parameter Diagram (P-Diagram) approach (Fritzsche 2006). The P diagram considers the 
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inputs, ideal outputs, error states, control factors and noise factors in a system. The P diagram 
that was developed for the hybrid system is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Parameter Diagram (P-Diagram) for hybrid system 
 
Of particular interest in the context of robustness are the noise factors. The P-diagram 
classifies the noise factors into; piece to piece variation, changes over time, customer factors, 
external environment and system interaction. From Figure 6.3 it can be seen that for a 
complex system there are considerable variety of noise factors. Many of these are possible to 
address at a component level via traditional quality techniques, those that are of most interest 
for this study are those noise factors relating to system interaction. On the basis of the 
findings of the case study review in Chapter 3 the noise factors selected for further 
investigation using the new methods was that of initialisation and shut down interactions, 
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sub-component variation, low voltage, delayed communication, user interaction and 
communications timing.  
 
6.2.2 Hybrid propulsion System Initialisation  
From a user’s perspective the hybrid system initialisation is simply the time between 
pressing the start button and the vehicle being ready to put into gear and drive off. In a hybrid 
electric vehicle it may initialize into one of 2 modes either with the internal combustion 
engine on (referred to as a “Combustion Start”) or by activating the high voltage system to 
allow the vehicle to drive off using the electric motor (referred to as “HEV Standby”) with 
the internal combustion engine off until required. In practice this is influenced by the state of 
the vehicle powermode (the virtual key position), the status of the engine and the status of the 
high voltage propulsion system which in turn are each determined by a large number of 
parameters ranging from security authorization checks to high voltage system integrity 
checks. It is also necessary to consider the initialisation of the Electronic Control units 
(ECUs) which provide the processing platforms for determining and communicating the 
states of the relevant system parts.  
Figure 6.3 shows the principal components involved in the initialisation of the hybrid 
propulsion system under investigation.  
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Figure 6.3 Simplified network architecture diagram of HEV System 
 
The body control module receives the signal from the start switch and based on this and 
other factors determines the overall power management state of the vehicle. The Powertrain 
Control Module (PCM) determines the powertrain status and hosts the hybrid supervisory 
control which monitors the status from other hybrid controllers during initialisation and 
determines the mode into which the hybrid system will initialise. The high voltage battery 
management system controls the high voltage battery system including functions such as 
checking system isolation, checking high voltage system integrity via an interlock loop, 
checking contactor status and ultimately closing contactors to connect the high voltage power 
source. The hybrid power inverter controls the motor and the DC to DC converter that 
provides energy to the 12 volt system and also performs checks on the integrity of the high 
voltage system.  
The communications between the Body Control Module (BCM) and Powertrain 
Control Module (PCM) go through the gateway module, then are via a high speed CAN bus. 
Additionally the BCM controls a hardwired ignition signal which is received by the PCM. A 
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second high speed CAN bus connects the PCM with the hybrid components. Other 
communication buses not relevant to hybrid system initialisation have been omitted in Figure 
6.3 for clarity. 
The individual parts of the system demonstrate its non-homogeneous nature being 
defined across a number of different organizations in a number of different types of design 
specifications and delivered through different routes. The power mode management in the 
BCM is defined in a state chart specified by the Electrical Department and is largely the same 
as for non-hybrid vehicles. The power management function is auto-coded by the BCM 
supplier from the in-house developed model. The power pack status is defined in a paper 
specification which includes a state chart drawing developed by the Powertrain Department 
with an implementation by the PCM supplier. It is largely the same as for non-hybrid vehicles 
with stop-start functionality. The hybrid system control is defined through SysML drawings 
(block diagrams, activity diagrams, and state machines) by the hybrid systems team but not in 
an executable fashion. The hybrid supervisory control in the PCM is delivered by an in-house 
team through model based auto-coding. The functions in the inverter and battery controller 
are fully supplier delivered based on textual specifications. 
 
6.3 Hybrid Propulsion System Initialisation Robustness Case 
Development 
This section describes the development of robustness case for the initialisation of the 
hybrid propulsion system. The development of the robustness case took approximately 50 
hours focusing on most relevant areas e.g. at a system rather than component level. The full 
robustness case is shown in Appendix B with key parts highlighted in this section to explain 
its construction. 
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6.3.1 Top Level Goal and Decomposition Strategy 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) arguments decompose a top level goal in a particular 
context through strategies and sub-goals to solutions with appropriate justifications. In the 
case of the Hybrid initialisation (shown in Figure 6.4) the top level goal is “the Hybrid system 
initialises & shuts down robustly”. 
 
  
Figure 6.4 Top level goal of GSN robustness case for hybrid system initialisation 
 
This goal needs to be put in context of the system, the vehicle use and a definition of 
“acceptably robust”.. The vehicle use context is defined as “Use by customer within 
performance limits of vehicle & across environmental conditions specified for vehicle use”. 
This definition seeks to avoid over engineering while not placing restrictions on how the 
customer uses the vehicle within these limits.  
Acceptably robust is defined as “Ability to drive vehicle to be maintained if possible, 
safe & legal i.e. avoid stranding, transient fault condition should not lead to permanent loss 
of drive unless safety related”. This encompasses the concepts of resilience through 
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maximising availability and ensuring the recoverability from error states that have previously 
been discussed in Chapter 2 as vitally important for the robustness of complex systems. 
The strategy for meeting the top level goal decomposes the top level goal into sub-goals 
at a system design, component design and validation levels  as shown in Figure 6.5. These 
form the top level goals for a series of argument modules.  The strategy for decomposition at 
this level was based on organizational responsibilities and so split into sub-goals for systems 
design, component design and verification. Colour coding with a legend was introduced to 
identify ownership.  
 
 
Figure 6.5. Decomposition strategy for top level goal of GSN robustness case for hybrid 
system initialisation 
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The component design strategy was not further developed at this stage but the focus 
was put on developing the system design and the verification strategy as these would feed 
into the robustness model and its testing. These argument modules will be described in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
6.3.2 System Design Robustness Argument 
The hybrid system initialisation design goal was decomposed to 10 sub-goals each of 
which formed argument modules for further decomposition. The strategy for this was based 
on the system design specifying adequate measures against known initialisation and shut-
down failures. This is illustrated in Figure 6.6 to show the structure of the decomposition, the 
details are subsequently described.   
182 
 
Figure 6.6 Decomposition of system design goal 
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The 10 sub-goals were mainly defined based on knowledge of generic causes of failure 
identified in Chapter 2 cover issues such as brownouts, state hang-up, loss of 
communications, loss of synchronization between parts of the system, variations in user 
inputs and usage patterns, variations in response time from system parts, flash memory write 
robustness and incomplete initialisation or shutdown. A sub-goal added to enable correlating 
the robustness model and actual system testing was that the design should ensure that system 
initialisation is sufficiently observable to facilitate grey box testing. The intent of this is that 
even if a supplier is implementing the design for which the detail is not known, i.e. as a black 
box, then state variables should be made available as parameters to enable observability 
during testing. 
Each of the 10 sub-goals were developed as argument modules to a solution level. An 
example of one of these arguments for the state hang-up goal is shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Robustness argument module for state hang-up system design goal 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.7 the argument breaks down more explicit design goals 
which are to be evidenced by design review and through the verification strategy. The 
breakdown of the argument required subject matter expert inputs either through direct 
consultation or from design guidelines. 
As has been observed in safety case development (Palin and Habli, 2010) it was found 
that there are often distinct classes of robustness goals whereby patterns can be used to codify 
and reuse design solutions to these objectives, an example of this being the  argument for 
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robustness to incomplete shutdown shown in Appendix 2 which has the potential to be re-
used on a wider basis. 
 
6.3.3 System Verification Robustness Argument 
In the System Verification Robustness Argument detailed verification requirements are 
derived to provide the evidence of meeting the robustness sub-goal of “Verification should 
detect defects at earliest stage (lower cost to fix and prevents masking issues) and seek to 
maximise coverage”. The strategy to achieve this robustness verification goal was through 
multi-level testing using models, components system and vehicle level tests, the argument 
module for this is shown in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8 System initialisation verification robustness argument 
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The first level of decomposition sets sub-goals for model, component, hardware in loop 
and vehicle based testing each of which has argument modules. The argument module 
defining the model testing strategy will be discussed later in this chapter as this was the basis 
for the testing of the robustness model. 
 
6.4 Hybrid Propulsion System Initialisation Robustness Model 
Development and Testing 
This section describes the development and testing the hybrid propulsion system 
initialisation model. 
 
6.4.1 Hybrid Propulsion System Initialisation Robustness Model Development 
The hybrid propulsion system robustness model was based on the generic approach that 
has been developed for the robustness modelling of non-functional properties, e.g. operating 
voltage, initialization timing, and operating modes, relating to the ability of the system to 
function as opposed to the function itself described in the previous chapter. This approach 
models a distributed system as a series of interlinked state machines whose state is dependent 
not only upon signals received from other nodes but also, more fundamentally, factors that 
affect the ability of the node to be able to receive and respond to control signals. The hybrid 
propulsion system initialisation model was developed in Matlab Simulink and Stateflow and 
is illustrated in Figure 6.9. The model took approximately 250 man hours to develop and test. 
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Figure 6.9. Hybrid propulsion system initialisation model - top level 
 
The model at the top level consists of the individual ECUs described earlier with the 
exception of the gateway module which has been abstracted as this has no functionality other 
to relay messages, the communication buses and the power-supply to the ECUs. An 
instrumentation block and signal bus has been included to automate running of test scenarios 
and aggregate data collection. Within each ECU block there is a master state machine for the 
operational mode of the ECU with states for unpowered, initializing, running and shutting 
down (see Figure 6.10).  
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Figure 6.10 Hybrid propulsion system initialisation model - ECU state machine 
  
In the running state there are underlying state machines for the behaviour of each the 
ECUs related to the initialisation strategy, for example driver start stop request and 
Powermode in the case of the BCM shown in Figure 6.10. This behaviour was modelled 
based on the individual specifications for each component.  
It was also necessary to model some aspects of the plant systems, e.g. the engine. This 
is done by abstracting the plant system to state based behaviour and running it as a parallel 
state-machine to the control behaviour. This approach minimizes the additional complexity 
of the model by having simple behavioural model which will can be directly linked to the 
control behaviour. A more complex continuous behaviour would require a new Simulink 
block outside the ECU block. Part of the engine plant model is shown in Figure 6.11 showing 
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this abstraction to the key states of behaviour relevant to the system initialisation and their 
interaction. The high level states were whether the engine was stationary or moving, with 
sub-states for modes for stopped or stalled for stationary and stalling, cranking, running, and 
stopping for moving. It is important that abnormal behaviour is modeled, e.g. stalled in the 
case of the engine, as the resultant system behaviour could be different. It was also found 
through testing to ensure the plant model was able to fully exercise the controller, that to 
model some of the continuous behaviour of the engine it was necessary to break down the 
stopping state into two separate stages, one in which the engine could be recovered to 
running by refueling and one in which it had to stop and be started by the starter motor 
(cranking). 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Hybrid propulsion system initialisation model – part of  engine plant model state 
machine 
 
It is important to model and make available control parameters to induce fault 
conditions identified in the robustness case, e.g. processor resets, under-voltage and other 
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fault responses. It is also necessary to make parameters available to allow control of factors 
which will be subject to variation. In the hybrid initialisation model this included time to 
complete particular functions which had physical interactions, e.g. checking integrity of high 
voltage system, and system timers which could be set through calibration. 
To facilitate testing an “instrumented model” was developed with an additional test bus 
which was used to feed parameters from test scripts into the model and log behavioural 
parameters for analysis.  
 
6.4.2 Hybrid Propulsion System Initialisation Robustness Model Testing 
The robustness case (shown in Figure 6.12) identified four key areas of model based 
testing which were; reachability testing, parameter variation testing, fault injection testing 
and correlation testing. These were proposed based on the good practice for model 
development (reachability and correlation testing) and the activation patterns of robustness 
failures from case study experience (parameter variation and fault injection). These tests 
types are generally applicable and can be used as part of the generic method. 
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Figure 6.12 GSN robustness argument for model based testing 
Reachability Testing 
Reachability testing is analogous to MCDC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) 
testing of software which is intended to prove all entry, exit, statement and decision branches 
of the code can be invoked and that every condition of a decision can have an effect 
(Hayhurst et al.,2001). In a similar manner systematic testing was conducted to ensure that 
every state and transition within the model could be reached.  
An example of test results is shown in Figure 6.13.  Each state and transition of the 
statemachine under test was individually numbered (this can be generated automatically 
using documentation functions of Simulink) and the model inputs were manually adjusted to 
confirm each could be reached. This testing initially realized results relating to the 
completeness of the model, e.g. the plant model had to be enhanced to be able to fully 
exercise the model.  Subsequently the testing did identify a design error (which was 
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concurrently detected by peer review), areas where it was necessary to precisely specify 
aspects of the implementation and a transition which had become redundant due to behaviour 
of another state machine. A specific example of an issue found during reachability testing 
was a state which triggered behaviour in another statemachine that could be reached with its 
exit conditions in place. This meant that it could be highly transitory and potentially cause a 
race condition between the state exit condition and the state machine with dependent 
behaviour detecting it had entered this state. 
 
Ref Pass/Fail Comments
1 Pass
2 Pass
3 Pass
4 Pass
5 Pass
6 Pass
7 Pass Reset will cause loop transitions 5 & 7 while set - only on model no change required
8 Pass
BCM Model
 
Figure 6.13 Reachability test results 
Parameter Variation Testing 
The next set of tests related to parameter variation. Sweeps were conducted of a 
number of critical parameters to determine their impact on the system initialisation 
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performance, primarily the time to reach a ready to drive state and the mode into which the 
system initialised. Input parameter matrices were developed in Microsoft Excel and read into 
the instrumented model from mat files (data file format used by Matlab Simulink). The 
results were logged and transferred to MS Excel for analysis and presentation.  
Figure 6.14 shows an example test result for sensitivity of the start time to the engine 
pre-start time where the engine is made ready for cranking by priming fuel and heating glow-
plugs if required.  The parameter sweep was performed in two conditions, one where the 
Hybrid system would start in HEV standby mode and the other where an engine start would 
be required by environmental conditions. In the first case the engine pre-start time makes no 
difference to the start time, as the engine is not started, but in the second after a minimum 
period it adds a linear delay. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Parameter variation test result 
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This testing provided insights into the behaviour of the system, particularly the 
tolerable levels of variation of these parameters before affecting the behaviour of the system. 
For example it became evident that there was an interaction between certain parameters and 
it became necessary to do analysis while simultaneously varying 2 and even 3 factors. This 
analysis was containable in a model based context as the test and the processing of results 
were automated and by making use of techniques such as the Classification Tree Method. 
Figure 6.15 shows the results of a 3 factor analysis which highlighted a relationship between 
2 configurable timing parameters which if calibrated wrongly, with the Prestart_Wait time 
equal or lower than the HV_Init_Wait  time, would cause a default engine start even in 
conditions where the preferred HEV standby was possible. 
 
Figure 6.15 3 factor parameter variation test result 
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For some parameters a pseudo random test was performed. One example of this shown 
in Figure 6.16 was on the start button pressed signal to simulate multiple user presses of the 
start button, a likely scenario in a hybrid if the user is expecting the engine to start whereas 
the designed behaviour is for it not to start unless needed, or due to issues of switch de-
bounce. 
 
Figure 6.16 Psuedo random start switch test 
 
The test results showed that due to the switch de-bounce timing and level of “inertia” 
within the system state transitions that the pseudo random input did not lead to undesirable 
behaviour e.g. rapid engine on off transitions, and always recovered to normal behaviour. 
Fault Injection Testing 
The next set of testing was based on fault injection. Studies of previous robustness 
issues had shown that during initialisation a key factor is not just that a fault has occurred but 
also when it occurs during the initialization phase that can determine whether it will lead to 
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failures. In cases where there is a critical time window in which the system is vulnerable if a 
specific abnormal event occurs it can be difficult to find and replicate at a physical level. 
Hence the fault injection testing looked at the impact of injecting faults, such as ECU resets 
which can occur due to supply voltage dips or watchdog resets, at various times during the 
initialisation sequence. This testing gave insight into the recoverability of failures during the 
initialisation. Figure 6.17 shows an example of a recoverability test for a drop out of the Body 
Control Module which controls the power mode. It shows that in this case that despite the 
drop out at 90.3 seconds the system re-initialised quickly enough to still detect the start 
button press and initialise to a ready state but with an increased start time. In situations where 
the ECU drop out occurred nearer the end of the switch button press there was insufficient 
time to initialise and detect so no start occurred however the subsequent press always 
resulted in a good start. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 Fault injection test result 
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Correlation Testing 
When representative physical systems become available it is advisable to do correlation 
tests with the modeled behaviour to give confidence in the results derived from the model. 
For the hybrid system initialization CAN bus logs were taken to check and correlate the 
behaviour of the actual system against the model. Figure 6.18 illustrates a result from this 
showing that while there was good correlation in the behaviour between the model and the 
actual vehicle there were differences in the timing of the state changes. 
 
 
Figure 6.18 Initial correlation test result 
 
Subsequent analysis found the major variation was in the pre-start time and crank time 
parameters which were both taking 600ms in the measured data as opposed to 300ms 
nominally in the model. Figure 6.19 shows a result from the test with the pre-start time and 
crank time parameters set to 600ms which exhibits a much closer correlation. 
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Figure 6.19 Updated correlation test result 
 
The slight delay in the model to react to the start button press suggests the actual switch 
monitoring strategy is detecting the press faster than the specified nominal of 100ms. It can 
also be seen that there is a 200ms lag in the powermode reacting to the engine running 
powerpack status in the measured data at 16.7 seconds which is not exhibited by the model. 
This can be partly put down to the publishing delay in the powermode CAN signals which are 
sent on a 100ms frame rate with the residual being attributed to processing time for the 
incoming message. However these levels of variance are well within the bounds of the levels 
of variance tested and so give confidence in the modeled test results. 
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6.5 Discussion 
In this section conclusions are given on the differences from the previous application 
and hence the transferability of the methods and also on utility of the individual techniques. 
 
6.5.1 Robustness Cases 
It was found the method of robustness arguments using GSN based diagrammatic 
arguments could be applied to the hybrid initialisation without requiring any changes to the 
generic methodology. It was possible to define a high level robustness goal and then conduct 
a high-level argument decomposition into modules based on organizational responsibilities. 
The further decomposition was possible using expert input and drawing on the findings from 
case studies. 
The decomposed goals were different from the Infotainment application reflecting the 
different technical concerns of the applications. The Infotainment application was very 
focused on the communication and ensuring that the implementation was homogeneous – 
this having being found as a cause of issues on previous systems. The hybrid application was 
focused on ensuring solutions were in place to the typical issues with distributed systems 
using results from case studies, as no previous system of this type had been produced. The 
hybrid application represents a more general case of CAN communication rather than 
infotainment specific MOST communication so it is more likely that the argument modules 
can be re-used on other applications as well as future Hybrid systems. 
The robustness cases were reviewed with 2 hybrid system specialists who were able to 
understand them. The robustness case was seen as useful in providing a common focus for 
various activities contributing to ensuring robustness making it visually reviewable for 
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assessing whether there are any omissions and as a mechanism for documenting and reusing 
good design practice. 
The level of effort to develop the robustness case was 70 hours although the argument 
for component robustness was not developed as the work focused on the system design and 
verification argument modules.  
 
6.5.2 Robustness Modelling 
The generic method for robustness modelling was also found to be applicable to the 
Hybrid system initialisation case with the same generic modelling approach being able to be 
reused. For the Hybrid case the resulting model was significantly simpler than the 
Infotainment robustness model as shown by the metrics listed in Table 6.1 
 
Infotainment 
Robustness 
Model
Hybrid 
Robustness 
Model
ECUs 9 4
Simulink Blocks 520 231
State-machines 10 4
States 4610 159
Transitions 8381 261
Model Executable (MEX) file size (kB) 11539 755  
Table 6.1 Comparison of model size between infotainment & hybrid robustness models 
 
The Infotainment model was larger primarily because of the amount of complexity in 
each node to accurately represent the MOST communication control channel behaviour and 
secondly due to a higher number of ECU nodes. Again the Hybrid case is likely to be more 
typical of most vehicle systems which CAN networks and have less complex interactions.  
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The development and testing of the model identified a limited number of valid 
concerns which has either been detected by peer review or could be discharged as a result of 
mechanisms in place which avoided failures. It was also possible to demonstrate that the 
system behaviour was acceptable under external failure conditions such as drop-out of 
modules providing inputs.  
The hybrid initialisation robustness model took 250 hours to develop, significantly less 
that the Infotainment model partly due to the reduced complexity of the application but also 
due to the ability to use established generic model structures.   
 
6.5.3 Ability to Use Methods in Combination 
The findings are that the two techniques are highly complementary and allow the 
exploration of robustness in the early design stages both as a structured thought experiment 
and through practical testing. The robustness argument will help identify critical design goals 
for robustness and the corresponding test requirements. By building an executable model of 
the robustness critical areas of the design, particularly the ability to function rather than the 
functionality itself, the design can be more completely understood. Through testing of the 
model the design can be checked for comprehensiveness and insights can be made regarding 
the underlying behaviour and the tolerable levels of variation understood.  
In making these techniques tractable it was necessary to focus on particular areas of the 
system design. There will inevitably be trade-offs between breadth and depth which must be 
guided by experience and expertise but this should not be surprising as in any form of 
modelling endevour skill is required. In doing this it is important to understand factors which 
present the most risk. In this case a subset of robustness factor was selected based on results 
from the case studies. Similarly the model has to be an abstraction of the full system and so 
inevitably will not exhibit behaviour attributed to un-modeled attributes.  Again the decision 
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on what aspects of to be model must be made on basis of expertise and experience. 
Correlation testing can be conducted once physical properties are available to check that a 
limited set of behaviours corresponds to the model. Obviously this is after the event as the 
design has been implemented by this stage but it can give a level of confidence in the much 
wider set of testing that can be been done on the model and confidence in the use of similar 
models on future designs.   
While additional up-front effort is required, more than 300 man hours in this instance, 
for these techniques early detection of robustness faults can greatly reduce workload later in 
development. In the next chapter the costs of the effort and potential benefits for the methods 
will be examined further. 
  
6.6 Updates to Generic Methods 
This section details where the generic methods can be extended as a result of the work 
on the hybrid evaluation study. 
 
6.6.1 Robustness Cases 
The hybrid case study reinforced the approach of decomposition of the robustness 
argument at a high level on the basis of organisational responsibilities, both within the 
organisation leading the development of the system and externally, to be able to cascade 
design requirements and allocate ownership appropriately. To make this division of 
responsibilities clear the use of colour coding to indicate ownership of achieving goals was 
introduced to the GSN diagrams. 
The further break down of the argument structure becomes dependent on domain 
knowledge either directly from experts or through knowledge capture and application such as 
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design guidelines and case study reviews of previous issues. The argument can be used to set 
robustness goals, i.e. design requirements, for which part of the solution evidence is testing 
through the robustness modelling.  
 
6.6.2 Modelling  
6.6.2.1 Modified Structure of Generic Robustness Model 
The generic approach to the modelling is fundamentally unchanged but enhancements 
have been made to support testing, communications between ECU blocks and to recognise 
that the system operating mode will be determined within an ECU. The modified structure of 
generic model is illustrated in Figure 6.20 and will be subsequently described. 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Modified structure of generic robustness model 
 
The Instrumentation Block is used to execute test cases and record corresponding test 
results. The test cases are time series of events which correspond to potential activation 
patterns of failures including: user inputs, power supply behaviours, parameter variations and 
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potential fault behaviours of individual parts of the system. The instrumentation block 
stimulates the inputs of the wider model appropriately through: direct control of inputs, 
modification of parameters and activation of fault behaviours within individual ECUs via the 
Instrumentation Bus. This Instrumentation Bus is also used to capture the resulting behaviour 
of the individual parts of the model, e.g. through node status signals, which the 
instrumentation block records along with the input data as the test results. The test cases and 
results were generated and analysed using Microsoft Excel which was converted to and from 
Matlab files but this could be done through more bespoke test automation and data analysis 
tools as required. 
The communication between the ECU blocks is implemented as a bus comprising 
individual signals rather than a set of discrete outputs. This makes the model more easily 
extendable as new ECU’s only require to be connected to the bus rather than adding 
individual connections to each corresponding input. It is also corresponds to the actual 
structure of automotive networks and it is possible to implement multiple busses 
corresponding to those on the vehicle. This becomes useful when looking at effects of 
failures within a bus or error propagation across the system of systems.  
The block controlling the system operating mode (or “Powermode”) was moved to be 
within an ECU rather than a standalone block. This reflects the reality of the implementation 
and in particular that the power mode signal availability is dependent on the state of the 
hosting ECU. 
 
6.6.2.2 Plant Modelling 
In the case where a plant model is required the following approach can be taken. The 
plant model should be only as complex as required to exercise each state and transition of the 
control model. This means that it can be a state based model itself which allows it to be 
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incorporated within the ECU state machine model alongside the control model. Continuous 
behaviours should be abstracted into states e.g. speed can be abstracted to: stationery, 
accelerating, constant speed and decelerating. 
 
6.6.2.3 Testing Strategy 
The approach for testing the robustness model can also be generically applied 
encompassing reachability, parameter, fault injection and correlation testing.  
Reachability testing is to identify areas of the model, or the design it relates to, which 
are incomplete. It is analogous to MCDC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) testing of 
software which is intended to prove all entry, exit, statement and decision branches of the 
code can be invoked and that every condition of a decision can have an effect (Hayhurst et 
al.,2001). In a similar manner systematic testing is conducted to ensure that every state of the 
model and transition within the model can be reached.  
Parameter Variation Testing is conducted to investigate the behaviour of the system 
resulting from variations in critical parameters, particularly the tolerable levels of variation of 
these parameters before resulting in failures. Initially single parameter sweeps of repeated 
tests with incremental variations in the value of a critical parameter are conducted to 
determine their individual impact.  It may be necessary to repeat these in particular modes of 
the system as failures may only occur in these modes. There may be interactions between 
certain parameters and if this is suspected then analysis can be conducted while 
simultaneously varying 2 and even 3 factors exploiting test automation capabilities of model 
based testing. Pseudo random test variations can be performed to simulate user inputs or 
voltage drop-out behaviours to test for failures whereby the sequence of events is important.  
Fault Injection Testing examines the impact of injecting known faults, such as ECU 
resets which can occur due to supply voltage dips or watchdog resets. These faults must be 
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selected based on previous experience and the local impact modelled, e.g. re-initialisation of 
ECU or loss of communications, along with the ability for the instrumentation block to 
control them. Testing needs to repeat the fault injection at varying times across different 
system states as there may be a specific time window of vulnerability in a specific mode for 
the fault to result in a failure. 
When representative physical systems become available it is advisable to do correlation 
tests with the modeled behaviour to give confidence in the wider set of results derived from 
the model. 
 
6.6.3 Interaction Between Methods 
As illustrated in Figure 6.21 there can be useful synergies between robustness 
arguments and robustness modelling. The robustness argument can provide design 
requirements which are embodied in the robustness models as solutions to issues known to 
cause robustness failures. The solutions that are modelled provide design evidence for the 
robustness argument. The robustness models themselves are then used as test artefacts for 
model based robustness testing. The robustness argument can provide the verification 
requirements for this model based testing and correspondingly the results of the testing 
provide evidence for the robustness case.  
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Figure 6.21 Interaction between robustness case and robustness model 
 
This approach can be applied in an iterative fashion as a design matures from model to 
components and systems through the use of hardware in the loop techniques. However to be 
effective the technique must be underpinned by capture and application of domain 
knowledge, specifically knowledge of issues leading to robustness failures.  
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Chapter 7 – Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the degree to which the work of this thesis answers the high 
level research question of whether a viable framework of methods to substantially improve 
robustness in the design of complex automotive electronics systems can be developed. Key 
discussion points concerning the viability of the methods proposed are; whether they are 
tackling the right problems, if so are they effective in doing this, are they efficient and likely 
to provide a cost benefit and how would such methods be practically deployed? Finally the 
novelty of the methods is discussed and specific contributions to knowledge identified. 
 
7.2 Targeting of Methods 
An overarching concern is whether the methods are addressing areas which are the root 
cause of robustness issues.  The literature review demonstrated the scale and seriousness of 
issues concerning distributed automotive electronics, for example through the statements 
made by senior industry figures and the evidence of recalls quoted in Section 2.4.2. However 
the literature review noted an understandable reticence to put specific details of the nature of 
such problems into the public domain. This led to a requirement for the case study 
investigation in Chapter 3 confirming the nature of robustness issues to ensure the methods 
would be targeted appropriately. This study found that of the 43 faults analysed 26 (60%) 
were robustness related issues due to faults external to the system controlling service 
delivery, and hence it was be concluded that robustness failures are a key issue to be 
addressed. The case study identified 73% of robustness faults as transient faults, created in 
the development stage, originating outside the system, affecting software. The primary cause 
210 
of this type of fault was communication errors, the most significant of which is the timing of 
interactions (race conditions, early and late interactions) followed by erroneous or missing 
input signals, spurious communications or corrupted messages. In a significant number of 
cases the precipitating cause for such communication errors was shut-down and re-
initialisation of external systems, often due to low voltage transients. The case study 
identified the need for top down design approaches and also early validation approaches 
recognising the need for behavioural rather than just structural models in order to exhibit 
emergent behaviour. These findings were the basis for the development of the framework for 
design for robustness including the specific new methodologies of robustness cases and 
robustness modelling. As the case studies were all from a single source OEM then it is 
unknown whether the causes of robustness issues would be equally applicable to other 
OEMs, however it is known that the underlying technologies, e.g. CAN, and suppliers are 
common.  
Further confidence in the appropriateness of the targeting of the methods can be 
derived from the infotainment and hybrid applications. These were selected as real concerns 
from industry that embody the types of issues found in the case studies rather than 
hypothetical ones. They also demonstrate the ability to use the methods across diverse 
automotive electronics applications rather than being specific to one type. Whether the 
methods are more universally applicable beyond automotive electronics has not been 
investigated as part of this work. Whereas this research draws on inputs beyond automotive 
further work could take the approaches subsequently developed in this thesis and test their 
application beyond automotive. 
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7.3 Effectiveness 
Having confirmed that the methods are targeted towards the right problems then the 
next question to determine if they are viable is whether they are effective? To answer this it is 
necessary to examine the results from the pilot applications of the methods to infotainment 
and hybrid propulsion systems. 
 
7.3.1 Effectiveness of Robustness Cases 
Robustness Cases were developed using Goal Structuring Notation for an infotainment 
system and for the initialisation of a hybrid propulsion system in Chapters 5 and 6. From 
these studies a number of positive indicators of the effectiveness of the technique were 
observed. 
Firstly the technique allows a broad and strategic approach by providing a structure 
through which it is possible to justify the approach to robustness at both an overall and 
detailed levels. In doing this it provides a structured approach which links many diverse 
activities, e.g. component specifications, system specifications, verification, supplier 
management standards and design processes, into a cohesive overall approach. Normal 
practice would have these elements in individual design and specification artefacts with a 
range of owners which the collective coverage would not be apparent. By having this overall 
view, gaps were identified in the applications investigated. Specific examples of this for the 
infotainment system were; a lack of system level verification methods and a need to get 
specific evidence of supplier resource capability. On the hybrid application the goal to 
specify adequate measures against known initialisation and shutdown failure modes 
highlighted both top down and bottom up gaps. From top down there were areas where it was 
not clear whether requirements were cascaded and solutions in place to issues such as flash 
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write robustness. From bottom up it made explicit many design goals e.g. “design should 
include super-states which guarantee transitions out of sub-states for major events” which 
were implicit in the actual design. However as these goals were not stated they would not be 
explicitly verified in the implementation of the design or could be transferred to other 
designs.  
As the technique is hierarchical it allows the user to focus in on particular areas of 
concern in more detail based on previous experience. For example, from the case study 
review initialisation and shutdown were identified as high risk areas. In the infotainment 
robustness argument a specific robustness objective and argument module was added for 
initialisation and shutdown to focus on this area. In the hybrid propulsion study the whole 
argument focused on this one topic at a high-level of detail and was able to define the 
particular areas of investigation for the robustness modelling.  
A strength of the robustness argument technique is that it can be used early in the 
design process. This allows necessary measures to be identified and incorporated into the 
design and development processes before too much effort and resources are committed. The 
technique was found to be useful in promoting a conscious discussion regarding robustness 
objectives and what they mean in practice. In the case of the hybrid initialisation what was 
the definition of “acceptably robust”. In Chapter 2 a definition of acceptably robust was 
derived from the definitions given by Avižienis et al (2004) of: an acceptably robust system is 
one whose behaviour in the presence of external faults correctly implements specified 
services to the user which may be a limited subset defined in a degraded mode. This resulted 
in specific goals being stated for the system behaviour in the presence of faults e.g. “PCM 
brownout should result in re-initialisation of hybrid system”. 
The use of goal structuring notation as a diagrammatic technique was found to be 
effective for communication and review, with domain experts in both the infotainment and 
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hybrid areas, even by those initially not familiar with the notation. The GSN diagrams were 
not reviewed by anyone without expertise in the domain, such as higher level managers, but it 
was expressed by the technical experts that they believed that existence of a structure which 
showed an overall strategic approach would be useful in being able to argue that they had 
taken sufficient measures. In taking an approach to argument decomposition which reflected 
organizational responsibilities it helped clarify and make explicit roles and responsibilities, 
particularly between supplier and the OEM in the case of the infotainment system and 
between different teams within the OEM in both cases. 
It was also noted in two specific areas that the method promoted ensuring evidence is 
actively and systematically collected and reviewed rather than assumed. The first was for 
legacy components that may be performing below their assumed capability which becomes 
critical within the new system context. In the case of the infotainment system there were 
carry-over components from previous systems which the goals required a review of previous 
test results. The second area was that of supplier resource capability which was generally 
assumed but to satisfy the goals required specific evidence of individual capability. 
A limitation is that the technique is highly reliant on expert knowledge to be effective 
in managing the trade-off between coverage and depth in determining the breakdown of 
robustness objectives and the level of detail required in a particular area. However from the 
literature review it was concluded that domain knowledge is essential to complex systems 
and Goal Structuring Notation robustness cases offers a structured and hierarchical method of 
applying and capturing this. The method provides a means of integrating domain knowledge 
from several experts providing individual argument modules in a format that allows peer 
review at an early stage in the design process. These argument modules have the potential to  
become reusable examples of best practice or design patterns and hence offer a means of 
sharing domain expert knowledge. This would require repeated application to confirm the 
214 
extent of the re-usability, which is suggested as future work, but in setting design goals and 
identifying solutions to known issues at a minimum provides example solutions for reference. 
The biggest opportunity for re-use is where the goals are expressed at a level which is not 
specific to the particular application, e.g. “each ECU should have specified fault response for 
the loss of each incoming signal”.   
It is important to note that in this context modularity applies to the argument not 
necessarily the system under development which typically for a system of systems will be 
heterogeneous in nature. However the arguments can be used to support the application of 
modular systems, such as in the infotainment case study, through identifying key supporting 
objectives such as composability and solutions such as proof of adherence to interface 
standards. 
While the robustness case gives a context for a structured thought experiment it does 
not specifically address the issue in some of the cases studied of unforeseen use cases. A 
structured approach to elicitation and analysis of use cases whereby the user deviates from 
intended operation of the system is an area for further work. 
 
7.3.2 Effectiveness of Robustness Modelling 
Robustness models were developed for the initialisation of a fiber optic network based 
infotainment system and for the initialisation of a hybrid propulsion system in Chapters 5 and 
6 and a generic robustness modelling method proposed. From these the following 
observations on the effectiveness of the robustness modelling have been derived. 
Firstly the models did offer a new capability to test and optimise the robustness of the 
systems not possible with physical components. In the case of infotainment system the 
impact of changing design parameters on the system initialisation and the effectiveness of 
different strategies was able to be assessed via the model. In doing this it highlighted 
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emergent behaviours of the system which were not readily appreciated. It was also possible to 
do a level of grey box testing not possible with physical parts, for example being able to 
observe the utilization of internal buffers. For the infotainment system much of the detailed 
functionality was set by external standards and the creation of the model led to a deeper 
understanding of these. 
In the case of the hybrid system initialisation the construction of the model detected 
errors in the specification. Although in this case these were also identified by design reviews 
this shows how constructing a model can reduce reliance on manual techniques for early 
error detection. The dynamic testing of the model found examples of redundant states and 
race conditions, showing effectiveness of the modelling and the testing regime identified in 
the robustness case. 
The model also gave a capability to test across a range of variability not possible with 
physical components, whereby only a specific instantiation of the system could be tested at 
any one time and only once parts were available. From the results of the testing it was 
possible to determine the tolerable range of variability of component performance for the 
system to meet its design objectives. 
The generic structure for robustness modelling shown in Chapter 5 and 6 gives a basis 
for a model of a networked system of systems but a limitation of robustness modelling, as 
with any model, is that it can only give insights on the attributes that are modeled. It is 
dependent on domain knowledge in determining what detailed aspects of the system are 
modeled and which use cases are tested. It can be seen from the case study that this can be 
derived from systematic analysis of existing information. In  particular the method used for 
analysis within the case study e.g. robustness fault pathology, classification scheme of faults 
and collection of activation path parameters, can be re-used on other data sources of issues 
seen within other domains. The case study analysis in this thesis identified the most prevalent 
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issues and hence these are captured in the generic model structure. The use of robustness 
arguments and P-Diagrams are suggested methods for further exploration of which 
application specific attributes should be modelled. 
  
7.4 Effectiveness of Overall Design for Robustness Framework 
It was also noted in the hybrid propulsion evaluation study that the robustness case 
provided an effective structured mechanism for determining the focus of the modelling so the 
two techniques are synergistic. In fact this test case included all elements of the proposed 
framework for design for robustness. Design principles from the literature review and domain 
knowledge helped to construct the robustness case, then a robustness model was iteratively 
developed and tested encompassing all stages of the framework. Although limited in scope 
some confidence can be derived from this that the elements of the overall framework 
combine effectively. As with any framework it is possible to tailor it to the specific 
application thereby helping to augment and reinforce existing practices. 
 
7.5 Cost vs. Benefit 
Although the case studies offer evidence for the effectiveness of the methods for design 
for robustness of complex automotive electronics a further question is if the likely benefits 
outweigh the costs of incremental effort involved in these techniques? To answer this firstly 
the cost of applying the methods must be considered and secondly the financial benefits from 
their use must be considered. 
The infotainment robustness case took approximately 100 hours to develop and the 
hybrid propulsion initialisation robustness case approximately 70 hours. The tools used were 
freely available adaptations of generic tools, e.g. Microsoft Visio, hence the only costs were 
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man power related. The current salary for an automotive engineer in the UK is typically 
£35,000-£50,000 per annum based on currently advertised roles (Jaguar-Land-Rover, 2013). 
Taking the top end of this and assuming 1600 man-hours per year and a 100% overhead rate 
gives a total employment cost per hour of approximately £62.50. From this figure and the 
time taken to develop the robustness cases it can be seen that they can be constructed for a 
cost of less than £10,000. 
The robustness models took considerably longer to develop and test, approximately 800 
hours for the infotainment model and 250 hours for the hybrid initialisation model. Again 
these models used generic tools, Matlab Simulink and Stateflow, which are available with no 
specific outlay. Hence the cost for constructing and testing the models can be estimated as 
£50,000 for the Infotainment robustness model and £16,000 for the hybrid propulsion system 
robustness model. The higher cost of infotainment model is due to a combination of higher 
model complexity and learning effects. 
In assessing the benefits of the methods it is more difficult to be precise as to their 
monetary value but the following analysis gives indicative scale based on conservative 
assumptions. These assumptions are based on the author’s experience as a senior manager in 
an OEM with teams responsible for the activities described. In general the benefits of the 
methods can be considered to be prevention of robustness issues at design stage for 
robustness cases and earlier detection of latent faults due to emergent behaviour through 
robustness modelling. The benefit of doing this will depend on the particular stage of 
development reached before an issue is detected and will escalate as design progresses and 
goes into production. This will be illustrated by considering the case of an issue which can be 
fixed by a simple software change to a single part of a system e.g. a modification to the 
conditions for a single state transition. An overview of the calculation approach showing the 
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different issue resolution activities and relative levels of effort across lifecycle steps is shown 
in Figure 7.1 and subsequently described. 
 
Life Cycle Stage
Initial Design
Not Required Not Required Not Required Not Required
Prototype Development
Man Power Cost Man Power Cost Not Required Not Required
Final Verification
Man Power Cost Man Power Cost Man Power Cost Not Required
Production
Man Power Cost Man Power Cost Man Power Cost
Software Update 
Cost Per Vehicle
Resolution Activity for Software Issue
Fault Diagnosis
Update & 
Integrate 
Software Module
Re-Validation & 
Regression 
Testing
In-Market 
Deployment of 
Software
x5
x12
x1
x1x1
 
Figure 7.1 Resolution activities and relative levels of effort across lifecycle steps 
 
If this issue is eliminated by design approach, e.g. as a result of robustness case or by 
robustness modelling, then there is no cost. If this is found after the initial software is 
produced then there is a cost for diagnosis of the issue, say one man-day, and re-writing and 
re-integration of the software, say 10 man-days giving a total of 11 man-days at a cost of 
£5500 using the man power rates derived previously (88 hours at £62.50 per hour). These 
costs are based on the internal man-power rates, if the changes are implemented by supplier 
the costs could be considerably higher. It should be noted that even at this stage these may 
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not be the only costs associated with an issue, as it could result in lost time for testing or 
mask the finding of other issues leading to project delays.  
If the issue is discovered during the final testing phase then there is a cost for diagnosis, 
say 5 man days, as having not been uncovered earlier diagnosis will be more difficult and a 
cost to re-write and re-integrate the software of 10 days as before. More significantly there is 
a cost for revalidation not just for the functions affected to prove the fix but additionally a 
cost for regression testing interfacing functions to prove they are unaffected by the change. 
This could be more than 50 man-days of effort for a system of reasonable complexity. Hence 
the total effort for finding an issue during final testing can be around 65 man-days even for a 
simple fix giving rise to a cost of £32,500 (520 man-hours at £62.50 per hour). Again there 
can be knock on effects that would result in much higher costs, for example if the issue 
caused delays in bringing a new or updated product to market. 
In the worst case, the issue is not discovered until the vehicle is in production with 
significant numbers in the hands of customers. For a problem to get this far would suggest a 
low incidence issue which occurs under a very particular set of circumstances typical of the 
issues investigated in Chapter 3. Such issues by their nature can require significant efforts to 
diagnose and so an estimate of 60 man days is not unreasonable. The costs to re-write, re-
integrate and revalidate would be similar to previous case giving another 60 man-days effort. 
This puts the cost of putting the fix in place at £60,000 (120 man-days giving 960 man-hours 
at £62.50 per hour).  
The other part of the direct cost at this stage is the cost of deploying the fix which is 
dependent on; the number of vehicles produced with the issue, whether issue is to be fixed at 
routine service or as a special service action, and the means for deploying the fix. To address 
the latter first, typically a software fix as under consideration in this example is done using 
diagnostic equipment to reload new software to a particular ECU via the vehicle's diagnostic 
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interface and the vehicle network. Due to restrictions on bandwidth of the on-board network 
this can take a significant period of time for which the dealer can reclaim a cost from the 
vehicle manufacturer. For this analysis the cost for the in-market software update is assumed 
at £50 per vehicle based on 0.5 hours work at a rate of £100 per hour dealer charge rate (a 
Sept 2011 Survey by Warranty Direct puts the average franchised dealer labour rate at £95.83 
in UK). Hence the variable cost for deploying the fix is £50,000 per 1000 vehicles in addition 
to the £60,000 fixed cost for putting the fix in place. Therefore if the issue impacts 100,000 
vehicles then the cost of fixing it could be in excess of £5M even if this is done as part of a 
scheduled service.  
Figure 7.2 illustrates the relative cost of implementing the proposed robust design 
methods against the potential cost per issue. This shows that the methods become viable at 
the point where they can detect a single issue which would otherwise have been undetected 
until final testing. For robustness issues which are only present during particular 
combinations of events and occur sporadically with low occurrence rates it is not 
unreasonable to assume they may not be detected before this stage due to low numbers of 
prototypes produced and the masking effects of other more prevalent issues. In the case of the 
methods of preventing or detecting an issue which otherwise could reach production, then 
they become highly viable from a cost benefit perspective with the cost of implementing 
them being a fraction of the potential cost of a single issue. 
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Figure 7.2 Cost of implementing robust design methods vs. potential cost per issue  
 
While the direct cost of robustness issues are significant there are even more serious 
implications for loss of brand loyalty and reputation. J.D.Power are a company who conduct 
the largest surveys into the effects of failures experienced by customers on their subsequent 
purchasing behaviour. In their 2013 Vehicle Dependability Survey (J.D.Power, 2013) they 
found that when experiencing three or more problems with their vehicle, loyalty among 
owners of premium models declines from 55% to 39%. Clearly if 16% of customers are lost 
due to poor reliability then this has a major impact in terms of lost profit. This underlines the 
thesis’s contention that robustness of non-safety critical functions is a business critical issue 
which needs more rigourous design methods. 
 
7.6 Deployment of Methods 
Having discussed the viability of the proposed methods and the framework for design 
for robustness, the next point of discussion is the practicality of their deployment. The two 
major prerequisites are availability of the necessary tools and of resource at a systems level. 
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As previously discussed the underlying tools, Microsoft Visio and Matlab Simulink and 
Stateflow, are widely available in large engineering organisations and used in other areas of 
design. However the availability of resource could be a constraint in the author’s experience 
as a senior manager in automotive product development.  
This constraint of availability of resource would suggest that an incremental approach 
to the deployment of methods, focusing on known areas of risk, would be the most viable 
introduction method. This would be similar to the pilot studies undertaken in this thesis but 
with a view to expand the knowledge of the techniques within the target area of deployment. 
By focusing on known areas of risk the potential benefits will be higher and as the benefit of 
the techniques become established then decisions can be taken on their wider use. If the 
techniques are successful then they should result in a net reduction of workload due to using 
less resource to prevent or detect an issue early in the design phase than to diagnose and fix 
later in the development phase or in production. However careful recording of appropriate 
metrics is required to substantiate this cause and effect. 
Another enabler to the deployment of the framework is its ability to integrate with 
existing processes or new processes which are already being adopted. For complex systems a 
suggested approach by the International Council Of System Engineers (INCOSE) is that of 
Model Based System Engineering (Forder, 2012). In Model Based System Engineering 
(MBSE) models form the primary source of data for analysis and communication, as shown 
in Figure 7.3, and as can be seen from examples studied in the literature review is being 
adopted by many organisations. 
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Figure 7.3 Model Based System Engineering from Forder, 2012 
 
The approach developed in this thesis is entirely consistent with this Model Based 
System Engineering approach. This can be readily seen from Figure 7.4 which summarises 
the approach proposed, based on the simplified framework for design for robustness 
developed in Chapter 6 which exploits the synergy between the methods. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Simplified framework for design for robustness 
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One potential mechanism to provide sufficient focus for the roll out of the methods 
would be to have robustness specialists similar to functional safety specialists. The role of the 
robustness specialist initially would be to; develop robustness cases and robustness models, 
conduct robustness testing, support issue investigation and capture domain knowledge. As the 
techniques roll-out then the robustness specialist role may be more focused on training and 
coaching other engineers and the further development and dissemination of methods 
including their deployment as internal standards. 
 
7.7 Contributions to Knowledge 
From the literature review the key opportunities for contributions to knowledge in the 
field of robust design of automotive electronics were identified as follows: 
1 Development of domain knowledge of impact in terms of prevalence, dependability 
characteristics impacted and the causes of robustness related failures in the area of 
automotive electronics. 
2 Development of a design for robustness framework for complex automotive 
electronic systems. This should leverage best practices identified during the literature 
review but should include the following two areas identified for further new work. 
3 Adaptation of safety cases to robustness to enable structured arguments for assuring 
the robustness of a system. 
4 Development of an approach to robustness modelling based on understanding what 
are important factors to model pertaining to the robustness of automotive electronics. 
 
These will be discussed in the remaining part of this chapter to confirm the specific 
contributions to knowledge that have been realized, including limitations, and finally to 
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discuss key learning at an overall level regarding the importance of domain knowledge in 
dealing with complex systems. 
 
7.7.1 Domain Knowledge of the Prevalence and Causes of Robustness Related 
Failures in the Area of Automotive Electronics  
The literature review identified that while there was evidence for the scale of issues in 
automotive electronics no systematic analysis of the prevalence and root causes of robustness 
issues was published. The analysis of a significant number of case studies in Chapter 3 has 
made a contribution to knowledge confirming the significance of robustness related failures 
is an issue and providing domain knowledge of significant route causes which has provided a 
focus for the development of methods. An overview of these findings has been included in a 
number of papers and presented at conferences (McMurran and Jones 2010, McMurran and 
Jones 2013). 
Limitations of this study were noted due to the case studies coming from a single 
manufacturer and the analysis into the classifications only by the author. Suggested future 
work is to use the analysis method on new case data by more than one person to confirm the 
repeatability and reproducibility of the results. 
 
7.7.2  Design For Robustness Framework for Complex Automotive Electronic 
Systems 
The literature review identified that while techniques for robust design existed in the 
mechanical domain, e.g. Design For Six Sigma, they were not transferable to the electronics 
and software domains. Where potentially applicable methods existed in automotive 
electronics and software domains these had been mainly focused on safety critical 
applications and no overall framework for an approach to robustness existed.  
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Requirements for such a framework were based on a set of requirements defined using 
literature review and case study results. The framework developed in Chapter 4 to meet these 
requirements and subsequently refined which brings together a number of complementary 
techniques in a cohesive manner to address robustness.  
While the elements of this framework were used in the Hybrid initialisation evaluation 
study the focus was primarily on the 2 new methods. Further application studies of the 
framework as a whole are required over a longer time period, allowing for repeated 
application to account for learning effects, to give higher degree of confidence in its overall 
effectiveness. 
 
7.7.3 Robustness Cases 
The generic method for robustness cases of using a hierarchically structured modular 
argument presented in a diagrammatic manner developed in Chapters 5  is based on that 
developed by Kelly and others for safety cases described in the literature review. What is 
novel is its application for arguing the robustness of a complex but not necessarily safety 
critical system, the general benefits being inherited from the original method. 
The focus of the robustness argument is in particular justifying the freedom from 
service failures in the presence of errors due to external faults. Until now there has been no 
method for systematically reasoning and justifying why a complex system is robust that 
allows upfront risk analysis to determine where design effort to address systematic risks 
needs to be focused. To satisfy safety and robustness goals may require different approaches, 
e.g. a safety goal may require a system to fail into a safe state but a robustness goal may also 
require the system to recover. 
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7.7.4 Robustness Modelling 
The literature review identified large bodies of work ongoing in the field of modelling 
complex systems, so is necessary to be explicit in defining what is novel in the approach 
developed within this thesis. The approach developed is unique in modelling an automotive 
complex system of systems at a level of abstraction which allows robustness properties to be 
viably examined. This approach is enabled by insights gained in the literature review and 
case study review which allow a sufficiently broad approach to deal with the problem at a 
system of systems level, while being a sufficiently detailed approach to model robustness 
relevant behaviours. 
Current approaches decompose modelling into separate structural and behavioural 
models which are not amenable to analysis of system level robustness issues. From the 
literature review modelling of a system of systems is done at an architectural level showing 
structures, e.g. in SysML. Functional behaviour is typically modelled at an individual system 
level and communications modelled and analysed in isolation from functions on basis of 
meeting functional requirements such as maximum age of signals. However from the case 
study analysis of robustness issues it was clear that in order to detect emergent behaviour 
between systems it is necessary to do sufficiently detailed behavioural modelling across 
systems. The method of robustness modelling of automotive electrical systems developed in 
Chapters 5 and evaluated in Chapter 6 is made tractable by focusing on the ability to function 
rather than the customer functionality itself which is typically the focus of behavioural 
modelling. By focusing on the ability to function, utilising domain knowledge, it allows both 
detailed behaviour to be modelled but encompassing a number of interlinked systems. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
 
In this chapter the main findings of each of the preceding chapters of this thesis are 
summarised followed by recommendations for future work. 
 
8.1 Summary of Chapters 
8.1.1 Summary of Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In the introductory chapter the background to the problem domain addressed by this 
thesis was given. The increasing requirement for vehicle features results in a rapidly 
increasing complexity of automotive electronic systems. Automotive electronics exhibit 
properties of systems of systems including that of emergent behaviour and validation 
complexity. This brings with it major financial risks for automotive manufacturers due to 
field failures, launch delays, recalls and loss of customers. In order to mitigate these risks 
effective tools and techniques for the robust design of complex automotive electronic 
systems are required, but initial research suggests that little published work on robustness, as 
opposed to safety, has been done in this field. 
Hence the research question identified was whether a viable framework of methods to 
substantially improve robustness in the design of complex automotive electronics systems 
can be developed. In order to address this research question the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis were structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviewed literature from both automotive other 
domains and highlighted where specific contributions to research could be made, Chapter 3 
conducted a case study review of automotive electronic issues to understand the nature and 
root cause of robustness issues, Chapter 4 developed a framework approach incorporating the 
two proposed new methods, in Chapters 5 the method is developed through application to an 
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infotainment case study and a generic approach to the methods derived, in Chapter 6 these 
new methods were evaluated on  a case study of a hybrid propulsion systems and in Chapter 
7 the viability of the framework of methods developed and their contribution to knowledge 
was discussed. The findings from of these chapters are summarised in the following sections. 
 
8.1.2 Summary of Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The literature review firstly sought to clarify what is meant by robustness especially as 
opposed to reliability. A robustness fault is an internal fault within a system that is instigated 
by an external fault causing an error to be propagated to the system. This is noting that the 
failure mechanism may be through triggering a dormant internal fault. An acceptably robust 
system is one whose behaviour in the presence of faults that successfully implements a 
specified subset of services to the user defined in a degraded mode. This is a distinct and 
different concern from reliability which is concerned with reducing the occurrence of internal 
faults in the first place. 
The literature on complexity confirmed that complex systems are where they have 
interdependencies which make them inherently non-linear. These exhibit emergent behaviour 
due to difficulty in predicting this during design through human analysis or modelling. 
Systems of systems are a particular type of complex system whereby a number of individual 
systems are interlinked to share resources, e.g. information, power sources or hardware. 
These are particularly vulnerable to emergent behaviour due to the individual systems being 
designed in isolation with individual purposes, potentially at different times by different 
organisations and also due to their large scale.  
Automotive Electronics are implemented as a system of systems, are highly interactive 
and hence highly complex. Additionally as they are embedded systems where there are time 
critical dynamic interactions they have a high degree of “Dynamic Complexity”. Review of 
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the literature also highlighted concerns with coping with this complexity coupled with a high 
rate of change and a short time to market. The approaches identified to address this were 
standards for open systems, sharing and reuse of software such as GENIVI and AUTOSAR as 
well as model based development. A key finding was that whereas there is evidence of the 
scale and seriousness of emergent issues in automotive electronics, such as the cost of recalls 
and statements by major industry figures, there is little published information on the nature of 
these problems. 
The literature on a variety of potential approaches across industries to address the 
robustness of complex systems was then reviewed. It was found that robust design techniques 
such as Design for 6 Sigma are highly mechanically focused and have an emphasis on “right 
first time” which fundamentally misses the issue of emergence. In contrast “agile” 
approaches developed in the software domain are designed around an iterative approach 
which accepts that issues will occur which can be fixed at a subsequent iteration.  
It was found that much of the research efforts and standards are focused on high 
integrity safety-critical systems which lead to solutions to guarantee high reliability as 
opposed to robustness. This primacy of reliability over robustness leads to solutions which 
are predicated on levels of redundancy which are not appropriate for non-safety critical 
systems on mass market products. However a body of good practice was identified for the 
design and architecture of complex systems embodying such concepts as simplicity, 
minimality, modularity, encapsulation, independence, composability, elementary interfaces 
and self-stabilization which can be applied with little or no piece cost effect.  
Some of the approaches used in the development of safety critical systems were 
identified as being applicable to design for robustness such as the need to do upfront risk 
analysis to determine where design effort is required to address systematic risks. In particular 
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methods of diagrammatically developing hierarchically structured safety cases were seen to 
have potential to be adapted to design for robustness. 
There is extensive work on modelling of complex systems ongoing which was 
reviewed but this highlighted the issue in resolving ”big picture” architectural level 
modelling (e.g. SysML) with detailed ”behavioural” modelling (e.g. in Matlab Simulink) for 
large scale systems. As none of the approaches were specifically focused on robustness the 
question of whether a complex system could be usefully modelled at a level of abstraction 
that allows robustness properties to be examined was unanswered. 
Verification testing is an area where there is specifically robustness focused work 
published tackling the issues of how to practically test systems with extremely large state 
space. Formal verification methods were also reviewed and it was concluded that given their 
potential a framework for robust design should incorporate them as an approach. However 
formal methods tools and techniques need to mature and become lightweight through on-
going application research in high integrity automotive electronic applications. At a future  
stage the robustness models and knowledge of specific properties that need to be checked to 
prove robustness can provide a basis for formal analysis. 
An observation running through much of the literature on complex systems is the 
importance of domain knowledge. Underlying this is the fact that as complex systems are not  
amenable to exhaustive analysis even by automated methods or full understanding by any 
single individual, then heuristic approaches based on domain knowledge to anticipating and 
finding issues are necessary. However as previously noted there is a lack of domain 
knowledge of automotive electronics robustness issues in published literature. 
In conclusion the literature review identified key opportunities for contributions to 
knowledge as follows: 
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1. Development of domain knowledge of impact in terms of prevelance, dependability 
characteristics impacted and the causes of robustness related failures in the area of 
automotive electronics. 
2. Development of a design for robustness framework for complex automotive 
electronic systems. This should leverage best practices identified during the literature 
review but should include the following two areas identified for further new work. 
3. Adaptation of safety cases to robustness to enable structured arguments for assuring 
the robustness of a system. 
4. Development of an approach to robustness modelling based on understanding what 
are important factors to model pertaining to the robustness of automotive electronics. 
 
8.1.3 Summary of Chapter 3 - Case Study Review of Automotive Electronics 
Robustness Issues 
A review was conducted of 43 well-documented field issues in the area of automotive 
electronic systems. It was found that these were predominantly (60%) robustness related 
issues due to faults external to the system controlling service delivery, suggesting that current 
development techniques were less effective in addressing robustness and so supporting the 
need for improved techniques. 
This does not necessary imply that this portion of all failures are robustness related as 
the case studies didn’t include problems that were fixed during development or in-service 
issues that had more minor impacts. However it does suggest that current techniques are 
generally picking up simpler failure modes but not more complex robustness related failures 
which then manifest themselves as issues when the vehicle is in service causing customer 
dissatisfaction. It therefore verifies the need for work in identifying improved techniques to 
prevent robustness related failures. 
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It was found that the primary impact of robustness failures are on reliability in 58% of 
issues studied, giving interrupted or degraded service, and on availability to provide the 
correct service in 38% of the issues studied. None of the issues were safety-related but any 
such issued may have been pre-filtered. 
A fault classification scheme was used to identify the most common type of robustness 
fault as transient faults, created in the development stage, originating outside the system, 
affecting software. This accounted for 44% of all issues and 73% of the robustness issues, 
The primary cause of this type of fault was predominantly communication errors, the most 
significant of which is the timing of interactions (race conditions, early and late interactions) 
followed by erroneous or missing input signals, spurious communications or corrupted 
messages. In a significant number of cases the precipitating cause for such communication 
errors was shut-down and re-initialisation of external systems, often due to low voltage 
transients. These types of issues were identified as the focus of robustness methods to be 
developed. 
Analysis of activation patterns of robustness failures concluded that while most were 
complex, involving 2 or 3 factors, a significant number (46%) only required a single factor or 
were permanent, i.e. if the fault occurred then so would the service delivery failure. Further 
analysis showed that in these cases either the activation factor had to be precisely controlled 
with respect to timing or level or it was combined with an elusive fault. Any robustness 
methods need cater for a variety of activation scenarios including at least 3 factors. Particular 
factors which were highlighted were user operations, low voltage transients and vehicle 
power-mode behaviour. While the study highlighted a number of important robustness 
related parameters a methodology for identifying and understanding these as part of the 
system design was identified as being desirable. 
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Design changes were made in response to the robustness issues in 88% of cases with 
these being predominantly software changes. Other common actions were specification 
changes (69%), verification method changes (62%) and FMEA updates (42%) which suggests 
these processes are not fully effective in preventing robustness issues. Hence it was identified 
that the design for robustness methods to be developed should seek to augment or improve 
these. 
The analysis of the earliest detection points suggested some opportunity to “left shift” 
detection to earlier in the development cycle before vehicles tests, particularly if viable 
model based testing approaches can be developed. 
 
8.1.4 Summary of Chapter 4 - Development of Design for Robustness Framework 
Chapter 4 utilised the learning from the case studies of robustness issues to develop a 
set of requirements for a design for robustness framework before developing the framework 
using knowledge of potential design methods from the literature review. This framework is 
shown in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1. Framework for robust design of complex automotive electronics systems 
 
The initial step in the framework is to identify key robustness parameters through 
variability analysis techniques such as review of previous design issues and parameter 
diagrams. At this stage a new technique is used of a “Robustness Case”. In a similar manner 
to a safety case the Robustness Case gives a structured argument for how robustness 
requirements are met. This serves as a structured thought experiment for the system designers 
making them consider and explicitly express robustness objectives at an early stage of the 
design. It also gives confidence to decision makers that there has been adequate consideration 
of robustness in the system design and there is traceable evidence of how robustness 
objectives have been met.  
From the development of the Robustness Case two key outcomes are derived relating to 
the design and the testing of the system. Firstly the decomposition of the top level robustness 
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goal allows specific sub-goals to be derived for the system design which then has to provide 
appropriate solutions to these. Secondly detailed verification requirements are derived to 
provide the evidence of meeting the robustness sub-goals. 
When designing the strategy of operation of a complex system, it is desirable to build 
an executable model of the relevant parts of the system and use the model to validate the 
robustness of the design before committing to its implementation. Hence the next step is to 
design and construct test artifacts at various levels of abstraction, which initially will be 
models of the operating strategy at a high level, before moving to more detailed models of 
the control and physical interactions and ultimately physical parts. In designing these test 
artifacts an input should be the design requirements identified in the robustness case as well 
as from robust design guidelines which should be embodied in standards, training and peer 
review processes.  
The next stage is conducting tests on the design artifacts modelled, physical or 
combinations thereof. A major consideration for robustness testing is the design of 
experiments which is challenging due to the exponentially large state space of complex 
systems and the large number of experimental variables. Techniques for structured pseudo 
random testing are one approach which has been employed (Dhadyalla  et al. 2010), but other 
applicable techniques include Classification Tree Method (Grochtmann, 1994)  and covering 
arrays (Dhadyalla  et al. 2013). It was also identified that formal methods, in particular model 
checkers can be used in future as these methods become mature and sufficiently lightweight. 
Data analysis of the results of robustness testing can also be challenging. This is not 
just due to the volume of data but also because the test is not looking for the expected 
response to a stimulus as in functional testing but rather whether an unexpected response has 
occurred, which by definition is more difficult to find. Therefore, as with performing the 
tests, automation of the analysis and use of data-mining tools are important. Ideally 
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continuous measures of the health of a system and its components should be used as these 
can expose areas of the test space where levels of variation or interactions cause risk without 
manifesting in customer level failures which can be the subject of more focused 
investigation. 
From the model based testing, which can be done at white box level on all modeled 
attributes, learning should be taken not just on the design of system but also what parameters 
could be made visible at a black box level which would enhance robustness testing of 
physical parts by giving a better view of component state and health. 
 
8.1.5 Summary of Chapter 5 - Development of New Robustness Techniques through 
Application to an Infotainment System 
In Chapter 5 the two novel techniques, specifically robustness cases and robustness 
modelling, were developed through application to a fiber-optic network based infotainment 
system. The chapter gave an overview of MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) which is 
a communication system with a flexible architecture designed specifically for automotive 
infotainment systems and used by many premium vehicle manufacturers. 
A robustness case for a MOST infotainment system was developed based on the 
diagrammatic technique Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) with the top level goal defined as 
“Infotainment system is acceptably robust in normal operation”. The structure of the 
robustness case followed a modular approach based on principles identified in the literature 
review of; high cohesion and low coupling, supporting work division and contractual 
boundaries, supporting future expansion and isolating change. In practice this worked well 
being able to recognise OEM and supplier relationships and utilise existing design artefacts 
from a variety of sources. The technique added value not just in providing structure to 
existing measures e.g. specifications, statements of work, but also in highlighting areas where 
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additional measures needed to be taken. The diagrammatic notation was easily understood by 
domain experts, including those to whom it was new. A further benefit was that it provided a 
mechanism to ensure that evidence e.g. results of testing, is systematically gathered and 
collated. In complex systems, especially those with legacy components, it can easily but 
wrongly be assumed that testing has been done previously resulting in system failures. The 
robustness case was constructed in around 100 hours. 
Taking the approach identified from the case studies of focusing robustness modelling 
on the ability to function, rather than the functions themselves, robustness models were 
constructed. These were initially of a generic system and subsequently a more detailed model 
of the behaviour of a nine node MOST infotainment system control channel during 
initialisation. The models were constructed using Matlab Simulink as a set of interlinked 
state machines representing the ECUs connected by signal buses representing the vehicle 
networks. This showed that it was possible to model the behaviour of the system to explore 
design alternatives to improve robustness which would not be economically viable with the 
physical system. The model exhibited emergent behaviours within the system which would 
have been unlikely to have been predicted through manual analysis. A further finding was 
that the model could enable parameters not normally observable on physical parts, e.g. 
memory buffer utilisation, to be studied. The infotainment robustness model took 
approximately 6 man months effort to develop but this included the learning effect of the 
development of the new method. 
The methods which had been developed were then described as generic approaches to 
allow re-application on a wider basis. The process steps in developing modular robustness 
case were defined as:  
Step 1. Define high level robustness goal,  
Step 2. Define argument module decomposition,  
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Step 3. Develop argument modules,  
Step 4. Review argument modules,  
Step 5. Review overall argument and   
Step 6. Correlate to design requirements.  
 
The generic methodology for the development of robustness models was explained 
with reference to a generic model structure for which the elements were described. 
 
8.1.6 Summary of Chapter 6 - Evaluation of New Robustness Techniques through 
Application to a Hybrid Propulsion Control System 
To evaluate the proposed new techniques of robustness cases and robustness modelling, 
and prove their wider applicability, they were applied to the system initialisation of a hybrid 
propulsion control system. The initialisation of the hybrid propulsion system was chosen as 
an example of a simple high level requirement that requires complex system functionality to 
deliver involving several different sub-systems and was different to the infotainment 
application used to develop the methods in that the constituent parts are not homogeneous. 
This was important in showing the methods are more generically applicable. 
The robustness argument helped identify critical design goals for robustness and the 
corresponding test requirements. A decomposition strategy broke down the argument into 
system design goals, component design goals and verification goals. The area of most focus 
was the system design which was decomposed into 10 sub-goals each of which were 
developed as argument modules which have the potential to be reusable examples of good 
practice although this would require follow-on studies to verify. Part of the argument for 
achieving the design goals was model based verification, hence the argument provided 
requirements for the system design and robustness model based verification. 
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By building an executable model of the robustness critical areas of the design, 
particularly the ability to provide customer level functionality rather than the functionality 
itself, the design could be more completely understood.  In this case the model took 
approximately 250 man hours to develop and test. Through development and testing of the 
model the design was checked for comprehensiveness and insights were gained regarding the 
underlying behaviour and the tolerable levels of variation understood.  
Four specific types of testing were undertaken as defined in the robustness case. 
Reachability tests of each state and transition, analogous to MCDC testing of software, was 
to found effective in confirming completeness of design and model. Parameter variation 
testing of robustness critical parameters was conducted including two-way testing and pseudo 
random testing. Fault injection testing, particularly with respect to when the fault occurs, was 
used to confirm particular vulnerabilities at different stages within the initialisation, fault 
reactions and recovery mechanisms.  Correlation tests were carried out when results from 
physical systems became available, which after calibration of 2 parameters showed a high 
degree of correlation between the behaviour of the model and the actual system.  
The findings were that the two techniques are highly complementary and allow the 
exploration of robustness in the early design stages both as a structured thought experiment 
and through practical testing. There were some minor updates to the structure of the generic 
model to support testing, communications between ECU blocks and to recognise that the 
system operating mode will be determined within an ECU and is therefore subject to the 
availability of the underlying processing platform.  
 
8.1.7 Summary of Chapter 7 – Discussion 
Chapter 7 firstly discussed the viability of the methods developed in answer to the 
research question of whether a viable framework of methods to substantially improve 
241 
robustness in the design of complex automotive electronics systems can be developed. To 
ensure viability the cost of implementing the proposed methods must be less than the 
expected cost of failures detected. This required analysis of what the expected cost of a 
failure could be depending on when in the product lifecycle it was found. Secondly the 
specific contributions to knowledge arising out of this work were dicussed. 
To be viable of primary concern is whether robustness is an issue with automotive 
electronics systems and are the methods developed addressing the root causes of robustness 
issues? This concern was addressed through conducting the case study reviews which showed 
that the type of issues not found through normal verification were indeed predominantly 
robustness related and gave insights of critical factors which allowed the methods to be 
targeted appropriately. 
Having confirmed the methods were well targeted, the next question was whether they 
are effective in prevention and detection of robustness issues? From the application of 
robustness cases to infotainment and hybrid propulsion systems a number of positive 
indicators of the effectiveness of the technique were observed. Firstly they brought a broad, 
structured and cohesive approach linking many diverse activities and by having this overall 
view gaps in approach were more readily apparent. The diagrammatic technique allowed the 
approach to robustness to be readily communicated and hence reviewed. Being hierarchical it 
also allowed particular areas of concern to be focused on in more detail and as the approach 
can be done early in the design phase it can identify areas of focus for subsequent design and 
verification activities. It was also noted that the method promoted a higher level of rigour in 
ensuring evidence is actively and systematically collected and reviewed rather than assumed. 
A limitation of the technique is that it is reliant on expert knowledge to ensure the robustness 
case addresses the right issues, however it does provide a mechanism for input and review by 
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range of expert stakeholders with the opportunity to systematically re-use best practice 
argument modules.  
The robustness models gave a new capability to test and optimise systems not possible 
with physical components. They allowed design alternatives to improve robustness to be 
evaluated at an early stage in the design and in doing so allowed the completeness of design 
to be assessed and the detection of errors in specification. When executed they highlighted 
emergent properties of the system not readily appreciated from a static analysis of the design. 
The models also enabled testing across a range of variability not possible with physical parts 
to be able to determine the tolerable range of variability of component performance for the 
system to meet its design objectives. A limitation of robustness modelling as with any model 
is that it can only give insights on the attributes that are modelled which again relies on 
expert judgment. 
Having gained confidence from the application projects that the methods will help to 
eliminate and detect robustness issues then an analysis was conducted of whether the likely 
benefits would justify the incremental costs of implementing the methods? This showed that 
the methods became viable at the point where they can detect a single issue which would 
otherwise have been undetected until final testing. For robustness issues, which are only 
present during particular combinations of events and occur sporadically with low occurrence 
rates, it is not unreasonable to assume they may not be detected before this stage. In the case 
of the methods of preventing or detecting an issue which otherwise could reach production, 
then they become highly viable from a cost benefit perspective with the cost of implementing 
them being a fraction of the potential cost of a rectifying single issue, even before taking into 
account potential loss of customers. 
Deployment strategies for the methods were discussed proposing an incremental 
approach focusing on known areas of risk supported by robustness specialists. The approach 
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is consistent with model based systems engineering and simplified framework for deploying 
it this in this context was illustrated and is repeated below in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Simplified framework for design for robustness 
 
Finally the contributions to knowledge were discussed. The first contribution is in the 
domain knowledge of the prevalence and causes of robustness related failures in the area of 
automotive electronics developed through the analysis of a significant number of case 
studies. The second contribution is the design for robustness framework for complex 
automotive electronic systems where previously no cohesive overall approach to robustness 
existed. The third contribution is in the adaption of methods for safety cases to robustness 
cases. The fourth contribution is in identifying an approach for modelling complex systems at 
a level of abstraction which allows robustness properties to be viably examined. 
8.2  
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8.3 Future Work 
The following sections outline specific areas identified for further work. 
 
8.3.1 Domain knowledge capture, codification and dissemination of robustness issues 
A major learning point from this work has been that is possible to develop viable methods for 
the design for robustness of complex systems, however they have to be underpinned by 
domain knowledge.  
This predominance of the importance of domain knowledge in dealing with complex 
systems is currently not reflected in the available literature containing domain knowledge, or 
as methods for systematically capturing and codify this knowledge or in specific training. 
This may be because such domain knowledge is important intellectual property in the form of 
know-how to give competitive advantage to an organisation or an individual working within 
that particular domain. A further factor is that of organisations naturally being reticent to 
publish details relating to failures with their products. However within a single organisation it 
should be possible to capture and share this knowledge for the wider benefit without 
compromising the competitive position, indeed this should reduce risk from loss of important 
knowledge and experience when individuals leave the organisation.  
A limitation of the case study is that as the base data has been given in confidence it 
was not possible to peer review and cross check the categorisation decisions. Future work 
could include correlation studies using the analysis method and categories developed on new 
data sources by more than one person to confirm the repeatability and reproducibility of the 
results. 
One potential method for capturing this knowledge is through robustness cases with 
robustness objectives to mitigate known issues and solutions representing design patterns 
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which have been found to be effective in achieving this. It was identified that the argument 
modules have potential for re-use but study of further applications of these could investigate 
the levels that can be actually achieved and the factors that promote or inhibit re-use. 
Additionally there may be other mechanisms for systematically capturing and codify domain 
knowledge which is a potential area for further work.  
8.3.2  
8.3.3 Applicability of methods to other domains 
The methods developed in this thesis have been targeted at automotive electronic 
systems but in principle could be applicable to other domains with similar issues. Potential 
areas could be information technology, consumer goods, and non-safety critical applications 
in aerospace such as in-flight infotainment systems. 
 
8.3.4 Integration of Robustness Models with Other Modelling  
As noted in the literature review SysML is increasingly being used for modelling at 
systems level but lacks detail at a behavioural level which would allow emergent behaviour 
to be detected. At a component level Matlab Simulink is increasingly being used to model 
detailed functionality from which application software can be derived through auto coding. 
By combining the architectural and systems interaction information from SysML model with 
the detailed behavioural information on existing functions from component level Matlab 
Simulink models there may be an opportunity to more rapidly develop robustness models. 
 
8.3.5 Application of formal model checkers to robustness models 
It was noted that the use of formal methods have significant potential within 
automotive and are the subject of on-going pilot and research projects focusing initially on 
high integrity applications. This should pave the way for lightweight methods and tools 
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which then can be used for robustness analysis of all systems. A potential area of future work 
is to conduct formal analysis using model checkers on robustness models which encompass 
robustness critical attributes and the knowledge of what are the specific properties that need 
to be checked to prove robustness.  
 
8.3.6 Application of Robustness Modelling Techniques to Functional Safety Analysis 
Converse to the use of techniques from safety analysis domain, such as safety cases, for 
design for robustness there also may be an opportunity to use robustness modelling 
techniques for complex systems for functional safety analysis. Through the work on 
robustness modelling a framework was developed for modelling and verifying distributed 
system functionality whereby a function is delivered through the interaction of several ECUs 
across one or more communication buses. This modelling framework could be used for 
modelling the behaviour of safety critical functions across a distributed system which could 
be for checking completeness of functional specifications, early detection of emergent 
behaviour and as evidence to support a safety case analogous to the interaction between the 
robustness case and robustness models. 
 
8.3.7 Abuse case elicitation techniques 
An issue identified in the case studies was that of unforeseen use cases where the user 
deviated from intended operation of the system. This is an inherent risk where complex 
systems are used by untrained users. A potential area for further work is in the development 
of a structured methodology for elicitation techniques for unintended use cases of automotive 
systems. 
 
247 
REFERENCES 
 
Afzal, W., Torkar, R., and Feldt, R. (2009). A systematic review of search-based testing for 
non-functional system properties. Information and Software Technology, 51(6), 957-976. 
Amor-Segan, M. L., McMurran, R., Dhadyalla, G., and Jones, R. P. (2007). Towards the self 
healing vehicle. In Automotive Electronics, 2007 3rd Institution of Engineering and 
Technology Conference on (pp. 1-7). IET.  
Andrews Z, Ingram C, Payne R, Romanovsky A, Holt J and Perry S. (2014). Traceable 
Engineering of Fault-Tolerant SoSs. In: INCOSE International Symposium 2014. 2014, 
Nevada, USA: International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). 
Arshad, N., Heimbigner, D., and Wolf, A. L. (2004). A planning based approach to failure 
recovery in distributed systems. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGSOFT workshop on 
Self-managed systems (pp. 8-12). ACM.  
Artop (2013). AUTOSAR tool platform. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from http://www.artop.org 
Arora, A., and Gouda, M. (1994). Distributed reset. Computers, IEEE Transactions on, 43(9), 
1026-1038. 
Avižienis, A., Laprie, J. C., Randell, B., & Landwehr, C. (2004). Basic concepts and 
taxonomy of dependable and secure computing. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE 
Transactions on, 1(1), 11-33. 
ATESST2 (2010) ATESST2 project brochure. Available from ATESST project website. 
Retrieved May 9, 2013, from http://www.atesst.org 
248 
AUTOSAR (2013), AUTOSAR.  Retrieved May 29, 2013, from http://www.autosar.org  
Barker, S, Kendall, I. and Darlison. A. (1997). Safety cases for software-intensive systems: an 
industrial experience report. In Safe Comp 97 (pp. 332-342). Springer London. 
Bar-Yam,Y., Allison, M., Batdorf, R., Chen, H., Generazio, H. Singh, H., Tucker, S. (2004). 
The characteristics and emerging behaviors of system of systems.  NECSI: Complex 
Physical, Biological and Social Systems Project, Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE 
International Conference on System of Systems Engineering, Los Angeles, CA, USA - 
April 2006. 
Bates, S., Bate, I. J., Hawkins, R. D., Kelly, T. P., and McDermid, J. A. (2003). Safety case 
architectures to complement a contract-based approach to designing safe systems. In 21st 
International System Safety Conference, System Safety Society. 
Becci, G., Dhadyalla, G., Mouzakitis, A., Marco, J., and Moore, A. D. (2013). Robustness 
testing of real-time automotive systems using sequence covering arrays. SAE International 
Journal of Passenger Cars-Electronic and Electrical Systems, 6(1), 287-293. 
Blochwitz, T., Otter, M., Akesson, J., Arnold, M., Clauß, C., Elmqvist, H., Freidrich, M., 
Junghanns, A., Mauss, J., Neumerkel, D., Olsson, H., and Viel, A. (2012). Functional 
Mockup Interface 2.0: The standard for tool independent exchange of simulation models. 
In 9th International Modelica Conference, Munich. 
Boardman, J. (2006). System of Systems – the meaning of of. Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE 
International Conference on System of Systems Engineering, Los Angeles, CA, USA - 
April 2006.  
249 
Box, G.E.P. (2000). CQPI Report No 179 Statistics for discovery. Center for Quality and 
Productivity Improvement (CQPI), University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. 
Retrieved April 7, 2013, from http://www.engr.wisc.edu/centers/cqpi/  
Bringmann, E., and Krämer, A. (2006, May). Systematic testing of the continuous behavior of 
automotive systems. In Proceedings of the 2006 international workshop on Software 
engineering for automotive systems (pp. 13-20). ACM. 
Broenink, J. F., Kleijn, C., Larsen, P. G., Jovanovic, D., Verhoef, M., and Pierce, K. (2010). 
Design support and tooling for dependable embedded control software. In Proceedings of 
the 2nd International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (pp. 77-
82). ACM. 
Brown, S. (2000). Overview of IEC 61508. Design of electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems. Computing and Control Engineering Journal, 11(1), 6-
12. 
Bryans J, Fitzgerald J, Payne R, and Kristensen K. (2014). Maintaining Emergence in 
Systems of Systems Integration: a Contractual Approach using SysML. In: INCOSE 
International Symposium (IS2014). 2014, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Butler, R,. Finelli, G. (1991). The infeasibility of experimental quantification of life-critical 
software reliability. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, Vol. 16, pp.66–76. 
Charette, R. N. (2009). This car runs on code. IEE Spectrum, Feb 2009. 
Chen, D., Feng, L., Qureshi, T. N., Lönn, H., and Hagl, F. (2013). An architectural approach 
to the analysis, verification and validation of software intensive embedded systems. 
Computing, 1-40. Springer-Verlag. 
250 
Coleman, J. W., Malmos, A. K., Larsen, P. G., Peleskay, J., Hains, R., Andrews, Z., ... and 
Didier, A. (2012). COMPASS tool vision for a system of systems collaborative 
development environment. In System of Systems Engineering (SoSE), 2012 7th 
International Conference on (pp. 451-456). IEEE. 
Cuenot, P., Gerard, S., Lonn, H., Reiser, M. O., Servat, D., Sjostedt, C. J,  Kolagari, R.T.,  
Törngren, M. and Weber, M. (2007). Managing complexity of automotive electronics 
using the East-ADL. In Engineering Complex Computer Systems, 2007. 12th IEEE 
International Conference on (pp. 353-358). IEEE.  
Despotou, G. (2011). Introducing the challenges of dependable systems of systems. 
Workshop on Dependable Systems of Systems, University of York, 5-6 September 2011. 
Dhadyalla, G., McMurran, R., Amor-Segan, M., Li, W., Talbot, K., Jones, R.P. (2010). 
Robustness testing against low voltage transients - a novel approach. SAE Technical 
Paper 2010-01-0195, 2010, doi: 10.4271/2010-01-0195. 
Dhadyalla, G. (2013). “Robustness testing of real-time automotive systems using sequence 
covering arrays”. SAE 2013 World Congress and Exhibition, Paper 13AE-0121, April, 
2013, Detroit, Michigan, USA. 
Despotou, G., and Kelly, T. (2004). Extending the safety case concept to address 
dependability. In Proceedings of the 22nd International System Safety Conference (pp. 
645-654). System Safety Society Publications, P.O. Box 70, Unionville, VA 22567-0070. 
Driscoll, K., Hall, B., Sivencrona, H., and Zumsteg, P. (2003). Byzantine fault tolerance, 
from theory to reality. In Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (pp. 235-248). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
251 
Fernandez, J. C., Mounier, L., and Pachon, C. (2005). A model-based approach for 
robustness testing. In Testing of Communicating Systems (pp. 333-348). Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
Fitzgerald, J. S., Larsen, P. G., Pierce, K. G., and Verhoef, M. H. G. (2013). A formal 
approach to collaborative modelling and co-simulation for embedded systems. 
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 23(04), 726-750. 
Fitzgerald, J., Larsen, P. G., and Woodcock, J. (2014). Foundations for Model-Based 
Engineering of Systems of Systems. In Complex Systems Design & Management (pp. 1-
19). Springer International Publishing. 
Frischkorn, H. (2004). Automotive software the silent revolution. Automotive Software 
Workshop, San Diego, 2004. Retrieved May 28, 2013, from  
http://aswsd.ucsd.edu/2004/program.html 
Fritzsche, R. (2006). Using parameter-diagrams in automotive engineering. ATZ worldwide, 
108, no.6 (2006), 17-21. 
GENIVI (2013), GENIVI website. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from http://www.genivi.org 
Grochtmann, M., Grimm, K. and Wegener, J. (1993). Tool-supported test case design for 
black-box testing by means of the classification-tree editor. Proceedings of EuroSTAR, 
93, 169-176. 
Grzemba. A, ed. (2008). MOST - the automotive multimedia network., Editor Prof. Dr. Ing. 
Andreas Grzemba, 2008 Franzis Verlag Gmbh, 85586 Poing, ISBN 973-3-7723-5316-1, 
Retrieved Jan 20, 2009, from http://www.mostcooperation.com 
252 
GSN  Working Group (2011).  GSN Community Standard Version 1 November 2011. 
Retrieved May 30, 2014, from http://www.goalstructuringnotation.info 
GSN Working Group (2012).  GSN Working Group Online - resources tools.  Retrieved Feb 
2, 2012, from http://www.goalstructuringnotation.info 
Habli, I., Hawkins, R., and Kelly, T. (2010). Software safety: relating software assurance and 
software integrity. International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems, 1(4), 364-
383.  
Habli, I., Ibarra, I., Rivett, R., and Kelly, T. (2010). Model-based assurance for justifying 
automotive functional safety. In Proc. 2010 SAE World Congress. 
Hank, P., Suermann, T., Müller, S. (2012) Automotive Ethernet, a Holistic Approach for a 
Next Generation In-Vehicle Networking Standard,  Advanced Microsystems for 
Automotive Applications 2012, pp 79-89 
Hayhurst, K., Veerhusen, D., Chilenski, J., Rierson, L.(2001). A practical tutorial on 
Modified Condition/ Decision Coverage. NASA Scientific and Technical Information 
(STI) Program Office Report NASA/TM-2001-210876, May 2001. 
Heinecke, H., Damm, W., Josko, B.; Metzner, A., Kopetz, H., Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, A., 
Di Natale, M. (2008). Software components for reliable automotive systems design, 
automation and test in Europe. DATE '08 , vol., no., pp.549,554, 10-14 March 2008. 
Highsmith, J. (2004). Agile project management. Addison-Wesley ISBN 0-321-21977-5, 
2004. 
253 
Hyung-Taek L, Volker, L., Herrscher, D. (2011). Challenges in a future IP/Ethernet-based 
in-car network for real-time applications. Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2011 
48th ACM/EDAC/IEEE , vol., no., pp.7,12, 5-9 June 2011. 
Huang,Y., McMurran,R., Dhadyalla, G., Jones, R.P. (2009). Automated functional and 
robustness testing of vehicle infotainment systems. SAE 2009-01-1366, April 2009. 
Huang, Y., McMurran, R., Amor-Segan, M., Dhadyalla, G., Jones, R.P., Bennett, P., 
Mouzakitis, A., and Kieloch, J. (2010). Development of an automated testing system for 
vehicle infotainment system. The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology Volume 1 / 1985 - Volume 51 / 2010. 
Forder, R. (2012). What is model based system engineering.  INCOSE UK Leaflet Z9 Issue 
1.0 January 2012, Retrieved April 27, 2013, from http://www.incoseonline.org.uk 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2005). IEC/TR 61508 – Functional safety 
of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. Published in UK 
by  the British Standards Institute, ISBN 978 0 580 50917 9. 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) (2011). ISO26262 - Road vehicles — functional 
safet., Published in UK by  the British Standards Institute, ISBN 978 0 580 62303 5. 
Jackson, D., Thomas, M., and Millett, L. I. (Eds.) (2007). Software for Dependable Systems: 
Sufficient Evidence? National Academies Press. 
Jaguar-Land-Rover (2013). Jaguar Land-Rover Careers. 
http://www.jaguarlandrovercareers.com - accessed 29/9/13 
254 
J.D.Power (2013). 2013 Vehicle Dependability Survey Press release. 
www.jdpower.com/dependability - accessed 18/10/13. 
Johannesson, P., Bergman, B., Svensson, T., Arvidsson, M., Lönnqvist, Å., Barone, S., and 
Maré, J. (2013). A Robustness Approach to Reliability. Quality and Reliability 
Engineering International, 29(1), 17-32. 
Kelly, T. P. (2001). Concepts and principles of compositional safety case construction. 
Contract Research Report for QinetiQ COMSA/2001/1/1. 
Kelly, T. P., and McDermid, J. A. (1997). Safety case construction and reuse using patterns. 
In Safe Comp 97 (pp. 55-69). Springer London.  
Kelly, T., and Weaver, R. (2004). The goal structuring notation–a safety argument notation. 
In Proceedings of the Dependable Systems and Networks 2004 Workshop on Assurance 
Cases.  
Knight, J., Heimbigner, D., Wolf, A. L., Carzaniga, A., Hill, J., Devanbu, P., and Gertz, M. 
(2001). The Willow architecture: comprehensive survivability for large-scale 
distributed applications. Colorado Univ at Boulder, Dept of Computer Science. 
Knüchel, C., Rudorfer, M., Voget, S., Eberle, S., Sezestre, R., Loyer, A. (2010). Artop – An 
ecosystem approach for collaborative AUTOSAR tool development.  ERTS 2010, 
Toulouse, May 2010. 
Kopetz, H. (1999). Elementary versus composite interfaces in distributed real-time systems. 
In The Fourth International Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized Systems, IEEE 
Computer Society, Tokyo, Japan, March1999. 1,14,15. 
255 
Kopetz, H. (2011). Real-time systems - design principles for distributed embedded 
applications. Second Edition, Springer, ISBN 978-1-4419-8236-0, 2011. 
Lamport, L., Shostak, R., and Pease, M. (1982). The Byzantine generals problem. ACM 
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), 4(3), 382-401. 
Larman, C. (2004). Agile and iterative development. Addison-Wesley ISBN 0-13-111155-8, 
2004. 
Lehmann, E., and Wegener, J. (2000). Test case design by means of the CTE XL. In 
Proceedings of the 8th European International Conference on Software Testing, Analysis 
and Review (EuroSTAR 2000), Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Lehmann, E. (2000). Time partition testing: A method for testing dynamic functional 
behaviour. Proceedings of TEST2000, London, Great Britain. 
Leyuan, S., Chun-Hung, C., Enver, Y. (1999). Simultaneous simulation experiments and 
nested partition for discrete resource allocation in supply chain management. Proceedings 
of the 31st conference on Winter simulation: Phoenix, Arizona, United States, Volume 1 
Pages: 395 – 401, 1999, ISBN:0-7803-5780-9. 
Li, Z., Sim, C. H., and  Low, M. Y. H. (2006). A survey of emergent behavior and its impacts 
in agent-based systems. In Industrial Informatics, 2006 IEEE International Conference on 
(pp. 1295-1300). IEEE. 
Lisagor, O., Pretzer, M., Seguin, C., Pumfrey, D. J., Iwu, F. and Peikenkamp, T. (2006). 
towards safety analysis of highly integrated technologically heterogeneous systems – a 
domain-based approach for modelling system failure logic. In 24th International System 
Safety Conference (ISSC), August 2006. 
256 
Lissack, M., Roos, J. (2000). The next common sense: the e-manager's guide to mastering 
complexity. Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 2000. 
Littlewood, B., Strigini, L. (1993). Validation of ultrahigh dependability for software-based 
systems, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 36, No. 11, pp.69–80. 
Lucas, Chris. (2000). Quantifying complexity theory. CALResCo Group. Retrieved April 7, 
2013, from http://www.calresco.org/lucas/quantify.htm 
Maier, M.W. (1998). Architecting principles for systems of systems. Systems Engineering, 
Vol. 1, No. 4, 1998, pp. 267-284. 
Marstaller, R. (2013). Potentials of function network analysis on vehicle level. 3rd 
International Conference Applying ISO 26262, Munich, March 2003. 
Matsubara, M., Sakurai, M., Narisawa. F., Enshoiwa, M., Yamane, Y. and Yamanaka, H. 
(2013). Application of model checking to automotive control software with slicing 
technique. SAE 2013 World Congress, paper 2013-01-0436, Published 04/08/2013. 
McConnell, S. (2004). Code complete. 2nd Edition, Microsoft Press, 2004. 
McMurran, R., Jones, R.P. (2010) “Robustness Modelling of Automotive Electrical Systems 
of Systems”, FISITA 2010, 30th May - 4th June 2010, Budapest, Hungary. 
McMurran, R., Leslie, J. (2010) “MOST Control Channel Modelling”, MOST Forum 2010, 
23rd March 2010, Frankfurt Germany, Reprinted in Elektronik automotive March 2010 
Special issue MOST. 
257 
McMurran, R., Jones, R. (2013) “Robustness Modelling of Complex Systems - Application to 
the Initialisation of a Hybrid Electric Vehicle Propulsion System” SAE Technical 
Paper 2013-01-1231, 2013, doi:10.4271/2013-01-1231. 
McMurran, R. McKinney, F. Tudor, N. Milam, W. P. (2006). Dependable systems of systems. 
SAE Transactions 2007, Vol 115; Part 7, pages 287-294, ISBN   ISSN 0096-736X. 
Meyer, B. (1997). Object oriented software construction. 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
Mössinger, J. (2010). Software in automotive systems. IEEE Software, Volume:27 ,  Issue: 2, 
ISSN 0740-7459, 2010.  
MOST Cooperation (2005). MOST Specification Rev 2.4. MOST Cooperation, Karlesruhe, 
Germany, May 2005. Retrieved Jan 20, 2009, from the MOST Co-operation website 
http://www.mostcooperation.com 
NASA (2011). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Toyota unintended 
acceleration investigation. NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical 
Assessment Report, NESC Assessment #: TI-10-00618. 
Oasis (2003). OS8104 MOST network transceiver final product data sheet. Oasis Silicon 
Systems, Jan 2003. 
Oliveira M., Sampaio A., Antonino P., RamosR., Cavalcanti A. and Woodcock J. (2012). 
Compositional analysis and design of CML Models. COMPASS Deliverable Number: 
D24.1, Version: 0.4, March, 2012, Retrieved March 21, 2013, from 
http://www.compass-research.eu 
258 
Palin, R., and Habli, I. (2010). Assurance of automotive safety–a safety case approach. In 
Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (pp. 82-96). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Pande, Peter S., Neuman, Robert P., Roland R. Cavanagh (2001). The Six Sigma way: how 
GE, Motorola, and other top companies are honing their performance. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill Professional. ISBN 0071358064. 
Ponticel, P. (2013). Global viewpoints – North America brands are king. Interview with 
Mark Chernoby – Senior VP Engineering Chrysler, Automotive Engineering 
International, April 2, 2013, SAE International.   
Powell, D. (2010). A generic fault-tolerant architecture for real-time dependable systems. 
Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated. 
Pretschner, A., Broy, M., Krüger, I.H., Stauner, T.  (2007). Software engineering for 
automotive systems: a roadmap. FOSE '07 2007 Future of Software Engineering. 
Rajeev, A. C., Mohalik,S.,  Ramesh, S., (2013). Design verification of automotive controller 
models. SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars – Electron. Electr. Syst. 6(2):2013, doi:10.4271/2013-
01-0428. 
Rao, A. C., McMurran, R., and Jones, R. P. (2009). A critical analysis of model-based formal 
verification efforts within the automotive industry. SAE International Journal of 
Passenger Cars-Electronic and Electrical Systems, 1(1), 77-83. 
Rau, M., Weiß, P. (2008) Development of an automotive standard with focus on functional 
safety (ISO 26262). Proceedings FISITA 2008. 
259 
Reichart, G.  Heinecke, H. (2006). Systemintegration – im wechselspiel von architektur 
technologie und prozess. 10. Jahrestagung Euroforum 07.02.2006.  
Reuters (2013). GM recalls about 33,700 vehicles to fix software issue. Reuters. Retrieved 
May 30, 2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/20/us-gm-recall-
idUSBRE92J0HC20130320 
Ricardo (2013). PICASSOS project press release. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from 
http://www.ricardo.com/en-GB/News--Media/Press-releases/News-
releases1/2013Rivett, R. (2013). The OEM/supplier relationship: An OEM perspective. 
3rd International Conference Applying ISO 26262, Munich, March 2003. 
Rushby, J. (2002). An overview of formal verification for the time-triggered architecture. 
Invited paper presented at FTRTFT’02, Oldenburg, Germany, September 2002. 
Springer-Verlag LNCS Vol. 2469, pp. 83–105. Springer-Verlag. 
SAE Automotive Quality and Process Improvement Committee (2009). J1739 Potential 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA), Potential Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA). SAE 
International. 
Schedl, A. (2007). Goals and architecture of Flexray at BMW. In slides presented at the 
Vector FlexRay Symposium 2007. 
Scheickl,O, Ainhauser, C. and Gliwa, P. (2012). Tool support for seamless system 
development based on AUTOSAR timing extensions. ERTS 2012 - Embedded Real 
Time Software and Systems, Toulouse, February 2012. 
260 
Schulz, A. P., and Fricke, E. (1999). Incorporating flexibility, agility, robustness, and 
adaptability within the design of integrated systems-key to success? In Digital Avionics 
Systems Conference, 1999. Proceedings. 18th (Vol. 1, pp. 1-A). IEEE. 
Stolle, R., Salzmann, C. and Tillmann S. (2006). Mastering complexity through modelling 
and early prototyping. 7. Euroforum-Jahrestagung Software im Automobile, May 2006. 
Taylor, J.E., Amor-Segan, M., Dhadyalla, G. and Jones, R.P. (2012) Discerning the 
operational state of a vehicle’s distributed electronic systems from vehicle network 
traffic for use as a fault detection and diagnosis tool. AVEC 2012, 9-12 Sept 2012, 
Seoul, South Korea. 
Thompson, W, (Lord Kelvin) (1904). Baltimore lectures on molecular dynamics and the 
wave theory of light. 1904. 
Toyota (2011). Toyota Annual Report 2011. Toyota Motor Company. Retrieved November 
19, 2013, from http://www.toyota-global.com/investors/financial_result/2011/  
Wang, W., Wu, J. Y-T. and Lust, R. V. (1997). Deterministic design reliability-based design 
and robust design. MSC 1997 Aerospace Users' Conference Proceedings. Retrieved 
May 30, 2013, from www.mscsoftware.com 
Warranty Direct Reliability Index (2013). Manufacturer ratings – electrical. Retrieved May 
29, 2013, http://www.reliabilityindex.com/manufacturer/Electrical  
Weaver, W. (1948). Science and complexity. In American Scientist, 36: 536 (1948). 
Woodcock, J., Larsen, P. G., Bicarregui, J., & Fitzgerald, J. (2009). Formal methods: 
Practice and experience. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 41(4), 19. 
261 
Yang, K. and El-Haik, B. (2003). Design for Six Sigma - a roadmap for product development. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
262 
Appendix 1 - Infotainment Robustness Case 
Infotainment Robustness Case - Top Level Argument 
  
263 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument Module for Robustness of Operating System  
 
264 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Function Implementation Argument 
 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Function Integration Argument 
 
265 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Node Hardware 
 
266 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of MOST Physical Layer 
 
267 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Network Interface Controller 
 
268 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Net Services 
 
269 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Integration of Application 
Layer Interface to Net Services  
270 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Initialisation Behaviour 
 
271 
Infotainment Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness of Shutdown Behaviour 
 
 
272 
Appendix 2 – Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Top Level Argument 
 
273 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Overall System Design Argument 
 
274 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Sporadic 
Voltage Loss   
 
275 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for System Robustness to State 
Hang-Ups  
 
276 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Sporadic Loss of 
Communication  
 
277 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Loss of 
Synchronisation Between Corresponding State Machines  
 
278 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to User Inputs  
 
279 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Variations in 
Response Times from Sub-Functions  
 
280 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness Due to Loss of 
Voltage During Flash Memory Writeback 
281 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Incomplete 
Initialisation 
 
282 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Robustness to Incomplete 
Shutdown 
 
283 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for System Observability to 
Support Grey Box Testing  
 
284 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for System Verification Approach  
 
285 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Model Based Test Strategy  
 
286 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for HIL Testing  
 
287 
Hybrid System Initialisation Robustness Case – Argument for Vehicle Based Test Strategy 
  
